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INTRODUCTION
The Institute of Southern African Studies commemorated the occasion of its Tenth 
Anniversary in 1990 with a series of activities intended to capture the mandate for 
which it was established. One of the activities for that occasion was to hold a three 
day workshop for retrospection and for a critical review of the Institute’s future 
direction in the context of the Southern African region in the 1990s.
The papers in this publication form a debate on the essential future character of 
research activities and the direction the Institute should consider in its quest to 
provide the country and the region with relevant and reliable studies, as well as 
high-level manpower training in Southern African studies. The document is an 
evidence of transformation, a process of growth and a demonstration of unusual 
ability to respond to the research problems from a multidisciplinary dimension.
At the time the Institute was conceived, a number of Southern African countries 
such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia were under firm colonial racist 
domination. The concern of the period was therefore directed at self-sufficiency 
and self-reliance within a heightened apartheid system in South Africa. Then the 
Institute hosted a regional workshop whose main objective was to "advise the 
newly-established institute" in setting its research priorities.
The commemoration of the tenth anniversary occurs at a time of universal 
expectancy, having reached an extraordinary juncture in the history of Southern 
Africa. The political and economic ideologies which shackled the governments of 
Southern African countries, the false democracies, are all showing gaping cracks 
of imminent collapse.
The wars of dispersion, the discriminatory and derogatory statutes shuttered the 
nations and social order of Southern Africa. Although from the 1960s to the early 
80s our hopes were raised as each Southern African country shed its colonial yoke, 
the oppression both in body and spirit did not seem to ease. We faced one another 
with mutual suspicion and enmity. We killed each other without a qualm. As we 
mused on the dangers looming over our region and amongst our nations the future 
prospects seemed dark indeed. Now, almost overnight, the regional prospects have 
begun to change! The hard mould of apartheid history is being dissolved and 
reshaped before our eyes. The threat of total-onslaughthas began to recede and the
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seeds of a new freedom have begun to germinate. There is a challenge to the old 
discriminatory systems which brought so much harm and hardship to countless 
Southern Africans. Perhaps never before have the Southern African peoples 
experienced such a responsive period so important for its future as the present 
transition. The central question is what does it mean for us? What are the 
possibilities and dangers? More important therefore, is, what is in store for the 
scholar community dedicated to scientific investigation expected to unravel the 
tangled scene? Are these events amenable to our current repertoires of skills or 
should we explore more innovative and responsive approaches?
This publication represents a selected collection of papers from the workshop, and 
edited within the Institute of Southern African Studies. The volume represents a 
multi-disciplinary suggestions on research areas which the Institute should consider 
for the last decade of the twentieth century. In most cases the papers highlight 
areas likely to require immediate attention of scholars and each subject area is 
discussed from a multi-disciplinary dimension, both the character of the problem 
and the approaches to tackle them are broad based. Although the authors come 
from varied ideological backgrounds each paper attempts a consolidated approach. 
Therefore, the papers are not a presentation of a certain theoretical and analytical 
school, but are more eclectic in approach.
The Institute decided to publish these papers for a number of reasons. It is hoped 
that the publication will provide the wider community with the information on what 
the Institute is about and what it has to offer and will promote academic exchange 
and discussion within and between the Institute and the region it is serving. It is 
also hoped that policy makers and planners will be encouraged to make use of the 
Institute’s resources and skills.
The publication is divided into six parts. The introductory part serves to acquaint 
the reader with the history and the role of the Institute in the solution of problems 
through research and the best possible ways to disseminate research findings. The 
second part deals with the socio-cultural environment of Southern Africa especially 
with regard to development in the region and the different research approaches.
The third part focuses on economic development issues and the endeavours in 
strategies for regional cooperation for economic liberation. Implication of
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population dynamics, educational and health issues which affect or influence 
development are also discussed. The fourth part discusses industrial and labour 
issues in the region and in Lesotho in particular. The fifth part examines factors 
that have affected political development in Southern Africa. While the sixth and 
final part deals with areas of science and technology, an area often neglected in the 
predominantly social science and humanity oriented small universities. Where there 
are science and technology institutes, these operate in isolation from the social 
scientists, educationists and lawyers.
The workshop as well as the publication were made possible by the generous 
sponsorship of IDRC, Ford Foundation, SAREC and USIS and by the cooperation 
of the organizers, the support of participants from the region and locally.
On behalf of the Institute of Southern African Studies and the National University 
of Lesotho, I would like to express our deep gratitude for the assistance, 
cooperation and support magnanimously given during this time.
G.M. Malahleha 
Director
Institute for Southern African Studies 
December 1992.
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SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE 1980s
AND BEYOND
FRANK BAFFOE 
Frank Baffoe and Associates (PTY) Ltd., Maseru
On this auspicious occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Institute of Southern 
African Studies (ISAS), I want to join all those wishing the Institute a clearer 
vision of hopes and commitment to the mission of its founding fathers. The 
mission of ISAS to serve as a research and high-level manpower training centre 
in Southern African studies in the subregion still remains a noble one.
I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to the Director of ISAS, Dr G.M. 
Malahleha, for the kind invitation to deliver this keynote address. It was both an 
honour and a privilege, and I therefore accepted it with great humility. It is my 
sincere belief that there are more suitable and more competent people who could 
perform this function. I am however, undaunted by this thought because I view 
my role on this occasion today as a challenge.
The invitation to deliver a keynote address provides a remarkable opportunity to 
present a mind at work on a burning subject of contemporary interest and concern 
- Southern Africa. I wish to use this unique opportunity to present some of my 
personal thoughts about recent events and pressing problems facing the subregion. 
In doing this I shall be mindful of the difference between the image of a future that 
one wants and the image of the future which is bound to become a reality.
Time flies! ISAS is now ten years old without our consent. It seems like yesterday 
when some of us had the privilege of serving as midwives to ISAS’ birth. Time 
indeed flies, but what does this trite old saying really mean?
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I think that the important thing is not the speed of time; it is what takes place in 
time and space. The direction of the change and its content are of critical 
importance. This means that we first have to be able to tell what is the substance 
of the changes which are going on around us. We can solve a problem only if we 
have defined it properly, and often its definition is half the solution.
Let me illustrate this with an experience I had some 18 years ago at the Makerere 
University in Uganda. I was lecturing to a class of 290 students during Idi Amin’s 
reign of dictatorship and societal terror. Amin’s mobilising political slogan was: 
"We are moving at a supersonic speed". We lived then in fear and in a subdued 
atmosphere of uncertainty. One day I questioned my students in class as to the 
meaning of the slogan. Was I risking my life at the time? With hindsight, I think 
1 was simply naive. Since no student braved an answer, I drew their attention to 
the fact that Amin had not told the Ugandans the direction the supersonic 
movement was taking. Yes indeed, it could be forward in progress or backward 
in destruction. We now know what happened.
The failure of the dons of Makerere University to use their critical research 
capacity to focus on the essence of Uganda’s societal, political, power and 
economic dynamics resulted as a matter of fact in their conferring on Idi Amin an 
honorary Ph.D in March 1976. The eulogy on the occasion included the 
statement: "Never in history has a leader done so much for his people in so short 
a time".
It has been suggested that the phrase from his people should have read to his 
people, because this would be a more appropriate epitaph of Amin’s eight-year 
reign of terror.
Let me now return to some other facts. I want to single out some of those that can 
help us define one of the major themes of changes in Southern Africa. The first 
is the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime in the mid-1970s. The formal 
political independence of Angola and Mozambique dealt a heavy blow to the naive 
belief that "Westerners were civilised; non-Westemers were natives in the sense 
that they had no human rights", and, by the same token, Western civilisation, in 
whatever sense defined, had come to stay.
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Internationally, the 1970s reflected an era of a socioeconomic syndrome consisting 
of economic growth expectations, a consumption orientation, the reliance on 
international prerequisites such as free trade and convertibility as well as national 
full employment and social welfare. The position of the countries of the 
developing world was extremely marginalised. They were just pawns in the 
international political, economic and military power game.
The political achievements of the 1970s not only brought forth the venom of 
international exploitation but also the verve of a people committed to regaining 
their birthright as a means of fulfilling the potential of their human life-changes. 
This process culminated in the political independence of Zimbabwe. It took a full 
decade thereafter for Namibia to regain its political independence in the midst of 
devastating destabilisation in the subregion, and regional economic and political 
regrouping in Europe, North America and Far East Asia. Namibia’s independence 
should be seen as a vital aspect of the evolving new Southern Africa.
The new Southern Africa will be weighed down by the heavy hands of history. 
The existing socioeconomic, political and power structures deny many people the 
basic opportunities of participating in the life of society: a minimum income, 
education and training, housing, social security and citizenship rights.
Since the prevalent structures prevent the realisation of our human life-changes, 
the task is to listen to those who question established assumptions and values, and 
indeed work towards the creation of a general sociopolitical environment which 
allows the majority a hearing. To do this we must not only break out of the glass- 
and-conc'rete towers of administrative and institutional structures but we must also 
shatter our ossified thinking patterns. This is an agenda of change with 
improvement, a change in attitudes.
I have not mentioned the most important development within Southern Africa. 
The past 13 months, and especially the past 8 months, have been months of hope 
because of the crumbling of the apartheid system. I insist however, that they must 
equally be months of decisions both in South Africa and in Southern Africa. 
Apartheid is crumbling and the options are staring squarely at us.
So far there has been an uneasy feeling. We are all standing on the banks 
watching the changing tides, looking with great interest and excitement to see what 
course the racing torrent of Southern African history is going to take. We are all
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following the events taking place, particularly in South Africa, full of hope but not 
without a sense of fear and anxiety because we seem to be unable to control the 
course of events. We keep on asking: What will be the outcome of the process 
of negotiation in South Africa?
Many an idea or ideology has been proven wrong and ineffective, many a doctrine 
has proved to be false. Apartheid and the one-party system are living examples. 
We can therefore not hide behind the memories of ideals, using them as shields. 
The building blocks of the old world of Southern Africa are crumbling and they 
will soon be lying in a heap of rubble waiting for a master-builder (or master- 
builders) to put them together again, but in a new edifice. Remember the saying: 
Facts are not what counts in history; what counts is how people assess them and 
act upon them.
This brings me back to the reason we have gathered here today. I am assured that 
the main purpose of the workshop is to review the research activities of the 
Institute during the past ten years, the issues it has been addressing and the way 
it has been managing its activities. In the light of the established past experiences, 
it is envisaged that the workshop will also establish a research agenda for Southern 
Africa during the 1990s.
I purposely do not want to preempt the research recommendations that will 
emanate from the various sub-themes which cover areas like political development, 
regional security, destabilisation, hegemony of South Africa, regional cooperation, 
the structural adjustment programme (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund, 
agricultural development, industrial and investment policies, labour migrancy, 
cultural issues, ethnicity and gender, education, population, health, science and 
technology.
I sincerely believe that those dealing with the sub-themes are competent enough 
to enlighten us on their various areas of specialisation. The Director’s remarks are 
also educative.
In spite of this observation, I take the liberty of putting forward my own thoughts 
on the future of ISAS in terms of fulfilling its mandate of research and teaching.
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My point of departure is that research is a complex subject, having many 
dimensions in many different fields of knowledge. 1 am talking about scientific 
enquiry which is more equivalent to the German word Wissenschaft embracing all 
knowledge - arts and humanities as well as natural science.
The history of research development, beginning with the cave man, parallels, for 
the most part, the history of human achievement. Research is a technique 
resulting in knowledge accumulation, an accumulation that has built the modem 
world. By the same token, business and government require a high order of 
problem-solving skills to meet the demands of place to work and live. The role 
of research as a problem-solver has become increasingly important to all societies 
and economies.
It must be emphasised at this juncture that those days are gone when a national 
economy could compete successfully in the global economic game on the basis of 
its natural resource endowment. As a matter of fact, the emergence of the global 
economy implies that a nation’s (or a region’s) competitiveness is now determined 
not so much by the availability of natural resources as by its ability to generate and 
deploy new knowledge.
Can we here today say of ISAS that it has effectively efficiently contributed to the 
subregion’s ability to generate and deploy new knowledge so as to improve and 
strengthen its competitiveness in the global game of economics and politics? We 
definitely will not deny the fact that ISAS has a vital role to play. The pertinent 
question is how?
I want to remind you of the keynote address given by Dr Michael M. Sefali, then 
Director of ISAS, at a Workshop on Research Priorities in Southern Africa, held 
at ISAS, November 23-27, 1981. While Dr. Sefali could apologetically say then 
that "the weak scientific and technological basis inherited from the colonial past 
is still another major constraint on the development process" in the subregion, any 
attempt to rationalise the appalling research capacity today will only betray our 
incapacity to learn to act. We all have ideas but none of us is prepared to pay the 
price.
It is not enough to have a research institute like ISAS; behind it there must be 
systems and programmes operating efficiently and effectively and a state of mind
conducive to decision-making; and there must be processes which galvanise the 
dynamic forces of society.
My contention is that ISAS cannot accomplish its mandate within the existing 
context of physical and other infrastructural facilities as well as of the available 
human resource capabilities for developing science and technology. For ISAS to 
be able to promote and coordinate research projects dealing with Southern African 
matters, it must have a solid infrastructural foundation for science and technology. 
The issue is essentially expenditure on research and development.
The starting point is to develop ISAS as an organisation whose focus shifts from 
the academic, ivory tower environment into a market-oriented research 
organisation. This will mean injecting business principles into the research and 
teaching programmes of ISAS.
There is no reason why the business community in the subregion would not fund 
research and development activities in ISAS if these activities would enhance the 
competitiveness of the sector. The Institute must be restructured to offer research 
and development services on commercial basis. The subregion is in dire need of 
innovative science and technology-driven growth and development. There is 
abundant testimony to the vital link between the implementation of the fruits of 
science and technology (in the broadest sense) and societal and economic 
transformation.
This is the challenge facing ISAS in the 1990s and in terms of its role in the 
subregion.
In conclusion I want to argue that now that apartheid and destabilisation politics 
are beginning to be no longer paramount in the way we South Africans view our 
sociopolitical and economic affairs it should be possible to get by without enemy 
concepts and without manipulating statistics. The basic principle in the subregion 
must be to replace the hegemonic rule of apartheid South Africa and confrontation, 
by collective regional interest based on cooperation and collective self-reliance.
The second basic task that must be performed to avoid the torrent sweeping us into 
an uncertain future is to set up a new interregional political and economic order 
that is based on interdependence and no longer hegemonic.
9
The states of Southern Africa are moving towards cooperation on the basis of 
interdependence within a common framework of a greater economic region. This 
process may not proceed smoothly as hoped for (and rightly so); but we must not 
be alarmed at the prospect of a greater political and economic region. If these 
countries grow steadily more worried their fears could easily become what the 
social scientists have termed self-fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, we must tighten 
the reins and not let them slack.
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INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH: 
THE CASE OF ISAS
M.M. CHADZINGWA and G.K. KHAPWALE 
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho
Introduction
This paper attempts to show the link between information and Development 
Research. The argument is that there is a symbiotic link between the two. 
The paper indicates also that Documentation supports and stimulates research. 
The role of publication and grey literature is emphasized and all are 
highlighted by an example of the activities of the Documentation Centre of 
ISAS in the past ten years.
The Volume of Information In Research And Development
Research is the essence of science and science here is defined broadly to 
include both the natural and socio-economic sciences. Other activities - 
ieaching, communication, organisation, etc. are auxiliary to the raison d’etre 
of a scientist, that is the creation of new knowledge and the transfer of 
existing scientific, technological and socio-economic knowledge into new 
realms and applications. In case of scientific and technological research the 
objective is to convert the creativity of scientists and technologists into new 
understanding and capability.
The research function is therefore essentially, it can be argued, a creative 
process for solving problems, the solutions of which are not readily apparent. 
Effectiveness in the research process relates primarily to finding problems to 
solutions that will have high value in accordance with long term organisation
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objectives. Efficiency in the research process is an expression of how 
economically resources are used to generate solutions. In a very broad 
sense, the product of research - differentiating it from engineering or 
manufacturing, is a statement of the solution to a complex problem, or the 
production of new and useful knowledge. This knowledge is taken by others, 
they being engineers, economists, scientists, politicians, sociologists etc. and 
is converted into new or improved products, methods or procedures. Hence 
we can conclude the only real product of research is data and information for 
use in or guidance of other functions.
If it can be accepted that research produces information then it can also be 
argued that information feeds research. In other words there is a symbiotic 
process throughout.
For example, in our region, the majority of the population live in rural areas 
in relative isolation. A vital part of the development process therefore are 
extension services through which modem, practical knowledge and simple 
government practices can be brought to the individual especially in the 
important areas of health care and agricultural practice. It is also a 
mechanism whereby information on new techniques, new crop varieties, 
marketing systems and the like, may be brought to a small scale farmer. 
Generally these extension services are run by central government but many 
may also by parastatal bodies and commercial companies where the small­
holders are growing a cash crop.
So, although a development project may have as its foundation a scientific or 
technological improvement for the benefit of the people, the types of 
information needed and produced range far beyond surely scientific and 
technical.
Thus for example, the introduction of high-yielding hybrid maize not only 
involves the breeding and distribution of the seed maize but also depends on 
detailed and exact information about the selection of suitable areas for 
introduction, with the correct soils and climate, the caliber of the farmer and 
where necessary his education in the appropriate husbandry; the supply of
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fertilizers and the credit required for their purchase, the development of 
distribution system for the marketing of surplus production and helping the 
farmer and his family deal with any additional cash income that he may be 
lucky enough to obtain from the exercise.
As well as utilizing such information needed for preliminary research and 
resource surveys, such an exercise provides information for development 
planners, the economists, financial institutions and most importantly the 
extension services.
It can be argued also that the concept of an extension system is essentially an 
extension of an information system of a particular field rather than new topic. 
There are three sub-systems to which distinct and sometimes institutionalized 
groups of people correspond. These are generation of knowledge, its 
transformation and transmission and its application and use.
In our example, knowledge may be generated by agricultural scientists, 
usually in government or private research institutions. It is transformed and 
disseminated by what we would call "change agents’ who in turn transmit it 
either to new research projects or competent personnel in extension services 
via reliable channels of communication; and in this case, it is used by the 
farmer. This structural model also fits the more restricted subsystem of 
scientific development, which comprises that one group of people, they being 
scientists who assume the various roles of knowledge generators, knowledge 
transmitters and users of knowledge.
Where does information fit into these sub-systems quoted above? 
Information is not an end in itself but an indispensable means to connect the 
elements of the overall research and development services -In this way, it is 
an orderly system and not a heap of unconnected and disorganised parts. 
Rather, the scientific, technological and socio-economic information services 
all form that cycle of knowledge as one single process.
That notwithstanding, it is regretted that very valuable research results are 
produced but they remain in the laboratories, the scientists’ offices or
13
secretaries’ files. Diffusion is minimal. However where diffusion exists, its 
propagation is usually uncorrolated, and hence chaotic.
Documenting Research Data and Development (R + D) Results
We have established the relationship between R + D and information. If it 
can be accepted that information emanates from research and that information 
needs research, then it can be argued, information is a valuable resource in 
R + D. Scientific communication is perhaps the most tangible tool for doing 
science. Research in the natural sciences for example is, in contrast to most 
other human endeavours, a highly collective undertaking. Often, researchers 
learn from the work of others and build on it. The cumulative structure of 
scientific and technological knowledge is made possible by considerable 
objectivity in the process of resolving scientific disputes and by the apparent 
structure of scientific laws compatible with such a cumulation.
The importance of scientific communication is so paramount that recent 
trends in the analysis of research output is formulated in terms of information 
and documentation services pertaining to the research projects. In other 
words the more of good raw data or input into research findings, the more 
of good quality of research results or output. Summarily it means, "garbage 
in garbage ou t."
Meltzer, when discussing Information as a Resource gives an analogy of 
information processing and dissemination to that of oil. He likens the 
processing and exploration of oil to determining the best source of 
information. Drilling and completing wells is analogous to developing search 
strategies. Recovery of oil is compared to retrieving raw data. The crude 
oil must be refined and processed, data must be analysed and synthesed (into 
knowledge). Oil storage and the problems of transporting it are not too 
different from the problems of maintaining and disseminating information to 
the ultimate user.
The oil-information analogy may be carried even further when it is 
considered that there are various graders of oil just as there are various
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grades of information, and just as the cost of oil continues to soar so too has 
the price of information increases. As a commodity, information can he 
bought and sold. However, unlike other resources, information is not 
depleted when it is retrieved. It need not lose its value, quantity, content or 
power. Also information is not consumed or destroyed when it is put into 
use. It can however be obsolete when it is provided too late.
The generation, processing, synthesis and dissemination of information 
involves a cost. The central economic fact about the process of research and 
especially where it involves invention is that it is devoted to the production 
of information. Invention must be a risky process involving high financial 
and material expenditure, and hence the by product, which is information 
itself, is costly. The documenting of research results therefore justifies the 
existence of documentation centres, research and academic libraries, archives 
and museums.
The Symbiosis o f  Research and Information: A case fo r  ISAS
Information on Lesotho and other countries of the Southern African region 
is produced by many individuals and agencies. Although some research is 
formally published, an increasing proportion appears in the form of 
mimeographed reports generated by short-term externally funded development 
projects, conference, workshop and seminar papers as well as dissertations 
submitted to a wide range of universities with research interests in the region. 
Government departments, parastatals, international organisations, charitable 
bodies and private individuals are among other contributors to this corpus of 
information commonly known as ‘fugitive’ or ‘grey’ literature.
At ISAS, Documentation Centre, which is at present a major operational 
component of the Documentation and Publications Division, has a specific 
mandate which makes it responsible for collecting, classifying and making 
available to users a comprehensive collection of the "grey literature" on 
Lesotho. These are material of inter-disciplinary nature with more selective 
coverage of informally published and semi - or non-published materials 
relevant to Southern Africa, the Third World, LDC’s OAU, the
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Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement and the like.
While collecting for researchers, "grey literature" deserves a special mention 
here, as it is the type of material that requires vigilant documentation. It 
being "hidden" it is difficult to acquire, sensitive in some cases but likely to 
provide fresh information for researchers. One should emphasise fresh 
because it has been proved that for research, information provides good 
quality results if it is provided at the right time, meaning, promptly.
On the one hand the subject for collection is determined by the research 
agenda. For example, if a research project is dealing with the South African 
Destabilisation Policy, the Centre makes certain that a comprehensive 
collection on destabilisation is acquired. The acquisition will primarily be 
broader on that topic and secondarily it will cover periphery areas, like 
Politics and the International Relations. In that way the researcher has an 
access to a broad spectrum of the research topic. On the other hand, the 
acquisition policy does anticipate information requests on some topical issues. 
As at present there is no on-going study on AIDS but the Centre has already 
started collecting in that field. This then proves that regardless of whether 
it is Research or Documentation that is conducted first, finally both make a 
vicious circle kind of interrelationship.
Consequently, at present ISAS has specialized collections for example, on 
Human Rights, Destabilisation, Women Studies, Agricultural Marketing and 
Migrant Labour. The collection is largely determined by the research agenda 
which at the same time stimulates further research into currently debated 
topics affecting the sub-region. At this point a symbiotic relationship 
between information flow and research is continuously established.
Publishing
The correct title of ISAS Division we are looking at is the Documentation 
and Publications Division. One important function which is often overlooked 
in this Division is Publishing. By design however, this sector was planned 
to work at three levels. Firstly, to take over immediate products emanating
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from the Research Division. Thus it has indeed received manuscripts and 
unedited research reports from researchers; it has employed professionals 
who have edited those reports before they are printed and published for the 
general consumption just as the processed oil is used. In this manner all 
ISAS scholarly works have been fully fulfilled; and as Cobbe ascertains this 
proves that publishing can be seen as an integral part of the natural function 
of a research library . Otherwise, research results remain raw, unknown 
to the public and thus unusable.
Secondly, the Centre arguments heavily on secondary sources; that implies 
publishing for the second time. In essence making abstracts, bibliographies, 
indeces clippings etc is an art of announcing what was primarily published 
elsewhere, but in a different form and perhaps for a different consumer. For 
example, when a newspaper is published, its information is originally for a 
limited use - for news. But when this paper is clipped out, selecting those 
articles which are kept in the clippings format, that second publishing is for 
the other category of user or researcher of some in-depth study. Again, this 
sieving of information, its re-packaging and storage indicates the costs 
involved in the "information industry at the end of which more and more 
publishing is developed through the titles like Lesotho Clipping which 
stimulate further research.
At the third stage, one notes that in Africa, where poor publishing facilities 
contribute to the continent’s book famine, the Publications section should win 
a compliment for ISAS whereby it does not publish its own papers only, but 
also works from outside the Institute whereby there are also announced and 
distributed. This has indeed been the case with some examples from several 
NUL Committees and Departments. There are prospects too that with NUL 
establishing its Publishing House, this field will be strengthened to fulfil more 
research results.
Prospects o f  Information and Documentation in the Region - ISAS 
Involvement
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All of the activities that deal with information throughout the world are in a 
state of rapid change. This involves influx of new ideas from a number of 
disciplines; expansion of applications; deployment of new systems, techniques 
and technology and even expansion of new theoretical, experimental and 
philosophical grounds.
The SADCC countries, Namibia and South Africa are no exception to these 
changes. Though these are heterogeneous entities, they now from one group 
within which ISAS should plan its strategies. The situation at the same time 
poses a dilemma for ISAS which is at different levels of development with 
all these countries.
The Past
From its inception almost a decade ago, the Documentation and Publications 
Division of ISAS has focused on a number of issues:
(a) initially it worked closely with Botswana and Swaziland 
with whom links are historically and culturally very tight. 
The intimate cooperations amongst the Documentation 
Centres of ISAS, NIR and SSRU is indicative;
(b) later the identification, collection, processing and storing of 
documents covered the entire SADCC region. This 
expansion was dictated by the obvious economic and 
political forces of the given sub-region;
(c) finally there was the establishing of linkages with other 
centres and organisations involved in information exchange 
internationally.
Despite some various problems the identification and collection of 
documents, especially on Lesotho has been and it continues to be a 
challenging venture. This would again be strengthened by the 
establishment of a National Research Council, which unfortunately
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is slow to take of the ground.
(d) Despite its close proximity to Lesotho, South Africa itself, 
for obvious political reasons, due to its vast area even its 
massive information, has been very difficult to satisfactorily 
document about. The same applies to Namibia. Though 
Documentation on these two countries is continuing, 
cooperation is almost not there.
The above four categories have respectively accounted for the 
following:
Southern African Social Science Index (SASSI)
A major co-operative venture in which the Division intends to 
participate, depending on funds, is the Southern Africa Social 
Science Index. This was launched three years ago among sister 
institutions, NIR in Botswana, SSRU in Swaziland an ISAS in 
Lesotho. The idea is to standardize methods of data input and 
exchange by use of modem technology. In the initial stages, 
exchange would be limited to floppy diskettes. The project proposal 
is with IDRC for possible funding. The long term objectives of 
SASSI is also to interconnect in Southern Africa other 
documentation centres. With future use of distributed databases 
information can be down loaded electronically from one database to 
another.
At the present the Division’s problems are mainly due to lack of 
space. Some thousands of documents in the centre are not yet 
indexed, and a mere attempt to retrieve a document on a given topic 
can be a nightmare.
Southern African Inter-Library Loan System: + Periodicals In Southern 
African Libraries (PISAL)
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ISAS is therefore not a member to this system which is based in Pretoria. 
From Lesotho the National Library and NUL Library participate. The 
question is then how ISAS can benefit form their membership. There are 
also a few participants who make input from Malawi, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe; three of whom are SADCC members.
The Future
Information and User Services: To develop a constituency of information 
users, the Division has to consider several factors. Information services will 
have to be constructed around the user and that users right to immediate 
access to information pertinent to his/her needs. This requires the 
development of user profiles to identify and synthesize their research interests 
so that specialized services such as current awareness, and selective 
dissemination of information (SDI) services could be provided.
Computer Applications: Recent technological developments in computer
usage and in complex communications systems have resulted in close linkages 
between data processing and telecommunications and have brought about 
revolutionary technology in data and information processing. The 
processing, storage and retrieval of a wide variety of information can now be 
undertaken on an international scale, and there has been rapid growth of 
transborder data flows, especially between institutions and corporations in 
industrialized countries.
In the region, information systems and communications facilities cover a very 
wide range. They extend from certain countries whose satellite 
communications facilitate a rapid data processing to those countries which 
continue to operate through traditional systems of information collection and 
through postal media and or oral communications.
As we forecast for the 1990’s and/or beyond efforts should be made to 
interconnect, by use of modems and dedicated telephone lines, to the Pan 
African Documentation Information System in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; to 
interconnect to SAPES (in Zimbabwe) and to other several database on
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varied developmental disciplines such as Environment and Gender.
The Documentation Division has, as already stated accumulated a lot of 
documents in paper form. Efforts will be made to "convert" the documents 
into microfiche form. PADIS is always willing to assist member countries, 
free of charge, to carry out such projects. The advantage of microfiche is 
the ability to contain volumes and volumes of information on a thin strip. It 
is also safe and cheaper to maintain.
What does all this entail? For an effective task of supporting research 
Information and Documentation should have adequate space, staffing, 
equipment and financial provisions. For research on the other hand to be a 
reliable source of life for Documentation it should be conducted in an 
atmosphere of academic freedom, economic growth, political stability and 
general tranquillity. Otherwise, research in interfered with, and vise versa. 
So far ISAS, Research and Documentation have no known cases that suffered 
through censorship, external political or cultural interferences.
Conclusion
The Division is committed to strengthening the Information Network of 
NUL; to provide accurate information to the University intelligentsia, 
academic researchers and students in the country and regionally. The will 
to forge ahead is there, what is needed are the resources outlined above. As 
we look forward to post apartheid Southern Africa, there are matters within 
the information profession that will need to be addressed; these comprise 
maintenance of bibliographical standards; computer networking and the end 
of all cultural/education boycott of South Africa. But above all, the 
mechanisms of coming to terms with incompatible systems and methods 
which for decades have developed differently. The success in that area will 
consequently promote a successful development research.
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THE SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSION OF NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
ARCHIE MAFEJE 
University of Zimbabwe, Harare
Introduction
The "Sociocultural Dimension of National Development in Southern Africa" is 
quite a mouthful. For someone with Cartesian proclivities, it certainly does not 
lend itself to any theoretical or philosophical precision. In terms of classical 
theory and in the context of struggles for "independence" in Africa thus far, there 
is a definite conceptual incongruity between "national development" and what 
might be seen as regional integrity (not integration) or common identities (not 
interests). This is attributable to the phenomenon of "nationalism". Classical 
nationalism in Europe, which came to be identified with the concept of "nation­
state", triumphed precisely because it sought to emphasise the uniqueness of the 
perceived national entity at the expense of centuries-old regional affinities. These 
were largely cultural and linguistic and not necessarily technological. Yet, 
between the 17th and 19th centuries there emerged in Europe a pervasive identity 
which became known as "European civilization". This had both cultural and 
technological connotations which were recognized ideologically but denied 
politically until the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) three 
hundred years later. If historical analogies are anything to go by, it might be 
asked: why was the frame of reference for development in Europe at one stage 
national (Adam Smith) and at another regional (the Common Marketeers)?
In pursuit of this developmental analogy it could be assumed that African 
countries, by virtue of imperialist penetration and integration into the world 
capitalist system, became historical contemporaries of their colonisers. This line 
of thought would make it possible to postulate a certain telescoping of "national" 
and "regional" development in particular subregions in Africa, e.g. Southern 
Africa. One of the implications of such a postulate would be that not only is 
colonialism a mother of African nationalism but also a foster-parent of regional
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integration at the economic level. It is African proto-nationalists who have proved 
incapable of dealing with the implications of this dialectic or dynamic, both 
programmatically and conceptually. One of the reasons for this is the inevitable 
conflict in any nationalism between subjective affirmations in the form of cultural 
identity and language and the objective structural implications of that to which 
nationalism is a response, i.e. white domination and capitalist/imperialists 
exploitation in Southern Africa. All these are not cultural phenomena and observe 
no boundaries. How do African proto-nationalists contend with them, without 
changing their terms of reference?
The tendency among proto-nationalists has been to emphasise cultural identity and 
values as a basis for political organization in a world which has been trans­
nationalised since the end of the 19th century. In some cases the insistence is in 
spite of the fact that the entities they seek to glorify are themselves products of 
colonialism. The best historical examples in Southern Africa are the British 
Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. Were these "nations" 
with identifiable cultural boundaries? Some proto-nationalists might be tempted 
to rewrite history for their own convenience or might adopt the pragmatic view 
and even argue that the existence of "nations" or nationalities in Africa pre-dates 
colonialism. True as this might be, it does not obviate the problem of cultural 
diversity versus structural integration under the aegis of "nation-building", as is 
understood by African proto-nationalists.
In the case of Southern Africa, anthropologically and ethnographically, we have 
not even reached the point where we can say with certainty which of the political 
entities that emerged during the 19th century had become "nations" and which had 
remained "tribal" fragments. In other words, if the "sociocultural dimension" of 
national development was taken seriously, where would one begin? Secondly, if 
the concept of "Southern Africa" were to be accepted as a historical reality, where 
would we draw the line and what would be the implications for the various 
Southern Africa proto-nationalisms and supposed cultural boundaries? It should 
be noted that, conventionally, the 11th parallel is what marks off Southern Africa 
geographically. This does not by any means represent a "sociocultural" unit, if 
that was a necessary dimension for "national development". Yet, economic 
integration and development has occurred in the region despite the observable 
cultural diversity. If so, what is the relevance of the "sociocultural dimension"? 
Could this be one of the lingering illusions of proto-nationalists?
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Culture and the Anthropology of Humankind
The relationship between culture and the history of humankind has exercised the 
minds of philosophers, historians, sociologists and anthropologists alike for the last 
two hundred years. Consequently, by now certain axiomatic statements can be 
made regarding some of the basic issues. For instance, it is generally 
acknowledged that culture is what distinguishes human beings from brutes. Yet, 
in modem history cultural distinctions have been used by some human groups as 
an excuse for drawing invidious distinctions between themselves and others and for 
brutalizing the target groups. Racial oppression and exploitation in Southern 
Africa in just one example of this. Nonetheless, it would be a great mistake to 
give credence to theories which attribute immanent force to culture and race. 
Fundamentally, the issue is not culture but structure. Cultural and somatic 
differences are often invoked to justify relations of domination and subordination, 
i.e. structural imposition. Southern African history has been nothing else but this 
since the arrival of the whites.
This is not to suggest that prior to white colonialism no structural impositions had 
occurred among the blacks themselves. However, in natural economies where 
nature is the subject of labour there is no predisposition towards structural 
imposition. The spread of the Bantu-speakers in Southern Africa, which was 
marked by a proliferation of small, autonomous chiefdoms, testifies to this. 
Dissatisfied groups simply hived off and set themselves up as independent entities 
with a new "tribal" name, even though culturally and linguistically, they were no 
different from their neighbours. Under the circumstances, "culture" could not 
have been an issue. That is why it is possible in South African historiography to 
employ all-embracing cultural categories such as the "Nguni" or the "Sotho", 
whose history is comprehended in terms of particular chiefs or "tribes". The 
question of whether this is methodologically justified or not will be reserved for 
another occasion.
Taken to a more general plane, what is implicit in our short review above is that 
the assertion culture is not a historical category. Rather, structural relations or 
organizational forms are. In the event, what would come to most minds is 
whether or not there could be organizational forms which are not themselves 
products of culture. This has of course been one of the longstanding arguments 
between materialists and idealists. In the wake of nationalist struggles in the Third 
World and a rebellion against Eurocentrism it has once again surfaced. Third
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World Marxists, especially, have more or less acknowledged that Marxism does 
not have appropriate concepts for analysing cultural phenomena precisely because 
it accorded them a non-determinant role and relegated them to a residual category, 
the "super-structure".
This is obviously unsatisfactory because it leaves out those institutions which 
straddle both the super and the infra-structure, e.g. kinship and language, which 
can be both ideological and instrumental. However, all this does not mean that 
there is a one-to-one relationship between culture and organizational forms or 
modes of production. The Chinese in Red China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore are culturally akin and yet have developed different forms of 
organisation and modes of production. This is accounted for by differences in 
their historical development. More examples could be furnished, e.g. cultural 
affinities between Latin Americans and Europeans accompanied by dramatic 
differences in structure, not to say anything about the organizational vicissitudes 
which have been the mark of the "common European home" since the Second 
World War. What are the theoretical implications of such structural diversities 
within recognisable cultural uniformities?
It would seem that the classical view of the anthropology of mankind was not 
incorrect but became perverted by latter-day anthropologists who abandoned the 
dynamic concept of (wo)man as the maker of culture in favour of the more passive 
conception of (wo)man as the product of culture. This is a conservative view 
which is incapable of explaining how human beings transcend the limits of their 
culture rmd open up new vistas of life through their own creativity (homo faber). 
As such, it is incompatible with the more generative concept of (wo)man as the 
maker of history and new structures, and a veritable agent of new social relations 
and meanings. Theories of "social change" are no substitute or compensation for 
this because they were assimilationist in the imperialist or Eurocentric sense. They 
assume that the impulses for social and cultural change necessarily come from 
outside. In the event the natives could only be presumed to have neither history 
nor generative powers. Certainly, this was no anthropology of mankind but rather 
self-justification by colonialists and imperialists.
In contrast, classical theory was universal in its outlook. We can only find fault 
with it by referring to its rationalist separation between ideology (normative 
rationalizations) and creative labour (technological rationalizations). It is important
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to grasp the significance o f the ontological precept that in doing we are creating 
culture and new material conditions for existence. How long it takes for this to 
be manifest is immaterial and is no valid ground for referring us to pre-existing 
cultures, as proto-nationalists are wont to as part of their ideological mystification. 
It is mystification because it does not describe accurately what they themselves 
actually do. In most cases their social behaviour is more deviant than that of 
ordinary citizens. This discrepancy is not without significance. It seems that the 
rising petit-bourgeoisie in Africa have found "culture" a ready-made tool for 
deluding the masses.
Development and the National Question
The denunciation of proto-nationalists and their cultural effusions should not be 
construed as a negation of all subjective representations in the struggle for national 
development. What is at issue is the profound question of who are the authentic 
subjects of the process of development in our circumstances. Who are the cultural 
bearers o f the coming African revolution? There seem to be many pretenders to 
the throne: monarchs, generals, Bantustan scarecrows, petit-bourgeois upstarts, 
proletariat opportunists, feckless migrant peasants and the impetuous youth. What 
a dismal lot, one may think; or what a desolate political landscape, one may 
surmise. Yet, underneath all this there are genuine forces whose identity is not 
self-evident. Otherwise, how do we account for the revoluntary pressures that are 
felt throughout Southern Africa? It is these pressures which constitute the national 
question. It is the job  o f the social scientist to fathom them and to discover the 
new standard-bearers. These questions are alien to conventional theory. Since the 
1960s, development had been thought of in naturalistic or physical terms. For 
instance, according to the natural theology of modernisation theories which held 
sway for a good 25 years, development was a matter of movement from 
"traditionalism" to "modernity". The two were defined in antithetical terms. 
Adoption o f Western values and the abandonment of traditional values was seen 
as the key to development. Although Western values were presented as largely 
technical or instrumental, it is apparent that the underlying suppositions were more 
cultural than technical because "Westernisation" was seen as a necessary condition 
for the successful application of Western technology in Third World countries. 
This rendered modernisation theories tautological, among other things. Why could 
it not be assumed that developing countries would borrow selectively from the 
West according to their own cultural predispositions, as happened among different
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civilisations before the rise of monopoly capitalism? It is obvious that 
modernisation theories were in accord with the drive towards cultural 
homogenization by the developed countries, except Japan. But the desire to 
dominate structurally was the motive force.
It took underdeveloped countries some time to realise this. But when they did, 
their protest tended to take a cultural rather than a structural form, as has been 
said of pro-nationalists. This having been said, it is very important to note that 
the Latin Americans and Asians did not fall into this trap, as is shown by the 
dependence theory and what came to be known as the "Indian Debate". It is in 
Africa and the Middle East where cultural revivalism or defensiveness has been 
most evident. These also happen to be the two regions which are weakest, 
structurally, in the world. Could this be a coincidence? Nobody can be certain. 
But there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Islamic fundamentalism (including 
veiled women and a reversion to what are supposed to Islamic intellectual 
traditions) gained in strength after the Middle East was plunged into a deep crisis 
as a result of repeated military ancf political defeats. The deep and pervasive crisis 
in Africa has not issued in exactly the same thing, but there has been a growing 
belief among some African intellectuals that culture is the "missing link" in 
African development. (This is implicit in my assigned topic.) At the political 
level there have been some noticeable "Africanist" convulsions, but these have 
remained purely intuitive. There might be objective reasons for this.
First, we have had an Africanist ideology and movement which ushered in 
"independence", but in recent years has been accused of having led to the present 
political malaise and economic crisis on the continent. Therefore, if anybody was 
to reassert any form of "Africanism", (s)he would have to take into consideration 
the fact that it has happened before, and that we are now faced with its negations. 
Secondly, if part of the reason was imperialist domination or neo-colonialism, then 
how could these be handled under a nationalist perspective, pure and simple? 
Theoretically and programmatically, this is no easy task, especially after the 
collapse of Eastern Europe which seemed to preempt any attempt to infuse the new 
nationalism with socialist ideals. It should be noted that since the Arusha 
Declaration, the armed struggle in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, and in 
South Africa, the Durban strikes in 1973 and Soweto uprising of 1976, there has 
been a perceptible trend toward this fusion.
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Taken at its face value, this marks a shift from the bourgeois conception of the 
national question of the independence movement to what might be called a post­
independence conception of the national question. The historical and social 
significance of the latter is that it was a result of disillusionment with the post­
independence state in Africa: "Not yet uhuru", as the popular slogan went. The 
traditional philosophical view is that "there are no negations without affirmations". 
Logical as this view is, it does not tell us how long in practice it takes to move 
from one moment to the other. It is obvious that this is neither instantaneous nor 
automatic. There has been a further disillusionment with countries such as 
Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. Considering this, what is going 
to be the content of the new nationalism or its source of inspiration? In my view, 
this points to the crisis of the African revolution at the present historical juncture 
(the case could be extended to other regions as well).
If the new radical nationalists had supposed that the emergence of the "Socialist- 
oriented" African countries signalled the end of the bourgeois nationalism of the 
independence movement, then they had a big shock waiting for them. The 
disintegration of the national alliance that brought about independence did not 
signify the demise of the bourgeois or old-style nationalists. It is possible that this 
could have been the case, if it had not been for certain international interventions 
and the relative weakness of contending forces such as the new radical nationalists. 
The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States gave the 
bourgeois nationalists a further lease of life, despite the deepening crisis in Africa. 
Nothing illustrates this better than the approved idea of "negotiated settlement" and 
a more or less a permanent ban on armed struggle. In practice this has meant a 
compromise with pro-imperialist and pro-capitalist forces in countries such as 
Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. In South Africa it has given rise 
to an anomalous situation, where what would have been reactionary forces in the 
national liberation movement are on the ascendancy and what would have been the 
radical forces find themselves in a quandary, unable to articulate clearly the 
meaning of the national question in the light of disillusionment with the post­
independence state in Africa and of the great retreat in what were thought to be 
revolutionary states in Southern Africa.
The apparent differences among various contenders within the national liberation 
movement in Southern Africa have been construed by the enemies of Africa as 
"tribal" differences. Ethnic cleavages among modem Africans may or may not 
occur. The important point to grasp, politically or sociologically, is that whenever
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they manifest themselves, these cleavages do so not in terms of themselves but in 
relation to issues that could be understood otherwise, e.g. political and economic 
power at the national level. Therefore, they should be seen as rationalizations of 
these non-ethnic interests. Ideological manipulation of ethnic identities by African 
leaders is as common as it is contradictory. African leaders are correctly seen as 
agents of African nationalism and are known to be great believers in "nation- 
building". Therefore, it is contradictory for them to be at the same time peddlers 
of "tribalism". We are thus obliged to interpret such opportunism as part o f the 
ideological battles that inhere in the national liberation movement itself. Contrary 
to popular belief among African intellectuals and academics, since the days of 
Nkrumah’s "African personality" or Senghor’s negritude, rarely do African 
nationalists couch their ideological projections in cultural terms. What has 
distinguished between them so far is the degree to which they lay stress on the 
Africanist or their common black identify in a white-dominated world. As stated 
earlier, in recent years the trend has been to inject some socialist ideals into the 
nationalist trajectory. This has made it possible to talk of the radical or 
progressive wing o f the national liberation movement vis-a-vis the reformist or 
liberal bourgeois wing.
This is not to say that there is homogeneity within each broad category. For 
instance, among the South African movements there are noticeable differences in 
emphasis between, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM) and Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) though they might 
all belong to the same camp. Likewise, there are significant differences between, 
the African National Congress (ANC), Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), and 
Inkatha. fe t, all could be seen as variants o f the same political trend - liberal 
bourgeois reformism. In this context the violent conflict between United 
Democratic Front (UDF) and Inkatha in Natal is very instructive. First of all, 
culturally and linguistically there is no dividing line between the two. There is a 
question whether ideologically there is a real difference between the two. This is 
bearing in mind that at one stage the ANC found it quite acceptable to maintain a 
dialogue with Gatsha Buthelezi.
Therefore, one suspects that Gatsha Buthelezi is indulging in the same old 
manipulation o f the so-called tribal sentiments, not so much because o f ideological 
revulsion for the UDF or the ANC but as a manoeuvre to gain more political space 
in the national arena. It would be a gross mistake to suppose that an astute 
politician such as Buthelezi would nurse the vain hope that under the changing
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conditions in South Africa he would be able to hold indefinitely the Kwazulu 
Bantustan as his footstool. A more realistic interpretation of the situation would 
be that Buthelezi is playing a disruptive role so as to get guarantees from the ANC 
and the De Klerk government that when the negotiations actually take place, he, 
not Kwazulu, will not be left out. The irony of it all is that to carry out his 
campaign Gatsha Buthelezi has relied on covert support from white diehards who 
would anyway like to see him stay in his Bantustan forever.
In the meantime, Gatsha Buthelezi regards himself as good an African nationalist 
as any o f the ANC leaders. While the ANC might for good reasons treat him with 
suspicion because of his apparent Zulu chauvinism, it still has to reconcile this 
with its SACP-inspired theory o f the right of nations to self-determination. This 
has been mechanically adopted by the ANC, despite the fact that the history of the 
South African black nationalist movement showed very clearly from the beginning 
that this was totally irrelevant. Far from joining the national liberation movement 
as representatives o f particular cultural and linguistic groups, South African black 
nationalists were bound together by common new values, namely Western 
education, the English language and Western liberal ideology. In general, they 
assumed, like the white liberal theorists of "social change", that African societies 
and culture would become civilised accordingly. Whether or not this perception 
of the future of African societies was justified or desirable, the fact is that African 
languages and culture were not a casus belli on anybody’s part. The rallying point 
was the rights o f blacks (especially the "civilised" ones) vis-a-vis those of whites 
under liberal democracy. This did not mean lack of appreciation of African 
languages and traditions, as is shown by the many and animated literary writings 
in what was condescendingly referred to as the "vernacular" (a concept about
which I have views but cannot go into here).
It should be understood that the glorification of African traditions at an earlier 
stage was not seen as an antithesis of western civilisation but rather as its 
animation by African interlocutors. Written African verse in stanzas and prose
was the best approximation to 19th century European literary forms. In other
words, there was a conscious effort towards reaching what were thought to be 
universal standards. It was not until the end of the Second World War that white 
racism and intransigence led to a questioning or rejection of what was supposed 
to be universal. This issued in an emphasis on African symbols and identity, and 
"Africanism" instead o f an assimilation liberalism. The rise of the Youth League
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within the ranks of the ANC and the stringent anti-liberalism or herrenvolk of the 
Unity Movement were clear expressions of an assertive black nationalism or 
nationhood. Even here existing cultural and linguistic differences remained 
inconsequential. When the Afrikaner government tried to manipulate them by 
introducing such policies as Bantu Authorities (1951), Bantu Education (1954), and 
Bantu Self-Rule (1959-60), it encountered strong opposition from all the national 
movements, civic and peasant organizations, including the so-called tribal chiefs 
in some instance (Thembuland, Pondoland and Sekhukhuniland in particular). The 
failure of the South African Government and the Bantustan leaders to appeal to 
tribal or traditional sentiment demonstrates the incompatibility between this and its 
historical successor, African nationalism.
The Passing of Tradition and Development
It is obvious that whatever African traditional social formations represented was 
undermined and transformed irrevocably by European colonialism in South Africa. 
As is known, the first thing colonialism did was to deprive African societies of 
their territorial base. Secondly, it destroyed their natural economy. The latter 
was replaced by colonial capitalism which, unlike classical capitalism, had 
contradictory transformational effects. Included among these were the so-called 
processes of "dissolution" and "preservation", which are epitomised first by the 
policy of Native Reserves and then by something as grotesque as the Bantustans. 
In the meantime, no Africans were willing to return to the "tribal" past, including 
the monarchies in Lesotho and Swaziland and various Bantustan leaders. The only 
difference was that the leadership, unlike the ordinary people, had found an 
advantage in maintaining the same policies of "dissolution" and "preservation" as 
the colonial or settler governments. They derived value from maintaining 
"traditional relations of domination, while not forfeiting any of the benefits of 
modem capitalism, e.g. opportunities for capitalist accumulation, bourgeois styles 
of life and consumption. This is probably what everybody aspires to but very few 
can attain. It is the social, economic and cultural implications of such aspirations 
and practice that need to be examined, not the illusion of traditional values and 
culture.
As it must have become apparent by now, the basic thesis in this paper is that the 
source of nationalism in Southern Africa, as elsewhere in the colonial world, is
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structural domination. Second; cultural deprivation or depravity is a necessary 
concomitant of this. Third, it is one thing to acknowledge cultural deprivation 
among oppressed peoples, but it is quite another to presuppose that this deprivation 
can be remedied by reverting to an imagined pristine state, however defined. We 
simply do not know what the peoples of Southern Africa might have done if over 
the last three hundred years they had enjoyed freedom of cultural action. Nor are 
we able to anticipate what they might do in the future, without imposing our own 
preconceived ideas, which are ultimately a reflection of our own structural 
interests. Implicit in this argument are two major issues: one concerns the
question of democratic pluralism and the other the question of development in the 
historical sense.
"Democratic pluralism", as an evolving political concept, is in conflict with a 
number of precepts which had been associated with national development, as has 
already been intimated. But if we were to distinguish between social and political 
movements, this would not be the case. The demand by the people to be heard 
and to have the right to fulfil themselves, socially and culturally, through their own 
organizations does not amount to class determination of the type of development 
within which this might occur historically, popular democracy has been realised 
under the concept of liberal and social democracy. But in both cases bourgeois 
rights and culture had been predominant. This has been so because the class 
which inaugurated the economic and political mode of organization which made 
all this possible was the bourgeoisie. Hence we can talk of the bourgeois 
revolution, starting from the 18th century in Europe. It is a question whether or 
not this spread to the colonies. But for the time being we note that bourgeois 
values pervade the ex-colonial world, including the settler societies in Southern 
Africa. As far as development is concerned, what does this signify?
The whole of Southern Africa had already been incorporated into a capitalist 
system by the end of the 19th century. The native economies having been 
deliberately undermined, the Africans had no choice but to participate in the new 
economic system, and they gradually embraced its values. Under normal 
circumstances, this would have implied a replacement of the pre-existing modes 
of production with a new expansive and socially progressive mode of production: 
modem capitalism. As in all cases of colonial capitalism, this did not happen. 
Instead, the Africans were obliged by extra-economic means to serve colonial 
capitalism as servile and itinerant labour. Under the circumstances, they could not
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be beneficiaries o f  expansive and progressive capitalism. On the contrary, they 
became victims o f parasitic colonial capitalism and white structural racism. Any 
attempts to develop themselves were thwarted by the system, i.e. they could not 
reproduce themselves socially either as agents of the pre-existing modes of 
production or the capitalist mode of production. It is only logical that at some 
point they found it necessary to rebel against the system and to develop their own 
nationalism. However, what is most important to observe is the fact that the 
nationalist rebellion was not necessarily anti-capitalist. It was against being 
underdeveloped by colonial capitalism. But what were the prospects for 
development in post-colonial capitalism or after independence?
The deep economic crisis, continued political strife and lack of democracy, and 
accelerated immiseration o f the majority o f the people after 30 years of 
independence in Africa would suggest that post-colonial capitalism in Africa has 
not been a great improvement on colonial capitalism, except for the change of 
white for black faces. African leaders are known for their corruption and 
shameless use o f state revenues for indulging in conspicuous consumption. 
Nonetheless, the various African kleptocracies are not in themselves an explanation 
of the deep crisis in Africa, objectionable as they might be. They are only part 
of a pervasive malaise that has to be explained and which is not limited to the 
African continent. In other words, it cannot be argued, as the Southern African 
racists (among others) are inclined to, that Africans are by nature or culture 
dishonest and autocratic. Ridiculous as such suppositions are, they are as much 
a product of cultural determinism as the cultural nationalism or revivalism 
espoused by some African intellectuals and politicians. It is patently clear that 
African development has not failed because of cultural reasons.
Cultural degradation, alienation and impoverishment are characteristic phenomena 
under imperialism but never a cause for it. The mistake African proto-nationalists 
made, it would appear, is that they spontaneously embraced capitalism without 
pondering the implications o f its imperialist foundations. Imperialism or capitalism 
in its monopoly stage exhibited two major characteristics: (a) far from expanding 
capitalist development in such a way that the gap between advanced and backward 
capitalist countries is narrowed, it created increased polarisation between the two 
through systematic transfer o f value from the latter to the former. In 1989 in the 
mist o f the worst economic crisis in Africa there was a net flow of value from 
Africa to the developed countries (see ECA Economic Report for 1989). (b) A
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refusal to accept any political and cultural autonomy anywhere in the world, as is 
shown by repeated military invasions and billions of dollars’ worth of military aid 
to pro-imperialist regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia; promotion of 
destabilisation programmes and low-intensity warfare in Africa (especially in 
Southern Africa), and decades-long subterfuge in Eastern Europe. If this be the 
case, what options are there for development in the Third World in general and 
in Southern Africa in particular?
Regional Self-Reliance and the Non-Capitalist Path to Development
It has to be admitted that there is a general economic and political crisis in the 
world. However, at present this is more of a crisis for under- and semi-developed 
countries than it is for the developed countries. If this can be construed as a crisis 
of global capitalism, then the worst dilemma is faced by the underdeveloped 
countries. They have not achieved capitalist development, and they cannot aspire 
to socialists development after the demise of the Eastern European economies. It 
is worth noting that even in this instance our two modal reference points are both 
European. This should confirm the racial prejudices of the Europeans and their 
descendants and contradict the lofty claims of black proto-nationalists. What 
models for independent development have the latter been able to evolve since 
liberation from colonialism? Imitation of models from either side of what used to 
be called the "Iron Curtain" has proved inimical to African development. This 
might be a justification for rejecting all forms of Eurocentrism. It would be 
particularly so, if it is recalled that o f all the underdeveloped regions, the Far East, 
which is renowned for its cultural traditions, has fared best in resisting Western 
capitalist penetration and in promoting national development, irrespective of 
professed ideological preferences. This observation might encourage my 
"culturalist" adversaries to seize on the fact to discredit my argument against 
attributing any determinant role to "culture" in the ontological sense as regards 
development. O f course, one would not be so foolish as to play into their hands. 
The case o f the Far East was introduced to raise an even more fundamental 
question than the role of "culture", as is popularly understood.
Asia is the site o f what are known as ancient civilisations. Although sociologists 
have used the term "civilisation" descriptively, it is apparent that it signifies 
something more than just "culture". The fact that is has been used normatively 
by European racists and Southern African white settlers to draw invidious
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distinctions between themselves and the rest of humanity does not detract from this 
simple observation. In his monumental study the ill-fated English historian Arnold 
Toynbee could identify only 27 "civilisations" in the history of mankind. It has 
been argued, and was argued against Toynbee that this is simply a matter of 
definition. Nonetheless, we are accustomed to hearing of Egyptian, Chinese, 
Indian, or European civilization, among others, but not so much of Sotho, Zulu, 
Xhosa, Khoi-Khoi, or Twa. Although under the impact of European racism, 
especially, the issue has become emotive, it would seem that there is a question 
to answer. This is not related to our taken-for-granted antinomies such as 
"developed"/"underdeveloped" or "backward"/"advanced". It is important for us 
to come to terms with these qualitative differences because they are implicit in our 
notions about "development" and in the study of the social evolution of the African 
societies themselves. For instance, how do historians and anthropologists decide 
whether the societies they study in Africa are "bands", "tribes", "chiefdoms", or 
"kingdoms"? Is it only a matter of scale, or is there something else?
It seems to me that the state of the arts, by which we mean the level of 
development of technical skills and knowledge, codification of various forms of 
information, elaboration of forms of organization and expression, is the key to the 
categorisation of societies. Historically, the societies that came to be known as 
"civilisations" excelled in the development of arts as defined above. The precise 
forms these took probably do not matter but what characterised all the societies in 
question was the development of the art of writing, mathematical and scientific 
knowledge, and of abstract forms of expression (art and literature). It is 
interesting to note that lack of development or advancement in black Africa is 
associated with the absence of the former two attributes. Indeed, all development 
programmes in Africa are aimed at enhancing these capacities. This is somewhat 
inconsistent with the proto-nationalist conception of the problem. It is impossible 
to invoke traditions that never existed. Likewise, relying on traditions developed 
elsewhere is culturally alienating or marks the passing of tradition. Thus, the 
proto-nationalist get caught up between sentiment and structure. Yet, all is not 
lost.
African nationalism is a valid response against racial oppression and imperialist 
domination. But like any other movement, it must be adaptable. For instance, it 
is obvious that in an integrated world there can be no African science sui generis. 
The most African nationalists can insist on is the indigenisation of scientific 
knowledge and activity. Similarly, the chances of developing a civilisation which
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is peculiarly African are gone forever. Modern industrial culture has universal 
implications but these need not be equated with cultural homogenization or 
imperialism. What the African nationalists might be called upon to do, like their 
counterparts elsewhere, is to increase the scope for cultural action, without being 
prescriptive or derivative about it. The true agents of cultural development are the 
people themselves, if they be free of structural imposition, whether it be it from 
traditional autocrats, independence kleptocrats, colonial settlers or imperialists.
The implications of the perspective we have developed here are far-reaching. It 
is a rejection of proto-nationalist cultural determination, colonial and neo-colonial 
capitalism and imperialism. According to received conventions, this would leave 
only the theoretical alternative, socialism. But "socialism" as a development 
model is itself on trial. Consequently, new conceptual and theoretical issues 
regarding its status have come to the fore. On reflection, it can be said that the 
classical European concept of socialism was too prescriptive and rationalist to have 
worked in practice. It overlooked the subjectivity and voluntarism of human 
behaviour. The negations of capitalism need not express themselves in a uniform 
manner everywhere in the world. Therefore, the way real people react to them 
is a matter of social choice. What is a matter of logic is the negations themselves,
i.e. the ending crisis of accumulation in Third World countries and the imperative 
to find a way out.
With everything considered, including the dramatic collapse of the so-called 
socialist societies in Eastern Europe, it would appear that the way out is not and 
cannot be capitalism, as is generally understood. According to this view, not even 
the social democratic version of capitalism, i.e. the welfare state, is possible under 
imperialism. At least in the Third World, if not the former Second World, a non­
capitalist path for accumulation and distribution will have to be found. As far as 
logic and historical experience can tell, this cannot be realised, without a rapture 
with imperialism. This is the only "sociocultural" context that makes sense in the 
totality of things. If it is the historical role of barbarians to liberate the civilised, 
this time they cannot do it except in concert. Regional cooperation is not only a 
necessity but a historical reality even in Southern Africa. The form it will take 
ultimately is what the contemporary struggles are about in the region. But if this 
is basic, then what is going to happen in South Africa in the short-term is vitally 
important.
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THE SO C IO CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT IN LESOTHO
A S  IT IM P ING ES ON DEVELOPMENT: 
FOCUS ON CHILDREN
ITUMELENG KIMANE 
Department of Sociology, National University of Lesotho 
Introduction
The point that development takes place within a certain sociocultural environment 
need not be debated further. Our perceptions regarding the components of such 
environment and actors within it, however, differ markedly. In my opinion, the 
"sociocultural" environment is often defined using formulation and aspirations of 
the adult populations, excluding and never reflecting upon those of the youth. 
Even the literature, we know, is silent about children and issues that are of interest 
to them. In a concomitant manner research activity which attempted to relate 
development to sociocultural factors has kept children invisible and unimportant 
in making nations progress.
From its inception up to now, the Institute of Southern African Studies has tended 
to follow the same pattern. None of the research activities it has sponsored, 
except one current one,1 has focused on matters and issues which are of concern 
to children. The Institute is not alone here; researchers in various disciplines have 
failed to draw on their observations o f and participation with children in an attempt 
to present some answers to issues that pertain to them. Other institutional 
researchers have exhibited the same neglect and silence when it comes to matters 
that affect children. On the whole this is a reflection of societal models which 
focus on adult values and priorities. Historically, this is a fact common to all
Reference is being made to the study by M .M .Tuoane on "the Economic 
contribution o f  children in Agricultural Production and its Effects on 
Population growth and Education".
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societies.2 The involvement of children as part of the sociocultural environment 
that has a bearing on developmental processes is as vital as that of adults. The age 
difference of the persons involved and the diversity of roles they play makes the 
task of understanding the relationship or position of parent and child in research 
most difficult. Research is undertaken by adults. Perhaps that is why issues that 
affect them have dominated the activity, putting children’s concerns in the 
background. Even in family issues such as conflicts in the home, family violence, 
broken homes, maintenance and others, researchers have more often than not 
preoccupied themselves with these problems as they relate to adults, although 
matters that affect the family unavoidably affect children in numerous ways.
People, and certainly a good number of academics, would question and challenge 
the wisdom of "studying children". In our attitudes we still consider children 
simply as appendages till they become adults. In that sense children are regarded 
as having no opinions, no voice of their own and therefore no place in decision­
making in society. Their actions are said to be of no vital consequence. Having 
stated this, perhaps one would justifiably place children among other "marginal 
groups" in society.
Academics, like the rest, have failed to recognise that the very existence of 
children imposes certain demands on societies. The scope of these demands is 
very wide indeed and as Foster (1974) rightly observes, this is quite obvious in the 
"Bill of Rights for Children" which proposes that a child has a moral right and 
should have a legal right in the following respects:
i) to be regarded as a person;
ii) to receive parental love and affection;
iii) to be supported, maintained, educated;
iv) to receive fair treatment;
v) to be free o f legal disabilities;
vi) to earn and keep his own earnings;
For exam ple, Sandra Burman (1986:1-2) in the chapter entitled "The 
Contexts o f  Childhood in South Africa: An Introduction", observes that 
South African children "are often invisible socially and seem to be so 
unimportant in the progress o f  a nation that they do not appear at all in the 
pages o f  most history books..." .
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vii) to seek and obtain medical care and treatment and counselling; 
and
viii) to receive special care, consideration and protection.
These may not be rules that are capable of application. However, it may not be 
totally wrong to take them as aspirations towards "fair treatment" in a world in 
which old parental dominance tends to break down.
Children’s issues, by implication, have to be studied within the context of today’s 
family structure. Child health, childcare, education and so on are dependent, for 
instance, on the social place of the family a child comes from. In the midst of all 
research concerns it does not appear as if there has been an understanding that the 
complexities of society are relevant to childhood. Research has not considered 
how children’s experiences are actually shaped and how they contribute to the 
design of the social fabric and its development. These are complex issues and are 
of critical importance, yet little is known about them.
To understand the intricacies involved perhaps one may highlight issues that relate 
to various disciplines, indicating also areas in which research is still badly needed. 
In this attempt it will be realised how interdisciplinary some of the research issues 
are.
Legal Issues
Our knowledge of child law is still wanting in many respects, yet such knowledge 
would be an invaluable tool for improving the lot of children.
Generally, legal research has concentrated on the relationship between man and 
woman as if it is the only one of primary concern in the legal sphere. The 
relationship of parent and child has thus been ignored. For example, the degree 
of intrusion of legal regulation into parent-child relations has not been considered 
a vital issue that needs to be carefully studied from the standpoint of a child. 
Issues relating to family stability have surfaced in research, but how far have we 
gone to demonstrate, for example, that a stable parental union underlies the 
relation of parent and child?
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No attention has been paid to the fact that there is a high possibility that in some 
cases united parents may try to assert their will on a reluctant child. In custody 
cases, for example, children may be given to one of the two parents. But we have 
not considered that children by their nature are likely to find it difficult to make 
their views known about their parents. We do not have information as to how 
many children give in to custody orders which do not fit their interests.
By virtue of their age children are dependent on adults to protect their interests, 
but is there any guarantee that this happens in the majority, if not in all 
circumstances? Reading the literature on juvenile justice makes one guess that 
false pretexts are often used. The welfare-oriented model of juvenile justice 
especially has in recent years been under serious attack. Questions have been 
raised "In whose best interest"3 such models are, while others have asked 
whether there is really such a thing as "juvenile justice".4 The main issue in such 
questions has been whether denying "due process" demanded for adults, and 
replacing it with informal procedures, uninformed police, social workers, etc. is 
actually in the best interests of the child, and whether it represents "fair treatment" 
before the law.
As a consequence of lack of knowledge about and interest in the literature focusing 
on juveniles, Lesotho enacted the Children’s Protection Act in 1980 with the same 
welfare orientation. The consequence of this is that the Act has hardly been 
implemented. The Act seems not to fit, in a number of respects, the sociocultural 
aspirations of the Basotho society. For instance, the idea of institutional placement 
of children with any type of disability is not yet developed among the Basotho. 
How would a Mosotho parent accept or even comprehend the whole idea of a child 
being taken to "a place of safe custody"?5 How would the police appreciate that 
they now have an additional responsibility to issue licences to children who want 
to attend a music festival at the national stadium or some other place?6 My
Such as in the work o f Taylor, L., et.al: In Whose Best Interests? (197?). 
In particular, the work o f Morris, A ., et.al: Juvenile Justice? (1980). 
Sec.7 o f  the Children's Protection Act 1980, Lesotho.
Ibid, Sec. 19.
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contention is that if all these issues had been carefully studied through proper 
research, the provisions of this Act would not be vague and irrelevant to the 
practical realities o f this country.
We have in addition the issue o f "children bom outside marriage",7 which is now 
causing concern in various quarters. Arguments are that the legal status of such 
children needs to be seriously addressed. There is need for the amelioration of the 
status of such children as they are constitutionally entitled to equal protection. 
Legal disabilities that discriminate against such children ought to be removed; they 
should be given succession rights like all other children, for instance.
There may be recognition in other disciplines that "children bom outside marriage" 
start life at a huge disadvantage; the factual difference that they bear from other 
children cannot be ignored. However, we do not know the size of this problem, 
as there has not been research addressing this cadre of children, the difficulties 
they encounter, nor the role the extended family may play in caring or failing to 
compensate for the prima facie disadvantages faced by such children. Although 
there are no official statistics, discussions with various workers in childcare and 
health institutions indicate that the incidence of "children bom outside marriage" 
is increasing and more children are being abandoned.
The term "illegitimate" child is common in the legal profession, but no one has 
cared to consider whether it could affect the concerned children negatively. The 
use of the term "child bom outside marriage" may sound a bit more "neutral" than 
the former. It-could be suggested that there is a need to study the effects that may 
result from the use of both concepts.
In a broken family there is tension and the child’s interests are in jeopardy. The 
rights and duties o f parents to the child are strained. Matters become more 
complicated, as each parent may be tempted to use the child as an instrument 
against the other. O f course, the fact that the child could take advantage of such 
circumstances cannot be ruled out totally. The main issue is the relevance of the 
child’s wishes in determining his custody and also which parent has authority over 
him. Is the child’s will taken into consideration?
Also referred to as illegitimate children.
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Child Health
Despite improved health facilities, Lesotho is still faced with a number of 
problems in this sphere as well.
For example, infant and child mortality is still extremely difficult to measure, 
mainly because o f the ineffective registration systems employed. Proper methods 
for the registration of births and deaths would greatly assist analyses of infant and 
child mortality. If such information is incomplete it means we lack one principle 
that is an indicator o f socioeconomic development or underdevelopment of a 
country. Perhaps not all of these problems can be blamed on the health facilities’ 
registration procedures. Further complications have been caused by the delay in 
the release of the 1986 population census results, so that 1976 population census 
and the 1977 Lesotho World Fertility Survey data are still heavily relied upon.
Basically information regarding both Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Child 
Mortality Rate (CMR) is inadequate, and there is need for in-depth and ongoing 
research. Many programmes intended to improve the health of children generally 
have still not been evaluated, representing a further area of research.
A number o f diseases have been cited to be the cause of infant and child deaths. 
Included here are diarrhoea, respiratory infections, nutritional deficiencies and so 
on. Health education is certainly the primary way to counteract these problems. 
However, and to achieve this, statistics are not in themselves sufficient; in addition 
there needs to be an assessment o f community knowledge and behaviour toward 
the diseases. Only such data would assist in the formulation of national control 
strategies to promote the good health of children. Table 1 below indicates some 
of the diseases that are common among children in Lesotho. Appropriate, 
representative and accurate data regarding these diseases is needed if effective 
control programmes are to be developed.
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Table I: Ten Most Common Diseases in AH Hospitals in 1988 for Various Age
Groups
Age Group in Years
Rank Order 0 - 1 F
All causes 705 585
1. Diarrhoea 167 131
2. Pneumonia 148 142
3. Marasmus/Kwashiorkor 63 32
4. Injuries (incl. fractures) 36 44
5. Skin diseases 34 37
6. Respiratory disease (exclud. pneumonia) 39 21
7. Measles 9 12
8. Eye diseases 9 10
9. Digestive system (exclud. diarrhoea) 12 6
10.Typhoid 3 1
Age Group in Year
Rank Order 1 - 4 M F
All causes 1018 878
1. Injuries (incl. fractures) 254 209
2. Diarrhoea 150 118
3. Pneumonia 124 136
4. Marasmus/Kwashiorkor 112 92
5. Skin diseases 50 48
6. Respiratory diseases (exclud. pneumonia) 33 22
7. Measles 28 25
8. Eye diseases 22 20
9. Digestive system (exclud. diarrhoea) 21 19
10.Typhoid 8 9
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Table I (continued)
Age Group in Years
Rank Order 5 - 1 4 M F
All causes 1269 800
1. Injuries (incl. fractures) 746 282
2. Skin diseases 71 70
3. Typhoid 68 69
4. Pneumonia 45 36
5. Eye diseases 49 28
6. Measles 27 22
7. Digestive system (exclud. diarrhoea) 24 19
8. Diarrhoea 15 20
9. Respiratory diseases (exclud. pneumonia) 19 16
10. Marasmus/Kwashiorkor 8 4
Source: Local Government, Ministry of Health, 1990.
The necessary assessment should take into consideration traditional methods of 
treatment. Effort should also be made to combine clinical investigations with 
knowledge and behaviours at community level. This would produce up-to-date 
data about the socioeconomic and also cultural factors that influence IMR and 
CMR.
Although breastfeeding is still highly regarded by Basotho women of different 
socioeconomic groups, research is needed to find out how appropriate this feeding 
method is for working mothers. From personal experience I am of the belief that 
it becomes impossible to continue with full breastfeeding while in paid 
employment.
There are further issues which need investigation. Questions such as whether a 
doctor should prescribe contraceptives to children are sensitive ground, and
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perhaps have legal implications. But these are matters for which answers must be 
sought. Research about the knowledge, attitudes and practices regarding family 
planning and birth control methods among children must be undertaken. 
Connected to this are issues relating to teenage pregnancies, a growing 
phenomenon in Lesotho today.
A further point which has to be recognised in health systems research is that in 
general terms social place determines the type of health care an individual child 
receives. Some children are destined to become part of the dismal infant mortality 
statistics by virtue o f being bom  into families with low socioeconomic standards. 
Comparative research would provide information about how similar disadvantages 
have been dealt with in other countries.
Early Childhood Development and Education
This is an area in which research is also greatly needed. Nowadays education 
determines whether one can in fact hope to have a decent, stable home 
environment.
Research into early childhood development remains inadequate. Consideration has 
to be given to issues such as whether the working mothers continue to have enough 
time to attend to their infants. Preschool facilities are extremely inadequate in 
Lesotho. The effects o f this on early stimulation are hardly known.
The school system is marked by a number of shortcomings, for example the rising 
drop-out and repeat rates. The Ministry of Education has cited the increase in the 
number o f children entering primary schools over the past ten years as a 
contributing factor (Ministry o f Education: 1989). However, there has been no 
research about the causes o f dropping out and repeating, and what happens to 
those that do so. Assumptions are that some of the drop-outs and up as part of the 
juvenile delinquency statistics.8
See Table 2 .
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Table II: Juveniles Who Committed Crimes 1986-1988
Crimes Period
1986 1987 1988
Rape 649 675 841
Indecent Assault 58 38 59
Concealment o f Birth 3 5
Murder 349 388 566
Theft (Common) 370 324 361
Robbery 388 338 201
Assaults 1205 1181 1249
Drugs 23 46 55
Housebreaking and Theft 294 371 390
Source: Department of Police Statistics, 1989.
Furthermore, the reality of education in Lesotho is that it imposes the burden of 
costs on parents, and to some extent on the churches which have historically 
sponsored and supported the system of education at various levels. It has been 
suggested that the high total cost of education - uniforms, fees, books, 
transportation, pocket money and so on - contributes to the high drop-out rate 
among children from poor families. Other reasons may include the high pupii- 
teacher ratios, high enrolment figures in schools, poor quality of teachers, 
increasing drug, solvent and alcohol abuse,9 etc. Many of these remain topics 
for future research.
See in particular, study by Malahleha, G .M ., Meursing, K ., and Morojele, 
N ., Use o f  A lcohol Among High School Students in Lesotho, (1989).
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Despite the paucity of information on the number of disabled people in Lesotho, 
it is evident that a number o f schools admit children who otherwise would fit in 
special education institutions. The lack of such information makes it difficult to 
determine the number of affected children and the type of facility they require. 
Claims have been put forward that parents tend to be overprotective for fear that 
their disabled children would be abused if sent to school. The extent to which this 
happens in reality is not known, but if such children are to be afforded equal rights 
the issues need to be studied.
If the national education policy is to be pursued, that is that every Mosotho child 
should at least complete the seven years of primary schooling,10 the above issues 
need to be investigated.
Political Climate
Perhaps one point which is seldom thought to be of any significance as far as 
children are concerned is the political environment in which they grow up. No 
one has thought about the question of what happens to children who grow up in 
politically unstable countries (Lesotho is perhaps no exception to this) and 
definitely the political climate of South Africa has a bearing on what goes on in 
this country. Children who are growing up today have lived with political turmoil 
and have known nothing but "political violence" by their parents. What prospects 
have they of knowing about peace and stability during their lifetime?
Crimes of violence are reported to have risen among children. Could this be 
attributed to the political environment noted above or are there some other causes? 
Many of these crimes occur in urban areas with different socioeconomic conditions 
from those that prevail in the rural areas.
In recent years there have been numerous uprisings in secondary schools in the 
country, some of which have caused serious disruption of school activity and/or
Set out in general terms in the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, and 
expanded in The Clarification o f  Lesotho’s Education Policies and 
Priorities, Part II - O peration’s Plan 1989/1990, (1989).
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considerable damage to school property. The origin of such unrest remains a 
matter of pure speculation. A number of factors have been blamed, including 
tension between the different providers of education, government of Lesotho, 
churches and the community; poor school administration; poor quality of teaching; 
and the influence of unrest in South African schools. There is also a reported 
incidence of alcohol abuse among school children and this is another likely factor 
contributory to the unrest.
Economic Issues
Despite the declining economy, it is difficult to estimate the numbers of children 
involved in the labour market as there is very little research in this area.
Furthermore, if we are to stick to the principle that children ought to have the 
right to earn and keep their earnings (Foster, 1974), does the extent of child labour 
need to be investigated? When children are forced by the poverty of their families 
to seek employment, can that still be designated child labour?
If the concept of child labour is accepted, what do we know about children 
engaged in paid work in the informal sector as against the formal sector? If there 
are any differences for the two sectors, what causes them? What about households 
and families? Does child labour occur in them too?
Traditionally, children in Lesotho are accustomed to doing certain household 
chores. Is this taken as a normal activity or does it also constitute child labour? 
What is the position of herdboys in relation to the concept of child labour? The 
numbers of children involved in these types of labour and a full account of the 
reasons for engaging in them are unknown.
Migration is a fact of economic life for most families in Lesotho. While it is a 
viable activity in economic terms, it may bear certain negative consequences for 
the families. For instance, a child whose father is a migrant labourer, absent from 
home for most of the year, cannot hope to have a decent stable home environment. 
There is limited data that attempts to demonstrate the effects of labour migration 
on the family, let alone on children.
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Conclusion
One can cite numerous areas in which children’s issues are inadequately researched 
in Lesotho. In this paper, research has largely been equated with a fact-finding 
mission. The general lack o f information on issues relating to children’s interests 
makes it imperative that research on them has to be in the main exploratory as 
well as policy oriented.
To facilitate effective planning we need to clarify options, and because of the 
scarcity o f resources available to improve the lot of children, it is necessary to 
expand the factual base on which development programmes and policies can be 
founded.
Finally, we need to bear in mind that by protecting children society is at the same 
time protecting itself. Without physically and psychologically sane children, 
society as a whole would be doomed. We need research that focuses on children 
in their best interests. It is necessary to look beyond the interests of adults. It is 
my hope that in the next ten years ISAS will promote an interest in children’s 
issues, and that funding agencies will regard this as a priority area.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOCIOCULTURAL  
ENVIRONMENT FOR W OMEN AND THEIR 
ASSUM PTIO N  OF MANAGEM ENT POSITIONS: 
THE CASE OF LESOTHO
MATORA T. NTIMO-MAKARA 
Faculty of Education, National University of Lesotho
Introduction
"Feminist" literature from all cultures highlights the point that women are poorly 
represented in executive management positions in the formal organisations, and 
that there are obvious and "hidden" obstacles that have an adverse impact on their 
motivation and advancement (Boserup, 1970; Spender, 1982; Ntimo-Makara, 
1985; Batezat and Mwalo, 1989 and Rawaf, 1990 to mention a few.)
In Lesotho, and indeed in most if not all Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries, the situation is no different. It 
precludes women from getting involved in policy making and also affects the 
extent to which women can directly and effectively influence the direction of social 
development. For Lesotho, in particular, to fully deploy the expertise of its 
female professional labour is not a matter to be viewed as a mere egalitarian 
gesture. It is rather a dire necessity for socioeconomic and cultural development.
As a case, this paper will attempt to highlight the situational, organisational and, 
particularly, dispositional factors that affect and shape the situation of women in 
Lesotho. It will also give a general picture of developments that have taken place 
during the past ten years to advance or retard the progress of women and the 
possible impact of this on the development of the country, as well as make 
suggestions on what has to be done in the 1990s and beyond in order to redress 
the situation and forge ahead in a positive manner.
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On the whole, the comments and observations in this paper are based on and 
greatly influenced by my 1985 study. Although 1 have not conducted a "parallel 
study" in the real sense of the word since then, an attempt was made to update 
data about some of the formal sector areas in which women are heavily employed, 
to determine numbers of women actually holding senior management positions. 
I have also had informal discussions with some men and women about the situation 
in organisations as regards evidence of more women assuming positions of 
responsibility, evidence of general change in attitude among men and women and 
what prospects people feel there are for improvement.
An Overview of the Situation of Women in Lesotho: Some basic facts.
Women constitute the majority of potentially economically active people in the age 
group 15-64 years. This is because there has always been a marked sex imbalance 
in the population, which in 1987-88 stood at 49% males to 51 % females (Bureau 
of Statistics, 1988). Women also constitute the most important home-based human 
resource for the country. This is because an estimated 45%-60% of men are 
migrant workers.
Another consequence of the continued absence of men from home is that between 
65 % and 75 % of the rural households are actually headed and managed by women 
on a daily basis for the greater part of the year.
The most striking feature of Lesotho’s education system is the predominance of 
females, particularly at the primary through secondary levels. The 1976 census 
estimated male and female adult literacy at 40% and 60% respectively (1988 
Statistics Report p. 1). This situation is unique among African countries and even 
majority of other developing countries where normally men have more years of 
schooling. The trend in Lesotho is attributable to, among other factors, the 
unusual excess of females in the population and the high level of male labour 
migration. The female predominance in the school system has also broken through 
into higher education as the following figures for enrolment at the National 
University of Lesotho (NUL) show. (See Tables I - IV).
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Table I: Basotho Students at NUL and Field of Study 1977/78
Field of Study F M Total Women as % of total
B. A. Administration 35 35 70 50
B.A. Economics 28 54 82 34.1
B.A. General 17 12 29 58.6
B.A. and Concurrent 
Certificate in Ed. 74 33 107 69.2
B.Sc. General 30 65 95 31.6
B.Sc. Education 5 10 15 33.3
B.Sc. CCE 15 24 39 38.5
B. Commerce 39 53 92 42.4
LL.B. 9 12 21 42.9
Diploma in Stats. 4 - 4 100
Diploma in-Theo. - 1 1 0
Certificate in Stats. - 1 1 0
B.A. Law 14 10 24 58.3
TOTAL 270 310 580 46.6%
Source: Derived from "Table 42/37" in The Kingdom of Lesotho Education 
Statistics, 1977. Maseru: Bureau o f  Statistics, 1978, p. 44.
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Table II: First year Basotho students at NUL 1981/82
Science Arts All
based based courses
Courses M F M F M F
First Degrees 41 30 90 97 131 127
Certificates and 
Diplomas 4 5 28 22 32 27
TOTAL 45 35 118 119 163 154
Source: The Kingdom of Lesotho Education Statistics, 1981. Maseru: Bureau of 
Statistics, 1982, p .65.
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Table III: Full-Time Basotho Students at NUL by Field of Study and Sex
1985/86
Field of Study Sex Total Females as % of Total
M F
B.A. Administration 12 15 27 56
B.A. Economics 12 12 24 50
B.A. General 16 26 42 62
B.A. Education 42 85 127 67
B.A. Law 36 15 51 29.4
B.A.(URP) 3 5 8 63
B.Sc. General 123 49 172 29
B.Sc. Education 58 41 99 41.4
B. Commerce 33 71 104 68.2
B. Education 19 36 55 66
Post. Grad. Cert. Educ. 3 4 7 57
357 359 716 50.1
Note: The table has excluded the sub-degree programmes.
Source: Derived from Table 59(65) of the 1985 Education Statistics Report, p .56.
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Table IV: Full-time Basotho students at NUL by Field and Sex 1986/87
Field of Study Sex
M F
Total Females % of Total
B.A. Administration 7 8 15 53
B.A. Economics 16 13 29 45.1
B.A. General 20 24 44 55
B.A. Education 37 109 146 75
B.A. Law 36 22 58 38
B.Sc. General 132 47 179 26.3
B.Sc. Education 54 33 87 38
B. Commerce 40 72 112 64.3
B. Education 12 38 50 76
Post Grad.Cert.Educ. 3 6 9 67
357 372 729 51
Note: The table has excluded the sub-degree programmes.
Source: Derived from Table 62(59) of the 1986 Education Statistics Report, p .63.
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The trend over the past five years indicates that Basotho women have constituted 
more than 51 % of the total number o f Basotho students studying at the National 
University of Lesotho. (NUL computer service unit, 1989). From the above tables, 
it would seem that the popular areas of specialisation by women include Education, 
Administration and Commerce.
Women constitute the majority o f the labour force in the formal and informal 
sectors of the economy. As indicated in the development plans, women in general 
and rural women in particular have become the major target group for most of the 
government’s rural development projects. These are unfortunately often conceived 
and planned on their behalf without input from them. The expressed intention, 
however, is to get women more involved in and responsive to the development 
initiatives through increased participation. More than 80% of participants in these 
projects are women.
Since Appiah (1981) reported that 28,2% of the labour force was employed by the 
government, it remains the largest single employer in Lesotho. In the teaching 
service, more than 70% of the qualified primary level personnel are female and 
women account for 50-60% of teachers at post-primary level. Despite this very 
few of them are heads o f schools and school managers.
Mulligan (et al., [eds.] 1976) noted that despite the high numerical involvement 
and participation by women in the agricultural economy and in the public and 
private sector, there appeared to be some unwillingness or hesitation to promote 
them to positions of major responsibility. Malahleha (1984), Gay (1982) and 
Ntimo-Makara (1985), made similar observations, and all of them attribute this to 
the cultural bias against women. The employment statistics indicate that the 
proportion o f women in executive positions is actually decreasing despite the 
increase in educational qualifications.
As of January 1986, the government of Lesotho had two female permanent 
secretaries (Information and Broadcasting and Commerce and Industry), a deputy 
permanent secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and an ambassador in the 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. There were also female directors for Tourism, Food 
and Nutrition Coordination Office (FNCO), Lesotho Dispensary Association 
(LDA), National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS) and deputy director 
for Central Planning. It is significant to note that there was no female cabinet 
minister. Since 1986 we have had a minister o f  state in charge of Youth and
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Women’s Affairs; a permanent secretary for Health who has since left the civil 
service, and a few directors for NMDS, Tourism, Soil Conservation and several 
other subdirectors in ministries such as CPDO and Education. The general feeling 
among women is that we have regressed in this regard and women are getting a 
raw deal.
The situation is not encouraging either for the NUL. The four top administrators 
of the university are all male. The academic office is the only one in the central 
administration headed by a woman. The university Council is all male, none of 
the seven faculties in the university is headed by a woman and there are only two 
female deputy deans (for Science and Education); only one of the four Institutes 
is directed by a woman and out of more than twenty four academic departments, 
only nine are headed by women. There are only two women on a sixteen-person- 
strong academic staff appointments committee, and not one woman professor. 
Kunene and Mascarenhas (1989) have reported a more or less similar situation for 
the 1988 Canadian International Development Agency/Association of 
Commonwealth Universities (CIDA/ACU) Women’s Programme Needs Assessment 
Survey covering universities in Eastern and Southern Africa.
What is the Problem? The Sociocultural Environment
There is a commonly held belief that men are better leaders than women. This 
basically reflects cultural attitudes and values that are heavily underlined by 
patriarchal social orientations intended to maintain male superiority. The 
socialisation process in different institutional contexts outside the home explicitly 
or implicitly reinforces most of these attitudes. The cultural factor helps to 
reinforce and perpetuate the situation in which women suffer subtle discrimination, 
even in the formal institutions.
The political and legal institutions have made women’s position that of a perpetual 
minor (Maope 1984; Mamashela 1984). Addressing a workshop on identification 
and analysis of women’s legal problems organised by the Lesotho Federation of 
Women Lawyers at the Lakeside Hotel, Maseru, in May 1990, the Attorney 
General and Minister of Justice, Prisons, Law and Constitutional Affairs the 
Honourable K. Maope pointed out that laws reflect the values of society, thus 
oppressive laws reflect the interest of society. He argued that in Lesotho religion
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and culture are among the values of society that reinforce the oppression of 
women.
Organisations, too, do not operate in a vacuum. They are influenced by the 
sociocultural dictates in the environment. The respondents in Ntimo-Makara’s 
1985 study cited the following problems facing women in employment in the 
formal sector:
1. Because their overall legal status is low, their authority is generally 
undermined and they are, therefore, not taken seriously by "society" in 
general. They are often ridiculed.
2. For the same reason, their authority is undermined even by other women 
in and out of the work situation.
3. They have to struggle to cope with the strains of holding full-time jobs 
and ever-increasing family responsibilities; added to this is the expectation 
that women have to continuously prove themselves through hard work and 
outstanding performance in order to justify their holding certain positions 
or even being promoted to them.
4. Because of the generally disguised subtle prejudices and some regulated 
differential terms of service such as those governing married women in 
the civil service, it is difficult if not impossible for the majority of women 
to move up the ladder. For more or less the same reasons, they often fail 
to take advantage of career development opportunities such as further 
study. This counts against them in the long run when promotions to 
senior positions are considered. Women felt and still feel that these 
problems are a result of cultural influences, most of them imparted during 
and through the process of socialisation. As one respondent put it:
Men consciously exploit this cultural claim that they are superior. They 
do it all to their advantage; sometimes even when they know that they 
are no better than an average woman.
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Women’s attempts to tackle these problems range from direct confrontation to 
discussion to doing nothing at all -depending on who they are dealing with and 
under what circumstances. Here are how some of the women have indicated they 
deal with the problems.
(A Motswana, Ph.D - in her late 30s):
Confrontation is painful, risky and costly in terms of sustaining long­
term relations. At least it earns one a great deal of respect. In 
confronting them one has to avoid generalisations. Take them on an 
individual basis. Otherwise they dismiss you. I try to transcend the 
male/female stereotype reaction. It needs a lot of effort and strong 
willpower to do.
(A Mosotho, Permanent Secretary - in her late 30s):
I have survived as a result of understanding the problem people have in 
accepting a woman holding a senior position. I have tried to exert 
myself more while I give time for the people I work with to accept that 
sex makes no difference to how much and what I am capable of doing 
as a person.
(A Mosotho. Graduate - Senior Police Officer in her late 20s):
I ignore them (male colleagues) and keep doing what they feel I ought 
to be employed to do, that is, being relegated to a junior position by 
refusing me a chance to perform or execute the functions of my rank 
and responsibility. I ought to be doing other functions. But I am not 
involved because my immediate male bosses do not want me to. I 
never participate in meetings or planning sessions because nobody ever 
communicates and invites me to them. So I never know when they 
meet or what they discuss, let alone why. I hear most of the things 
from male colleagues of my rank or the junior officers.
It is only when things go wrong and my bosses want to exploit my 
expertise that I am suddenly "ordered" to attend some meeting and write 
out a paper. Deep down they know that I have a lot to offer my 
department because of my academic background. It is a pity because
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in the capital city, I would have to be completely in charge on my 
own; yet I do not even have an idea of what one does running a station 
because they won’t let me do it here so that I can learn.
Asked what steps she was taking to ensure that this situation is rectified, she
replied.
I am playing it all cool. I will not demand that I be involved but I am 
going to wait patiently until the right time comes. They, too, are not 
yet ready to listen and learn. It would not be much help if I were to 
talk to them now. The time is surely coming and it will be when they 
run into problems. Then they will have to accept their own deficiencies 
and recognising that I have a lot to offer, they will have no choice but 
to involve me.
Although women can still retain their designated positions and continue to earn 
corresponding salaries, they are effectively relegated to junior "operative" levels 
by being deliberately blocked from performing the functions of their positions. 
Women who strive to get to the top are often regarded as threats by their male 
colleagues. In an interview a postgraduate female ex-civil servant director of one 
of the government’s units said:
It is a very funny attitude these men have because we have been 
competing with them through our educational career and we have 
always outperformed them at school. But here, they display some 
unfounded condescending arrogance yet they know women are capable 
of achieving. In the end you just wonder why you should continue the 
fight at all.
We are to remember that women, like men, are liable to make mistakes in the 
normal course of the execution of their duties. However, it would seem that 
things get blown out of proportion if the error has been committed by a woman. 
This is a part of male campaign to reinforce an already biased position against 
women’s success in areas that men regard as their own. A senior female 
Advances Manager in one of the local commercial banks summed it all up as 
follows:
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It is the traditional outlook towards women that has hampered their rise 
to reasonable jobs. On average, Basotho women are more brilliant than 
most of their male colleagues. Even so, the "system" continues to 
promote the less educated, less brilliant and less hardworking men.
This demoralises women a lot and it encourages men to suppress them. 
Basotho men have an inferiority complex. They know that their women 
colleagues have more potential than them. Yet their ambition forces 
them to limit the chances o f better opportunities for women so that they 
can perpetuate their stay in power. No woman would wish to do the 
spade-work while some men or someone else gets the benefit from her 
efforts. It is the exploitation of women’s talent by men in Lesotho that 
demoralizes most women. It is men who would usually claim that we 
are our own enemies because they want to justify their unfairness.
Perhaps the public needs to demonstrate more confidence in women so that they, 
too, should not doubt their own capabilities. Because of the continued emphasis 
on women’s inferior status, most women have come to believe that they have 
inborn inabilities that could make it difficult for them to operate in senior positions 
in the public sphere.
In an attempt to get as many views on this issue as possible, I have made a 
deliberate effort to also seek male opinion through informal interviews with senior 
male civil servants, some of whom are retired, male professionals in private 
organisations, senior personnel in the education sector and the ordinary men in my 
village and place o f work.
Their overall position was that, while acknowledging certain facts about women,
i.e. that they constitute a higher percentage than men of people employed in the 
formal sector, and that on the whole they are better educated/longer schooled than 
their male colleagues, they still held some reservations about actually letting the 
women appear even more stronger by giving them senior positions in the formal 
organisations. I had assumed that professional men with a great deal of experience 
and from many years of formal schooling would assess the issues against their 
presumably better informed background and, therefore, display a less negative 
attitude. Few of them made explicit reference to the disabling laws that have 
relegated women to the status of minors, let alone felt that they should be
63
reviewed. A male Managing Director of one of the local commercial banks had 
this to say about the female staff in his bank:
Before long women have taken over this place. These women work 
hard and are more dedicated to their work. Almost all of the women 
who are part of our high and middle level management are not 
university graduates; whereas their male colleagues are. But the women 
still come up on top in efficiency and overall performance. It is a real 
pity that our men are generally lazy and do not give in all the effort to 
their work. They just seem satisfied to do the bare minimum.
The Policy Makers’ Views
Like several other governments in Africa and the SADCC region in particular, the 
Lesotho government is a signatory to almost all of the United Nations declarations 
whose sole intention is to promote the lot of women worldwide. One must 
recognise some positive steps that the government has taken over the past ten or 
so years, particularly within the framework of the Women’s Decade.
The worrying thing is that often the absence of the accompanying logistic 
framework and clearly defined modalities of implementation of the many well - 
intentioned policies undercuts efforts to improve the situation. The major 
stumbling block is the law. The Honourable Chief Justice B. Cullinan (May, 
1990) pointed to the prominent role of Basotho women in public life when he 
noted that about 40% of magistrates in Lesotho are women, who by far outperform 
their male counterparts in terms of quality of work. But, again, he pointed to the 
adverse effect of the law on women. In the case of Zimbabwe, Bateratz and 
Mwalo (1989: 65) point out that while the passing of the legislation is a positive 
step for women, the enforcement of laws has been weak. One is inclined to say 
that our governments have the power, but somehow they seem to lack the political 
will to initiate reforms and follow them up to their logical end. Social 
transformation, much talked about as the priority goal, cannot come about unless 
our governments are prepared to take the leap, set the tone and create the climate 
and environment so vital to the success of such a process.
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Officially opening a seminar on "Another Development for Lesotho" in Maseru, 
Lesotho ( 14th-18th December 1987) and specifically addressing the question of 
women’s participation, His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II said:
.... We must also seek to right another wrong, namely the inferior 
social status that women in some instances suffer. It is our women 
who, more than any other section of our society, have had to pay the 
price of the lack of economic progress in development. The amount of 
responsibility they take has not been matched by any significant growth 
in their status, or in their influence. Women’s rights - social, legal and 
political are - directly related to a self reliance strategy for Lesotho’s 
"Another Development". We shall not succeed in socially transforming 
our society unless we are prepared to alter the status of women. It is 
not a favour that "Another Development" demands, it is a right. We 
must recognize the right of women to define, for all of us, their own 
problems, their own ideas, their essential contribution, and we need 
their commitment, their energy and their equal participation, if we are 
going to ensure "Another Development" in its fullest extent.
For most of us women participants at that seminar, this statement was understood 
to suggest that perhaps in the "New" Lesotho the long talked about "structural 
reforms" would finally be effected with all the vigour and the determination they 
deserve. Sadly, we still do not see any evidence that we are anywhere near even 
taking off the ground in that direction.
What can he done? The Way Forward into the 1990s and beyond:
Research Priorities:
One dare say that time is long overdue for our societies to adopt a much more 
"adaptive" approach and attitude in a world that is fast changing socioculturally, 
politically, economically, religiously and otherwise.
Presentations by other speakers have already pointed at some of the areas that must 
be concentrated on in the 1990s. For the purpose of emphasis, some will be 
repeated here.
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1. Education for awareness creation is most vital. There is need for a well 
planned and organised campaign to sensitise both men and women to these 
gender issues. It is a fact that for any meaningful change to occur, there 
must also be transformation o f social structures. This calls for society’s 
reassessment o f some o f its norms and values. The education campaign 
has to be promoted on all fronts, both formally and informally.
2. "Objective" dissemination of information through effective use of the 
available media is vital. Ignorance and misinformation are the major 
problems for most of our societies. There is an appreciable amount of 
information on gender issues in all of our countries. The problem is ht 
people are just not informed. The education function would best be 
promoted if this were to take place.
3. The "disabling" redundant laws should be reviewed urgently. Our 
governments need to muster enough political will to do something about 
them right away.
4 The establishment of a W omen’s Studies Unit within ISAS to facilitate
research on gender issues should be a priority. Perhaps, as has already 
been suggested, such a unit would promote the flow of access of 
information to publishing networks. It would also help facilitate the 
promotion o f the priorities outlined above.
Conclusion
In conclusion, one has to reiterate the major point that culturally motivated biases, 
slavishly nurtured in the name of "preserving the culture", despite their proven 
redundancy in the sociocultural environment which has so drastically changed in 
so many ways, have negative implications for the development of the country. 
The legal system is generally regarded as a stumbling block because it relegates 
women to the status o f minor. This effectively incapacitates women because it 
has implications for their career prospects, chances for promotion and even their 
overall psychological fulfilment.
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The government has a duty to take the lead and set the pace with regard to the 
gender issue in general. Although government can easily enact laws and 
regulations, on the whole it has still fallen far short of creating the corresponding 
statutory logistic framework that ensures the implementation of the laws passed.
This situation is generally very counter-productive. It undercuts most of the 
development objectives that deal with maximising the deployment of the available 
human resources. Malahleha (1984) clearly sums up the situation in which 
Basotho women find themselves when she points out that on one hand they are 
expectated to participate effectively and efficiently in development efforts, while 
on the other hand the very legal framework and the social structures within which 
they must operate make impossible the realisation of these national expectations.
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EDUCATION AN D  DEVELOPMENT  
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
ANSU DATTA 
National Institute of Research 
Gaborone, Botswana
Introduction
The decade o f the 1980s saw some dramatic changes in Southern Africa. On the 
negative side were the continuing crisis in Angola, the deepening tragedy of 
Mozambique and the near collapse of Zambia as a viable entity. But fortunately 
there were some positive developments too: the birth of Namibia as a sovereign 
nation; the hopeful happenings south of the Limpopo; and the robust performance 
of Botswana’s economy with salubrious developments in other sectors.
The situation is pregnant with possibilities. Not only are there problems and 
challenges o f unusual complexity but also opportunities hitherto not within our 
reach. The tenth anniversary of the Institute of Southern African Studies of the 
National University of Lesotho provides an occasion to take stock of the regional 
situation and project ourselves into the future.
In this paper I address a limited aspect of the contemporary situation in Southern 
Africa - that o f the interface between education and development. In the first 
section an attempt is made to get a global scenario of the current state of the 
development process in the region. This is followed by an analysis of the 
contribution education has been making to development, particularly in terms of 
the private and social returns o f education. In the third section the impact of 
development on educational expansion is considered. I conclude by stressing the 
dialectical association between education and development.
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A brief account of the contemporary development process in the region provides 
a suitable background to the subject matter of the paper. During the 1980s all 
countries of the region, with the exception of two, witnessed a decrease in their 
per capita GNP (Table 1). In the case of Zambia, there has been a substantial 
decline in the national income. Mozambique has gone down from the sixth lowest 
position in 1985 to the bottom of the list of 121 countries with at least a million 
inhabitants for which data are available.
Contemporary Development in Southern Africa
Table I: Development of Southern African Countries as Measured by 
their GNP (in US $)
1981 1988
Botswana 1 010 1 010
Lesotho 540 420
Malawi 200 170
Mozambique 160 (1985) 100
Swaziland 760 810
Tanzania 280 160
Zambia 600 290
Zimbabwe 870 650
Note: Statistics for Angola are not available.
Sources: For 1981 figures: World Bank, World Development Report 1983. 
Table 1: Basic Indicators, p. 141 & p.204.
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For 1988 figures: World Bank, World Development Report 1990. Table 
1: Basic Indicators, p. 178 & Box A. 1: Basic Indicators for Economies 
with Populations of Less than 1 Million, p .243.
For Mozambique’s 1985 figure: World Bank, World Development Report 
1987. Table 1: Basic Indicators, p .202.
It is interesting that while the GNPs of countries within the region have generally 
been falling, primary school enrolment has been expanding in all countries for 
which detailed figures are available (i.e., except Angola and Swaziland). The 
same is the case with secondary education the most dramatic expansion taking 
place in Zimbabwe: from 6 % to 45 % of the relevant age group between 1965 and 
1987 (World Development Report 1990, Table 29: Education, p .234).
Education and Development
All this suggests that there is no direct, one-to-one and short-term casual 
connection or even one based on co-association between education and what may 
loosely be called "development". How then are education and development 
interrelated? Education is a private and social investment.
Firstly, why should anyone spend money on education? There are of course many 
other things - goods and services - which can claim our attention. People prefer 
education to the alternatives because by going through an institutional programme 
they can expect to earn more money than otherwise. Of course there are 
important social and political considerations for every educational programmes; but 
if someone argues on economic grounds for greater expenditures on a particular 
system of education or on education in general, he should be prepared to justify 
his case in terms of costs and benefits accruing from the expenditure.
Education is in general terms positively correlated with personal earnings, although 
one’s income is additionally determined by other factors such as age, sex, race (in 
certain cases), inherent ability, socioeconomic background, place of residence, 
sector of employment, occupational level, on-the-job training, incidence of inter­
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regional and interoccupational mobility, and pressure by trade unions and 
professional associations.
Education as private investment may be calculated by means of cross-sectional 
evidence by correlating the present earnings of adults and amounts of education 
they had. This gives what can be called age-eamings profiles by levels of 
education.
Age-eamings profiles by educational levels have been constructed in various 
countries including Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia. The most important 
conclusions that can be drawn from the profiles are:
a) The highest point reached in one’s career is just after the age of forty, 
beyond which the curve levels off or even goes down. Changes in the 
earning process do not seem to be affected by either the amount of 
education or level of education attained.
b) Educational attainment has a positive correlation to the steepness of the 
increase in earnings throughout the early period of the working life. It 
is usually, but not always, positively correlated with the starting salary.
c) Finally, educational attainment is positively associated with the lateness 
of the age when the subject receives his maximum earnings and also with 
the amount of retirement earnings.
The social returns of education can be conceived in several different ways: the 
formal and the informal sector; education accompanying demographic changes and 
health-related behaviour leading to better nutrition and increased life expectancy; 
the social mobility function and impact on income redistribution; curricular reform 
and the reorganisation of the school system and their potential influence on 
national integration and education as a factor in personal development.
Clearly some of the supposed effects of education on the development process are 
non-economic and even those which are cannot all be expressed in monetary
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terms. However, several attempts have been made to match labour incomes to the 
level of education and costs of undergoing training for the purpose of computing 
rates of return to education. This is on the assumption that education can change 
people’s behaviour which may reflect in greater productivity, an important 
ingredient of socioeconomic development. George Psacharopoulos (1985) gives 
the following figures for three countries of the SADCC region.
Table II: Returns to Investment in Education in Three Countries of Southern 
Africa
Social Private
Pri­
mary
Secon­
dary
Higher Pri­
mary
Secon­
dary
Higher
Botswana 1983 42.0 41.0 15.0 99.0 76.0 38.0
Lesotho 1980 10.7 18.6 10.2 15.5 26.7 36.5
Malawi 1982 14.7 15.2 11.5 15.7 16.8 46.6
Source: Psacharopoulos, 1985: Appendix Table A-l.
Psacharopoulos dealt with 16 African countries and estimated their average social 
returns to education at 27% for the primary, 17% for the secondary, and 12% for 
the higher levels. Neither the figures in Table II nor Psacharopulos’s averages, 
taken singly or together, present a clear picture that can be generalized except that 
private returns to education are consistently higher than social returns. They also 
suggest that in some Southern African countries the dividend from secondary 
education may be higher than that from primary education a departure from the 
prevailing pattern elsewhere in Africa. Perhaps this has to do with the relatively 
advanced stage of primary schooling in some of the Southern African countries as 
compared to other countries of the continent. The higher monetary returns of 
secondary education may also be a result of the utter neglect of secondary 
education for Africans in the colonial period which has probably added a scarcity 
premium to it.
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The study of the social and private returns of education involves analysis in 
monetary terms. However, education can also contribute to development in several 
other ways that may not be easily measured in money.
An important influence of education lies in the fields of health, nutrition and 
family planning. An attempt is being made here to examine the inter-connection 
of education and health in the SADCC region. As indicators for health life 
expectancy at birth and under-five mortality rate and for education the adult female 
literacy rate has been selected.. These are being placed together to give us some 
indication of the association between education and health (Table III).
Education, mediated by other factors, is also associated with several other 
processes that have a direct bearing on development: increasing the productivity 
in urban and rural sectors; promotion of social mobility for those who have 
achieved it; the improvement of women’s status and strengthening the process of 
national integration. Volumes have been written on each of these topics. There 
are obviously conditions which limit the role of education in all these fields. Also 
not everyone is convinced of a cause-effect relationship between education and 
development, so much that they argue for a relationship of covariation or co­
association between them. Even when education is seen as contributing to 
development, much more information is needed about how this impact is 
channelled that is, about its mode of operation.
Impact of Development on Educational Expansion.
Education’s possible bearing on development is just one side of the interface 
between education and development. It is also necessary to address the problem 
of how development influences education. Is there a linear path of progression of 
education following a developmental process? Is this universal? Or can different 
societies blaze different paths of educational advancement in the wake of 
socioeconomic development? If the latter is the case, what are the factors that 
shape the path of educational progress? These are some of the questions that 
should be posed in this connection.
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Table III: Female Literacy Rate, Under Five Mortality and Life Expectancy 
at Birth Among Nine Countries of the SADCC Region
% Literacy among U5MR Life expectancy
females (1985) (1987) at birth (1987)
Angola n.a. 288 45
Botswana 69 95 59
Lesotho 84 139 57
Malawi 31 267 48
Mozambique 22 295 47
Swaziland 66 177 57
Tanzania 88 179 54
Zambia 67 130 54
Zimbabwe 67 116 59
Note: U5MR =  Under five mortality rate.
Source: UNICEF, The State o f  the World’s Children 1989. Table 8: Basic 
Indicators on Less Populous Countries (p. 108) for Swaziland. Table 1: Basic 
Indicators (p.94) for all other countries.
Taking Botswana as an example, it is clear that the impact of development has 
been reflected differently in various sectors of the education system. Between 
1965, on the eve of independence and 1985, Botswana’s education system 
responded unevenly to the growth in the national income as is evident from the 
following figures.
The per capita GDP during this period grew steadily from P240 in 1966 to PI 190 
in 1985-86, an increase of about 400% (Granberg & Parkinson, 1988: Table 
A 2.1, p .259). This is to be matched by what happened in primary and secondary 
education. While enrolment in the primary school rose by slightly more than
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225 %, in the secondary school enrolment registered a dramatic increase of more 
than 2000%. (CSO, 1986:55). The massive growth was partly due to the small 
base of secondary school enrolment — 1531 in 1966, in terms of which even a 
small increase (and in the present case the increase was not small) would appear 
very large. But the expansion also took place because of the thrust of government 
policy - the determined effort to step up secondary education. This has been so 
despite the fact that, in Africa, the returns of primary education, especially in 
terms of literacy and numeracy, are said to be higher than the corresponding 
benefits from either secondary or tertiary education. Finally, development has its 
own logic and exigencies. Once a "modem" sector grows in a country’s economy, 
the demand for formally trained manpower, at the higher and middle level, rises. 
With this comes an expansion of secondary and tertiary education.
In examining the impact of development on education, development should not be 
considered as a self-sustained, autonomous force. Development in all countries 
of Southern Africa, even when a country is tied to the philosophy of market 
economy, is closely monitored by a centralised authority. So is schooling as an 
instrument of enhancing education. The role of government policy in the 
expansion of secondary education is thus understandable.
So far, an attempt has been made to delineate the linkage between socioeconomic 
development and educational progress. A case of positive achievement, illustrated 
by the example of Botswana was chosen. What happens when socioeconomic 
development slides down, that is, there is negative development? Random 
examples mainly from Tanzania will be selected.
It is obvious that although Tanzania’s economic development, as measured by 
GNP per head, has gone down considerably (by more than 42% between 1981 and 
1986) the country’s educational expansion has continued. This will caution those 
who tend to pose a short-term, one-to-one cause-effect relationship or even co­
association between education and development. Formal education may be seen 
as an end in itself or as a political ploy so that special efforts are made to continue 
with it even when the going is tough on the developmental front. Or maybe there 
is time lag between economic stagnation and educational stagnation - the 
educational institutions and mechanisms which were created earlier go on 
delivering the goods for some time before they finally succumb to economic 
pressures. Finally, the quantitative expansion of education may be a shield that 
hides a deplorable decline of educational standards.
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Table IV: Tanzania : Economic Growth & Education
Aspects of Education
1965
Years
1985
Primary School 
Enrolment 
(% of age group) 32 72
Secondary School
Enrolment
(% of age group) 2 3
1960 1980 1985
Adult Literacy 
(% of age group) 10 79 93(m)/88(f)
1981 1985 1986 1988
GNP per capita 280 290 250 160
Source: For primary and secondary school enrolment: World Bank, World Development Report 1988. 
Table 30: Education, p .280.
For the 1985 Figures o f  adult literacy and GNP per capita: UNICEF, The State o f  the W orld’s Children 
1989.T&b\c 1: Basic Indicators, p .94.
For adult literacy 1960 & 1980: World Bank, World Development Report 1983. Table 25: Education, 
p. 196.
For the GNP figures for the years 1981, 1986 and 1988: World Bank, World Development Reports o f  
1983 (Table 1: Basic Indicators, p. 148); o f  1988 (Table 1: Basic Indicators, p .222); and o f 1990 (Table 
1: Basic Indicators, p. 178).
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GNP and Education
For a long time an attempt has been made to associate education with 
"development", conceived solely in terms of the per capita Gross National 
Product. Until recently, social scientists have - reluctantly - accepted this measure, 
coupled with the rate at which it is changing, as perhaps one of the most 
convenient ways of ranking countries by their socioeconomic success.
The inadequacies of this measure are, however, many. A major problem is that 
the per capita GNP cannot fully reflect the structure and distribution of the national 
income. It also leaves out the factors that fall outside the monetised sphere and 
fails to take note of "social" or "real" values of things that may vary from their 
market prices. Furthermore, as a market-related concept, it is not readily 
applicable to centrally planned, let alone subsistence economies. Then there are 
the technical problems of pricing the commodity in a market under inflationary 
pressure and of comparing countries with different economic systems. Even 
within the same country, comparisons of the GNP for different years may be 
difficult because of changes in the quality of goods and services and the marketing 
of new products and services.
One of the early thinkers who drew our attention to the weakness of the GNP 
approach was the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal who advocated the need for 
conceptualising development as a total process in which both economic and non­
economic factors are closely intertwined. Other attempts have followed such as 
the Statistical Unit of the Geneva-based United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development (UNRISD) (1969), Adelman and Morris (1967; 1973) and 
Seers (1972). Very recently the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1990 has 
advocated the use of a new measure called the human development index to be 
constructed in terms of purchasing power, life expectancy and literacy.
In the rest of this section the interface between education and "human 
development" in Southern Africa as it emerges from the UNDP’s study will be 
discussed. The figures are slightly dated, but they have not changed significantly 
since then.
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What kind of interface between "human development" and education emerges for 
the countries mentioned in Table V? To provide a rough answer to this question, 
we applied Spearman’s rank order correlation formula (rho = 1 - {(6 D2)/N(N2
- 1)} where D is the difference between the two rankings for each case and N 
stands for the number to the data in columns (3) and (5). The value of rho, i.e., 
the rank order correlation is +0,52,38. Thus the association between adult 
literacy and hurr^n development in the eight countries of Southern Africa is 
positive, but moderate.
Table V: Education & Human Development in Southern Africa
Countries Life Adult Real HDl DNP
Expectancy Literacy GDP p.c. p.c.
0 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Angola 45 41 1 000 0.304
Botswana 59 71 2 496 0.646 1 050
Lesotho 57 73 1 585 0.580 370
Malawi 48 42 476 0.250 160
Mozambique 47 39 500 0.239 170
Tanzania 54 75 405 0.413 180
Zambia 54 76 717 0.481 250
Zimbabwe 59 74 1 184 0.576 580
Notes
1. Swaziland’s human development index is not available.
2. Life expectancy, as at birth, has been calculated in years.
The figures are for 1987.
3. The adult literacy rate is in percentage and relates to 1985.
4. GDP per capita has been adjusted to reflect the purchasing power o f  the national currency. Figures 
are in US$ and are for 1987.
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5. GNP figures are per head o f  the population and for 1987.
Sources
For columns (2), (3), (4) and (5): UNDP, Human Development Report 1990, as quoted in The 
Economist (London), 26 May-1 June, 1990, p p .17-18 and 78-79.
For column (6): World Bank, World Development Report 1989. Table 1: Basic Indicators, p. 164.
Table VI: Female Enrolment in Primary and Secondary Schools in Southern 
Africa (1987 figures)
Countries Female enrolment Female enrolment in
in primary schools secondary schools
(1) (2) (3)
Botswana 117 33
Lesotho 125 26 (1986 figure)
Malawi 59 3
Mozambique 59 4
Tanzania 66 3
Zambia 92 13
Zimbabwe 132 36
Notes
1. Figures for Angola and Swaziland are not available.
2. Data refer to the percentage o f  the relevant age groups enrolled in primary and secondary 
schools.
Sources
For the figure in co l.3 under Lesotho: World Bank, World Development Report 1989.Table 29: 
Education, p .220.
For other figures: World Bank, World Development Report 1990. Table 29: Education, p .234.
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This exercise partly involves a statistical tautology. Adult literacy rate is a 
component of human development index and literacy is an aspect of education. 
It is to be expected, therefore, that the two variables, education and human 
development are in some way associated. We thus took primary and secondary 
school enrolment of females as alternative indicators of educational development 
and examined the extent to which they are correlated to human development (Table 
VI).
Applying the Spearman rank order correlation formula to the figures female 
enrolment in primary schools (Table VI) and human development (Table V), the 
correlation is computed at +0,84,82. The association is positive and high. A 
similar exercise is carried out with regard to female enrolment in secondary 
schools. The correlation is found to be +0,7768 which is positive and substantial.
Conclusion
The human development index in Southern Africa is correlated to female 
enrolment in primary and secondary schools to a much greater extent than it is to 
adult literacy rate. The close interface between human development and education 
may be true of other proxies of education as well. We may hypothesise that this 
is so because of the broad basis on which HDI is constructed.
As was argued above, the causality issue has not yet been resolved to the 
satisfaction of all, although there should be general agreement about an associative 
relationship between the two variables. What is more, just as education 
contributes to development, so can development to education - and in ways which 
may not easily fit in with the prevailing orthodoxy. How else should we explain 
the rationale of setting up a School (Faculty) of Mines at the University of Zambia 
and a Cocoa Research Institute in Ghana?
In the African context, can the interface between education and development have 
a better simile than the tail-biting Dahomeyan serpent ouroboros, symbolising the 
eternal circle of action and reaction? Whichever extremity is considered, it always 
leads to the other end: in semiology, the head of the ouroboros biting the tail or 
the tail penetrating the mouth of the serpent (one wonders what the sequence is) -
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in real life, education and development relentlessly interacting with each other in 
a spiralling process of reintegration at a higher level.
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IN LESOTHO
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Introduction
Livestock industry has a historical and contemporary significance as a component 
of the economic and social structure of Lesotho and Basotho. The Basotho have 
a long-standing record of investing in livestock, particularly cattle. From cattle 
they derived multiple products/by-products and uses such as meat, milk, dung, 
draught power, ceremonial sacrifices, and bridewealth payment. The Basotho also 
adopted small stock, mainly angora goats and merino sheep. These provide meat 
and are important in the fulfilment of ceremonial and cultural obligations. Above 
all, they are a vital source of cash income through wool and mohair sold mostly 
in the international export markets.
Despite the predominant role played by livestock, several analysis have since the 
1930s expressed concern about future development of livestock farming. Debates 
are dominated by such issues as appropriate marketing infrastructure, herd quality, 
range management and degradation. Problems are generally identified very 
consistently and amplifying the importance of national debates on these issues. 
However, solutions and proposals in respect of implementation and acceptability 
to livestock owners are often contentious and have political understones.
The overall purpose of this paper is to articulate the roles and functions of the 
informal and formal marketing channels utilized by Basotho livestock owners. 
More specific analysis focuses on cattle marketing as well as dairy farming as a
85
specialized subject matter within a broader study area. Therefore, the paper 
expediently deals firstly with the broad issues and perspectives in respect of 
utilization of informal and formal marketing channels for cattle. Secondly, it 
outlines the fundamental economic and marketing forces which seperate and 
differentiate formal and informal marketing channels in the milk marketing system. 
The paper draws extensively from the research findings of the authors under the 
Agricultural Marketing Research Project (AMRP) of ISAS.
Perspective on Cattle Marketing in Lesotho.
The Lesotho livestock industry is characterized by overstocking, range 
degradation, low marketed offtake of animals and animal products, low 
reproduction and high mortality rates. There exist two perspectives on cattle 
marketing in Lesotho. These have been termed the dominant and alternative 
perspectives.
Dominant Perspective.
The dominant perspective on the livestock production, utilization, and marketing 
environment in Lesotho is that Basotho stockowners are traditional, subsistence - 
oriented peasants who place great value on their livestock for social and cultural 
reasons, hence the low marketed offtake of annimals. It is also argued that before 
markets were organized by the government or projects no markets existed for 
Basotho cattle. It is further argued that Basotho stockowners are burdened with 
surplus cattle which they would sell if only markets existed.
Alternative Perspective
The other perspective is the view that Basotho own large numbers of livestock 
because they regard their livestock as capital assets, generating returns competitive 
with other available investments. This was evident in the 1970s when mine wages 
increased substantially and cattle imports increased. The higher migrant 
remittances meant that there was less need to sell cattle to get cash and at the same 
time they had surplus funds to invest. Low cattle prices in the RSA and low
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interest rates paid on savings accounts in Lesotho Banks, encouraged Basotho to 
invest their surplus funds in cattle.
Marketing Channels Utilized by Basotho Stockowners
In order to find the appropriate perspective, the AMRP within ISAS undertook a 
study of the Lesotho cattle marketing system in 1985/86. In addition a survey of 
livestock-owning households was undertaken in the winter of 1985. The survey 
was jointly completed by the Farming System Research Project at the Research 
Division, Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Marketing Research Project, 
Institute of Southern African Studies, National University of Lesotho. A total of 
137 households were interviewed in 18 rural areas scattered around Lesotho, with 
three cluster areas selected randomly from each of the six geo-climatic zones in 
the country. The study’s findings were that marketing channels available to 
Basotho stockowners can be categorized into formal and informal.
Formal Marketing Channels
The formal marketing channels available to Basotho stockowners are Livestock 
Products Marketing Services (LPMS) auctions, National Abattoir and Feedlot 
Complex (NAFC), and private butcheries. The LPMS is a section of the Ministry 
of Agriculture while NAFC is a parastatal. LPMS organises cattle auction sales 
at a number of locations around the country. At these auctions NAFC is the 
dominant purchaser although recently a number of butcheries and the Royal 
Lesotho Defence Force have been attending. The LPMS is responsible for 
maintaining sales yards and transporting cattle to the buyers. For all these services 
LPMS charges buyers a 6% commission on sales value.
There are approximately 30 auction sales yards in the country although only 13 are 
presently used. Between 1985-88 LPMS organized an average of 46 cattle auction 
sales in the country per year. In 1987, an arrangement was made with the South 
African Meat Board for NAFC to export Lesotho’s livestock to RSA abattoirs. 
At present NAFC is exporting cattle to the Bloemfontein abattoir.
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Farmers from villages far from sales yards wishing to sell cattle register with the 
local Livestock Assistant who in turn submits the list to the District Livestock 
Officer (DLO). The DLO forwards the list to LPMS which then sets a date for 
an auction. LPMS usually recommends that a minimum of 20 cattle he offered for 
sale at these unscheduled auctions. Stockowners who wish to sell to the NAFC 
can do so indirectly through the LPMS auctions or directly to the NAFC at 
Maseru.
The National Feedlot’s handling capacity is 3,600 cattle at any time and if cattle 
are fed for an average of 90 days, it can accommodate 14,400 cattle per year. 
The National Feedlot buys cattle from three sources: LPMS auction sales, direct 
purchases from farmers, and imports from the RSA. The National Abattoir design 
capacity is 100 cattle and 200 sheep or goats per day on a single shift day. Most 
of the animals supplied to the abattoir are from the National Feedlot. The abattoir 
slaughters animals on custom and proprietary basis. Under custom slaughter, an 
individual or firm commissions the abattoir to slaughter animals for a fixed fee. 
Under proprietary slaughter the abattoir slaughters animals which it owns and sells 
the parts.
Butcheries are the other formal marketing channel utilized by Basotho 
stockowners. Very few butchers attend LPMS auction sales eg. in 1987/88 only 
about five butchers attended regularly. Before the early 1980s, the common 
practice was for farmers to sell animals directly to butcheries. Under the present 
marketing system dominated by NAFC, the situation is changing. This is because 
butchers are now advised to buy animals slaughtered at the National Abattoir or 
have them custom slaughtered. The majority of butcheries purchase cattle from 
the NAFC. In 1985, Maseru butchers purchased 64% of their cattle from the 
National Feedlot, the majority of which were purchased by the Feedlot from the 
RSA. With regards to sheep, most butchers purchase from RSA farmers. In 
1985, Maseru butchers purchased 81 % of the sheep from RSA farmers (Swallow, 
Mokitimi and Brokken, 1986). Butchers prefer to import sheep because the supply 
from Basotho farmers is irregular. RSA suppliers also provide 30 day credit 
unlike Basotho farmers who demand cash on delivery. In comparing Tables I and 
II, it is evident that the number of animals slaughtered by butcheries is much more 
than those sold through LPMS auctions. This means that most of the animals 
slaughtered by the butcheries are imported from the RSA.
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Table I: Number of Cattle sold through LPMS
auction sales (1979-1988)
Year Number Average Price (M)
1979 198 162
1980 2 134 185
1981 4 158 303
1982 2 161 289
1983 1 539 255
1984 1 234 295
1985 1 155 340
1986 1 575 396
1986/87 3 378 487
1987/88 4 983 651
Source: LPMS Annual Reports and Swallow, Mokitimi 
and Brokken (1986).
Table II: Estimated Number of Animals Slaughtered
by Butcheries (1978-1985)
Year Cattle Sheep Goats
1978 10 837 55 385 573
1979 16 416 67 945 625
1980 15 851 85 793 525
1981 14 655 89 968 223
1982 10 171 93 534 652
1983 5 166 53 145 878
1984 6 998 57 744 604
1985 8 581 65 053 395
Source: Bureau of Statistics (1987).
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Informal Marketing Channels
Individuals such as farmers and traditional doctors are the most important informal 
marketing channel utilized by Basotho stockowners. Individuals purchase animals 
for home consumption, bridewealth payments bohali and ceremonies (wedding, 
funerals etc.). Traditional doctors in most cases purchase oxen and colored goats 
for rituals. Farmers purchase animals for draft power and also to increase their 
herds or replace fallen or stolen stock. Before 1984, Basotho stockowners 
increased their herds by importing animals from the RSA. The mid-1970s 
experienced large wage increases in the RSA mines and cattle imports rose 
dramatically as miners invested the increased wages in cattle. Between 1975-78 
the cattle imported increased from 8,000 - 58,000 (this was the peak). Since 1984 
the importation of animals has been restricted to those of improved breeds or those 
for slaughter. This means those farmers who wish to increase their herds have to 
acquire animals from within the country.
In the livestock owning households survey, respondents were asked the source of 
cattle, sheep and goats purchases: 62% of catMe, 83 % of the sheep and 95 % of the 
goats were purchased from farmers in the neighborhood. That is the same village 
or nearby village; 31 % of the cattle, 1 % of the sheep and 2% of the goats were 
purchased from the RSA. It is possible that the percentage of animals purchased 
from the RSA has decreased because of the restrictions on imports. Most 
purchased animals were males. It can be argued that farmers retain the females 
to build up their herds.
Under stock sales, most animals were also sold to farmers in the neighborhood: 
82% of the cattle, 61 % of the sheep and 90% of the goats. Most of the animals 
sold were males. This further supports the argument that farmers retain the 
females for building their herds. Butcheries were the second most important 
marketing channel utilized by the stockowners with the National Feedlot and 
LPMS auction sales last.
Data on animals slaughtered by rural households also indicate that the informal 
market is the most important marketing channel utilized by Basotho stockowners 
(Table II). Animals slaughtered came from own herd, purchases and gifts. It can 
be concluded that most of the slaughtered animals by rural households are 
purchased. As noted earlier, data from utilization of the formal marketing system
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channels indicate they handle small numbers. This means most of the animals 
slaughtered by rural households are purchased from farmers in the neighborhood.
Table III: Number of Animals Slaughtered by Rural Households
Year Cattle Sheep Goats
1979/80 13 351 43 113 24
930
1980/81 14 598 49 636 29
415
1981/82 20 279 79 050 36
402
1982/83 17 500 80 000 37
Source: Unpublished data from Bureau of Statistics.
Appropriate Perspective on Cattle Marketing in Lesotho
Evidence from the studies leads to the acceptance of the perspective that Basotho 
regard their livestock as capital assets, because livestock generate returns 
competitive with other investments opportunities. Analysts have recently stressed 
the importance of cattle as investment goods in Lesotho. Over the period 1978-84, 
the average interest rate on savings accounts in Lesotho banks was 10%. This 
compared unfavorably with significant positive rates of return from livestock 
investment found by the studies. The studies findings are that the estimated 
returns to capital investment were 8,3% for cattle, 7,2% for sheep and 10,1 % for 
goats. Respondents in the survey were asked questions regarding the most 
important reasons for owning livestock. The majority of reasons given were 
economic. This further supports the conclusion that economic factors dominate 
social and cultural factors in determining how and why Basotho own and manage 
their livestock.
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The dairy marketing system comprises the formal and informal marketing 
channels. These marketing channels differ both in their price discovery process 
and in the phases through which the product passes before reaching the consumer. 
The aim is to explore the main features of the milk marketing sub-system.
The expression "price discovery" is used in literature of agricultural economies as 
a process of establishing commodity prices. The process takes place in many 
ways. It involves numerous alternative physical and institutional arrangements 
which vary from informal to formal marketing sub-systems of markets. Buyers 
and sellers may privately agree on what prices they deem equitable; prices may be 
established through auctions; a monopolist may set prices that buyers should accept 
prior to the transaction taking place. Alternatively, monopolists would strife to 
dictate prices at which they buy.
Formal Marketing Channels
The formal milk marketing sub-system consists of two scenarios. Firstly, the 
Lesotho Dairy Products Company is the only formal marketing channel which 
purchases raw milk, and performs three major marketing functions of processing, 
packaging and distribution. Since the import controls were instituted in 1988, 
there is less competition. Milk imports constitute the second milk marketing 
channel and the marketing functions are mainly performed by foreign Firms made 
up of dairy plants, supermarkets and retail shops. The formal marketing channels 
perform operations such as enforcing certain minimum standards of hygiene, 
quality control, processing and packaging of milk which all contribute towards 
changing the form of the final product.
In dealing with the formal marketing channels, emphasis is placed on utilization 
of locally produced milk from the farm to the consumer. Therefore, the sub­
system presented in the figure excludes imports, hence no attempt was made to 
present the entire system of milk marketing channels. The area of inquiry is to 
highlight the relative importance of formal marketing channels against the 
utilization of informal marketing alternatives.
Marketing Channels Utilized by Basotho Dairy Farmers
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The milk collection centres which were established in 1987 through the 
Canada/Lesotho Dairy Development Project perform the vital function of supplying 
milk to the dairy plant. Milk collected at the centres is cooled and stored in bulk 
before it is transported to the dairy plant in Maseru for processing. Since the 
collection centres were built the utilization of formal marketing channels has been 
growing.
Despite the establishment of the dairy plant and collection centres, the volume of 
milk marketed through formal marketing channels remains low. It has been 
established through a survey (Mochebelele, 1990) that only 31,2% of milk 
produced by local farmers is marketed through the Lesotho Dairy Products 
Company. In other words most of the milk is retained by households for domestic 
consumption or selling through informal marketing channels directly from the 
farms. The survey further established that the 31,2% of milk delivered to the 
dairy plant comes from 23 % of dairy farmers. The remaining 77 % of farmers do 
not utilize formal marketing channels for the disposal of their produce.
Milk Distribution and Collection
Farmers arrange their own transport to deliver milk to either the processing plant 
or the collection centres depending on which is more convenient. The modes of 
milk delivery involve either the use of own transport, or arrangemens among 
farmers who have vehicles. In cases where alternate arrangements are practiced, 
members draw up a rota such as a week for each farmer. This practice facilitates 
a close to optimal use of resources and provides an effective means of cutting 
costs. However, it promotes efficiency only among farmers who have resources 
and are clustered in the same location but becomes practically impossible for 
sparsely located farmers in the rural areas.
The most common transport is the independent individual farmers’ vehicles. But 
this is expensive as all costs are borne by individual farmers. In many ways, the 
economies of scale benefit farmers who share transport organized and paid for 
jointly through the dairy associations. But this is not often possible because oflack 
of concentration of farmers in most areas. Use of public transport for milk 
delivery has a number of inconveniences, for example it is unreliable and leads to 
late deliveries.
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Some of the reasons why the utilization of formal milk marketing channels is low 
are: lack of organized and efficient means of transport; the economies of scale 
which do not justify transporting small quantities of milk to distant collection 
centres or make direct deliveries to the dairy plant; and the problem of moving the 
product from the collection centres to the dairy plant. Tests made at the dairy 
plant sometimes lead to rejection of milk on the basis of substandard hygiene and 
quality control. In cases where milk is delivered from a collection centre in bulk 
tanks, losses are larger and affect all farmers in the centre concerned. To avoid 
the problem of joint liability it is imperative that all tests be made at the milk 
collection centres where farmers carry individual liability for their actions and 
mismanagement. Collective liability of losses arising from bulk deliverfies of milk 
to the plant from collection centres is more likely to promote inefficiencies.
As noted in Mochebele et al. (1990), the formal milk marketing channel (milk 
processing plant) tends to be a residual claimant of milk which cannot be 
successfully sold at a higher price through the informal marketing channels. In 
this way, the volume of milk intake at the plant is subject to seasonal variations 
in demand and supply in the informal marketing channels.
During summer when supply is high; when local supply of vegetables is high and 
competes with milk; and when the risk arising from perishability of milk is high; 
there is a general tendency for farmers to deliver more or all milk to the dairy 
plant. As these factors change the demand a supply imbalance again in winter, a 
higher ratio of milk tends to be marketed through informal marketing outlets. 
Larger farmers, who are few in number, are the exception. For the latter group, 
a "premium" gained from a higher price offered in the informal marketing outlets 
does not compensate for the inconvenience of irregular payments and collection of 
debts from many customers who buy in small volume. This also becomes time- 
consuming, and complicates both the financial accounting and planning.
In some milk marketing systems, the formal channels adopt a variable price 
depending on the demand a supply imbalances. In winter when supply is low, the 
dairy plants would offer a price premium to induce stable supply and full 
utilization of processing capacity. In contrast, a lower price in summer would be 
rationalized on the basis of excess supply. This option would potentially sustain 
a high milk intake in the formal markets in winter. It is important however, to 
note that the dairy plant is not likely to offer a premium in winter because supply 
requirements can still be met through import arrangements at less cost from the
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RSA. This is the fundamental issue which would predispose the Lesotho Dairy 
Products Company to continue dependence on imports to meet its capacity 
requirements.
We contend that a potential for a higher utilization of formal marketing channels 
exists, but there are many constraints related to uneasy access to the central 
marketing centres. The increased intake of milk in areas where collection centres 
have been established that utilization of formal markets is below its potential level.
Milk Pricing
In the formal marketing channels, farmers are primarily price takers. There is an 
unequal bargaining power between the atomistic number of farmers who sell to a 
single dairy plant which has monopsony power. The milk price is gazetted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture with the advice from other government departments and 
the dairy plant.
Since the milk collection centres were established, a two price system was 
effected. Farmers whose milk is precooled at the collection centres benefit from 
a price premium of two cents per litre. These collection centres have tended to 
stimulate milk sales from a nuclei of farmers situated in their locality centres. 
However, the beneficiaries of these spinoffs from the premium remain limited to 
a few farmers. At the moment, only three milk collection centres are operational.
Although farmers have limited influence on the price paid through formal 
channels, there are some benefits which do not exist in the informal marketing 
outlets. The formal marketing channels ensure stability in incomes and minimize 
risk to farmers. This reduces the incidence of dairy and seasonal fluctuations in 
demand for milk which farmers face in the informal marketing outlets. The milk 
collection centres and the dairy plant purchase all milk delivered daily by farmers, 
giving them a steady and reliable flow of income. Payments are made at 
convenient time and at fixed periods once or twice a month. Because farmers get 
lump sum revenue at fixed times, a measure of systematic planning is ensured in 
procurement of feed and other farm supplies.
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In terms of both the number of farmers, and the volume of trade for locally 
produced milk, informal marketing channels are of more significance than formal 
marketing channels. About 77 % of farmers rely on informal marketing outlets for 
sale of heir farm produce.
Major Outlets and the Price Discovery Mechanics:
The informal marketing outlets can be sub-divided into two main categories: 
direct sales from the farm to the consumer and direct sales to local institutions. 
In both cases, the transactions between the buyer and the seller take place at the 
farm gate. As a result they do not normally involve transportation costs. The 
transactions also eliminate other marketing functions such as processing, 
packaging, and product differentiation which would otherwise be performed in the 
formal marketing channels which involve the dairy plant. An alternative 
expression often used to explain this is "milk is milk."
The informal outlets account for 50% of total milk produced in Lesotho (figure I). 
Out of this 50%, 42,3% is the share of direct milk sales over-the-fence to final 
consumers in the neighbourhood. The other share, 7,7% of milk sales goes to 
local institutions.
Informal Marketing Channels
The institutions take many forms: hospitals, clinics, schools, hotels and 
restaurants. The share of these institutions is relatively low since they have a 
general tendency to deal in processed and packaged milk from the formal 
marketing channels. These institutions also tend to buy in bulk, therefore, 
individual small farmers often do not meet their requirements.
The milk pricing process in the informal marketing channels is primarily 
independent, free of legislation, and does not conform or relate with the formal 
pricing system. In this system, there are many buyers and many milk producing 
and selling farmers. Without clear appreciation of the institutional structure within 
which these farmers operate, one would easily be compelled to conclude that 
perfect competition prevails. However, because of the collusive nature of the 
farmers, they tend to wield a market power over the consumers.
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The most notable institutional structures through which fanners exercise market 
power are dairy farmers associations and cooperatives. These interest groups tend 
to foster uniform, but unlegislated form of pricing system within their locations 
and among members. It was found in the survey that even farmers who were not 
organized into associations or any form of groups are generally collusive in 
asserting power to ensure high, and uniform price in given areas where over-the- 
fence milk sales are made.
Because of the power base derived from collusive behaviour, the market structure 
in the informal markets assumes a monopolistic form. In this market there is an 
element of demand pull inflation in that there is too much money or high demand 
chasing a limited supply of milk. Farmers maximize their returns through milk 
sale prices which are significantly higher than the delivery price to the dairy plant. 
Consumers tend to prefer direct sale arrangements with farmers, perhaps 
influenced by dislike for processed milk and its comparatively high price. These 
forces create prevalence of artificial market conditions in favour of producers.
To quote Adam Smith (from Gould and Ferguson, 1980, p .210).
"People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices." By this, Smith attempted to show that the external 
market controls exercised by farmers are more amorphous than the government 
regulation. That is, when only a small number of producers are in a certain 
economic activity, there is a strong desire or incentive for them to aet collusively 
to fix a monopoly or a near monopoly price. This practice contravenes the 
universally accepted parable of perfect competition where all participants, whether 
demanders or suppliers, regard price as given.
Differences in producer prices reveal the kind of amorphous price discovery 
process exerted by producers in the informal market outlets. These producers 
exercise price discriminination between the institutions and individual consumers. 
The sale price to private consumers is approximately 1% lower than the price 
charged to institutions. But both prices are maintained well above the delivery 
price to the dairy plant. However, it is important to note that the informal market 
price remains competitive in the eyes of a consumer since it is lower than the price 
of processed and packaged milk sold through formal marketing channels. The 
high price for processed milk is due to the value-added at different stages before
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reaching the final market place and the consumer. These costs all add up and are 
subsequently passed on to the consumer.
It was not ascertained as to what factors contribute to the discriminatory pricing 
behaviour towards institutions and immediate consumers. However, common 
economic reasoning is suspected to prevail in explaining this tendency. 
Differences in demand elasticities and the ability of producers to seperate markets 
into sub-markets are the principal causes which lead to price discrimination in 
monopolistic markets.
The principal problem with the informal marketing channel is the tendency to 
restrict expansion. Since farmers do not get contracts and there is no obligation 
for the customers to buy all the milk produced, losses are incurred when the 
demand is low. A case was made earlier for summer months when supply is high 
while effective demand is low. Because of this market insecurity, farmers tend to 
keep small herds as a means of minimizing risk. Without guaranteed market, 
heavy losses are imminent since milk is highly perishable. Therefore, unless 
access to the dairy plant becomes easy and more collection centres are established, 
the rural dairy farmers are unlikely to expand their operations. An alternative 
solution would be a decrease in the prices during summer to stimulate demand. 
However, prices tend to be less responsible to supply-demand imbalances in the 
informal markets.
Alternative Ways of Milk Disposal
Besides marketing milk for cash income earnings, there are two other main forms 
of usage. These are retention of milk for household consumption and for the 
maintenance of calves before weaning. Indeed, it was not until the mid-1980s that 
policy pronouncements emphasized milk as an income earner as against the initial 
overemphasis of milk production towards meeting household requirements.
Even though these two forms of milk disposal are not income earning, they are 
cost-saving. They account for less than 20% of total milk production. Milk 
retained for home consumption and for herd boys makes up 12,3% with calf 
feeding making 6,4%. The use of milk substitutes (milk replacer) for calf feeding 
is not common, rather, farmers tend to raise calves on whole milk from their 
farms.
98
A SUBSYSTEM OF LESOTHO MILK MARKETING NETWORK
LESOTHO MILK PRODUCERS
(total milk production - 100 %)
1
42.3% 7 .7% 31.2% 6 .5% 12.3%
1 I i
Local Retail
Institu­ Outlets, Retention
tions Wholesalers, for
(Hospitals, Institutions, Calf
Clinics, Final Feeding
S c h o o 1s , Consumers,
etc. ) etc.
Source: Mochebele M. (1990)
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Conclusion
The paper sought to articulate the roles and functions of the informal and formal 
marketing channels utilized by Basotho livestock owners. It is evident from the 
research findings that the utilization of informal marketing channels in Lesotho 
prevails over the formal markets in the livestock industry. The supporting 
evidence indicates that 82% of cattle, 62% of sheep and 92% of goats are sold 
through informal marketing arrangements. A similar trend is documented for milk 
marketing, where only 31 % of total milk produced in Lesotho is marketed through 
formal marketing outlets. The main reasons are the inadequacy of the marketing 
infrastrure and lack of price incentives of the formal marketing channels.
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Introduction
Various definitions of economic integration exist, some of which exhibit serious 
anomalies in the characterisation of this phenomenon. The existence of economic 
interest between two or more countries, for instance, may not in itself entail 
economic integration or linkage. Thus, a significant volume of trade between 
countries could continue uninterrupted without the creation of, say, a free trade 
area, a customs union or an economic community. Furthermore, most economic 
literature on integration has generally laid stress on the instruments used such as 
free trade, market unification and policy coordination while very little attention has 
been paid to the integrating countries’ peculiar conditions and objectives. The net 
result of this bias has been the general disregard for a careful analysis of the 
various economic and political actors who initiate the process of regional 
integration and whose special interests are being served or sought.
In the above light, the economic and political environments within which such 
schemes are developed are ignored by many analysts and this has resulted in a 
general failure to explain some of the real motives behind integration. The 
enlightening analysis by Vaitsos on the definition of economic integration identified 
four criteria used in characterising this phenomenon, namely, (a) factor, product 
and social mobility; (b) uniqueness or similarity of economic stimuli emanating 
from policies (tariff, fiscal, monetary, etc.) as well as similarity in reactions (with 
respect to intensity and form) of economic actors; (c) institutional aspects of
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"supranational" agencies; and (d) collective use of power in relation to the rest of 
the world.1
It is perhaps at the level of determination of the criteria for measuring the degree 
of economic integration where most care ought to be taken. It is common among 
analysts to depend largely on the level of exchanges or goods, services and input 
in the countries’ interaction as a measure of economic integration. On the contrary 
, as Vaitsos pointed out, a realistic or representative analysis of inter-state 
economic integration would be inadequate unless account is taken of at least three 
types or levels of interaction, namely, interaction among networks of power; 
information and knowledge; and exchanges.
The importance of unequal power and knowledge (which include technology and 
R&D) is reflected in the possible dominance of certain countries in economic 
integration or cooperation arrangements. The motives of such strong powers as 
South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union; Kenya in the now defunct 
East African Community; Nigeria in ECOWAS; and Zimbabwe in SADCC are not 
always purely economic since they may also embrace national security, influence 
and/or mere prestige. Insofar as the elements of power and knowledge can never 
be equal among integrating states, it has been common for countries’ inherent 
development disparities before integration to be accentuated rather than reduced 
over time.
Against the above background, it would seem unrealistic for integrating countries 
to work towards equalising condition purely on the basis of exchanges and 
neglecting the elements of power and knowledge. It is imperative to appreciate 
that in understanding the meaning and theory of integration, it is important both 
to look at the instruments of this process and to establish who benefits from the 
scheme.
Economic integration among developing countries has so far assumed three 
distinctive but nevertheless overlapping forms. The first one is the laissez faire  
system which is typified by the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). The
Vaitsos, C .V . "Crisis in regional economic cooperation 
(integration) among developing countries: A Survey", World 
Development, V ol.6, N o.6, June, 1978, p .297.
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second type is a modified laissez fa ire  system in which elements of compensation 
through planning are introduced. The Central American Common Market 
(CACM); the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); and the East African 
Community (EAC) are good examples of this form. The third type of economic 
integration, the dirigiste system, links planning to regulation within the regional 
context. So far, this last type has been represented only by the Andean Group 
during the 1969-76 period.
One can also look at economic integration as assuming a multiplicity of 
approaches, two of which are integration of the market (the one most commonly 
used by the Third World countries but with least success) and integration by 
project (through cooperative efforts). Whereas the PTA falls under the former, 
the SADCC arrangement assumes characteristics of the latter.
Several factors have heightened developing countries’ interest in the process of 
integration and cooperation amongst themselves. The European Economic 
Community (EEC) provided an encouraging example. The general success of the 
European Community revealed appealing benefits derived from integrating regional 
markets. Increasingly, developing countries associated integration with the concept 
of rapid or accelerated economic development. This is particularly so against the 
background of the general failure of these countries to achieve most of their set 
objectives for the restructuring of the world economic order as reflected in a series 
of UNCTAD meetings beginning with its fourth session in Nairobi in May 1976.
The call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was conceived 
within the context of the North-South dialogue and whose spirit is contained in the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, exemplified the need for 
cooperation. In particular, the NIEO called for the achievement of more rational 
and equitable international economic relations and the encouragement of structural 
changes in the world economy; the creation of conditions which permit the further 
expansion of trade and intensification of economic cooperation among all nations; 
the strengthening of the economic independence of developing countries; and the 
establishment and promotion of international economic relations taking into account 
the agreed differences in development of the developing countries and their 
specific needs.
The failure of developing countries to achieve most of the above expectations of 
the international community made them to increasingly build faith on cooperation
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among themselves. For Africa in particular, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa contributed significantly to the emergence and/or 
consolidation of many regional groupings on the continent. Several factors 
peculiar to the African situation further justified the perceived need to integrate 
regional economies. The limited size of sub-Saharan African countries; the weak 
industrial and technological base; the dominance of foreign transnational companies 
in these economies; the low level of intraregional trade due mainly to restrictive 
tariff and non-tariff barriers and low industrial output, etc., have all suggested the 
desirability of integrating national economies.
Southern Africa Development Coordinating 
Conference (SADCC) Background
Conceived by the ’Front Line’ states in 1978 and institutionalised by the 1979 
Arusha Meeting of ministers that prepared the ground for the April 1980 Lusaka 
Summit of the Commonwealth heads of state, SADCC consists of eight Southern 
African countries and one from eastern Africa, namely Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. 
Namibia has since become a member. According to the basic statement of aims 
agreed upon at the Lusaka Summit, the following are the main objectives of 
SADCC:
a) the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only, 
on the Republic of South Africa (RSA).
b) the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of 
national, inter-state and regional policies;
c) the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional 
integration; and
d) concerted action to secure international cooperation within the 
framework of the strategy for economic liberalisation.
Apart from the 1980 Declaration, the SADCC has no treaty providing binding 
rules and regulations. The SADCC Memorandum of Understanding of 1981
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established the Summit of Heads of State or Government; the Council of Ministers 
and the Secretariat but it hardly amounts to a legal treaty, as in the case of the 
PTA, with constitutionally binding commitments. Consensus and voluntarism 
rather than binding rules are, thus, the criteria used by SADCC to devise and 
operationalise jointly agreed objectives.
Mindful of the disparities in development levels and the need to contain 
polarisation effects, SADCC states decided not to create a supranational institution 
to oversee the activities of the regional group. Instead, functional responsibilities 
have been allocated to member countries for coordination while the role of the 
small Secretariat in Botswana is primarily administrative. Accordingly, Angola 
has been assigned the task of coordinating energy development and conservation 
in the region; Zimbabwe food security and land conservation; Botswana crop 
research and control of animal diseases; Mozambique transport and 
communications; Swaziland training and manpower development; Tanzania 
industrialisation and trade; soil conservation and land utilisation are the 
responsibility of Lesotho in collaboration with Zimbabwe; mining for Zambia; 
fisheries and wild life for Malawi.
SADCC Performance
By world standards, the economies of the SADCC countries are very weak and 
greatly conditioned by extra-regional politico-economic events. The region’s total 
income was estimated at US$25 billion in 1982.2 The agricultural sector has 
continued to be the main source of national income and contributes roughly 34% 
of the GDP, employing about 79% of the total labour force and accounting for 
approximately 25 % of the region’s export receipts. Nevertheless, the area is well 
endowed with mineral resources. In 1983/84, for instance, it produced close to 
US$4 billion worth of mineral resources, most of which were exported out of the 
region. Mineral resources include diamonds, petroleum oil, copper, nickel, zinc, 
cobalt, gold, asbestos, chrome, coal and iron.
SADCC, SADCC: Investment in Production, February 1987, 
p .9.
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The manufacturing sector in SADCC has contributed very little to development 
except in Zimbabwe where it contributed US$1 195,3 million, or 30% of GDP in 
1983. Table 1 gives the manufacturing sector’s contribution to SADCC countries’ 
GDP. On average, recent trends in SADCC industrial growth have been poor and 
the principal explanations for this include the South African destabilisation efforts, 
especially in Angola and Mozambique where the industrial sector’s supportive 
infrastructure has been crippled. Secondly, the regional manufacturing sector’s 
high dependence on imported intermediate and capital goods during the period of 
mounting foreign exchange scarcities, resulting in capacity underutilisation, further 
worsened the sector’s performance. Generally, in the majority of member states, 
the 1980-87 period witnessed significant decline in the manufacturing sector’s 
share of GDP, with the regional average reduced from 31,1 % in 1980 to 12% in 
1987.3
Several country-specific problems have been associated with the poor economic 
performance of the SADCC region. In Angola, the good oil price of 1985 led to 
appreciable economic recovery but the South African and US-supported UNITA 
activities against the Angolan government negatively affected growth. The low 
price of oil since early 1986 which dropped by over 50% in that year alone, has 
further worsened Angola’s already desperate situation amidst the ever-rising debt 
service problem.
In Botswana during the 1985/86 period, the marked improvements in economic 
performance were affected by drought which reduced agricultural output 
significantly , resulting in the country having to import 90% of its grain 
requirements during the 1986/87 season. Nevertheless, during this period the 
generally good performance of the Botswana economy resulted in a 12,7% 
increase in the overall balance of payments surplus, and the debt service ratio 
stood at 1 % of exports.4
SADCC, Industry and Trade, Lusaka meeting, 31 January - 2 
February 1990, p .23.
SADCC, Annual Progress Report, July 1986 - August 1987, 
p.5.
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Table I: The Contribution of the Manufacturing Sector to SADCC Economies’ 
GDP
Angola MVA (mill kw) 
Share o f MVA in GDP
1980 1981
3.99
1982 1983 1984
Botswana MVA (mill Pula) 49.3 71.2 81.7 91.6 108.5
Share o f  MVA in GDP 4.1 3.7 9.0 7.7 7.3
MVA [mill US $] 63.5 85.5 80.0 83.5 84.5
Lesotho MVA (mill Maloti) 11.9 14.7 17.9 21.1
Share o f MVA in GDP 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.5
MVA [mill US $] 15.3 16.9 16.5 18.9
Malawi MVA (mill K) 
(1978 prices)
89.0 92.0 91.8 98.1
Share o f  MVA in GDP 11.7 12.8 12.4 12.8 12 3
MVA [mill US $] 109.6 102.8 86.9 83.5 71.8
Mozambique MVA (MVA mill Esc) 30.7 30.8 29.7 27.6
Share o f MVA in GDP 37.3 37.8 34.9 35.2
Swaziland MVA (mill E)
(1980 prices)
79.6 83.4 92.6 94.0
Share o f  MVA in GDP 21.8 22.3 22.8 23.5
MVA [mill US $] 102.3 101.6 89.3 84.5
Tanzania MVA (mill T.Shs) 
(1976 prices)
2 288.0 1 804.0 1 482.0 1 351.0 1 1710
Share o f  MVA in GDP 9.4 7.5 6.1 5.5 4.7
MVA [mill US $] 279.1 217.8 159.6 121.2 76.6
Zambia MVA (mill K) 
(1980 prices)
162.9 180.0 173.0 184.5
Share o f MVA in GDP 18.5 19.6 20.6 19.8
MVA [mill US $] 206.6 207.3 186.4 147.5
Zimbabwe MVA (mill Z$) 857.0 1084.0 1 188.0 1 208.0
Share o f MVA in GDP 24.9 25.1 30.0 30.0
MVA [mill US $] 1 333.6 1 575.0 1 568.7 1 195.3
Source: SADCC, SADCC Macro-economic Survey: 1986, SADCC Secretariat, 
1986, p. 104.
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In Lesotho and Swaziland, the fall in the South African Rand has had serious 
negative effects on the two small economies by virtue of their membership of the 
Rand Monetary Area (RMA). In Lesotho, the early 1986 South African blockade 
and low rainfall further worsened the economic performance of this small, 
essentially agricultural, economy. Additionally, the 1986/87 period saw the 
worsening of Lesotho’s balance of payments position as a result of increased 
consumption demand while the budget deficit increased. For Swaziland, on the 
positive side, the 1986/87 period saw a GDP growth of 9%, explained mainly by 
the higher sugar production in 1986 and improved performance of the 
manufacturing sector.
In the case of Malawi, despite better performance in the country’s agricultural 
sector during 1985, high transport costs, caused by disrupted routes to the sea via 
Mozambique, affected overall economic progress. It was reported that Malawi’s 
current account balance of payments deficit declined marginally from K 166,2 
million in 1985 to K163,6 million in 1986, despite a 7% increase in the volume 
of exports and massive 19% reduction in the volume of imports.5 The country’s 
real GDP fell by 3% during 1986/87 mainly because of the continuing transport 
problems and low export prices.
The effects of the South African supported MNR rebel activities in Mozambique 
not only caused major disruptions in the country’s economic performance despite 
improved rainfall in 1986 but also led to mounting tensions between that country 
and Malawi because of the latter’s alleged harbouring of anti-Mozambique MNR 
rebels. As a result of serious disruptions of the production base by the civil 
instability that has seen the worsening of the country’s trade deficit, the 
Mozambican government embarked upon a major economic rehabilitation 
programme during the 1986/87 period.
A poor economic record and foreign exchange scarcities also characterised the 
Tanzanian economy during the 1985/86 period. As a result of the depressed 
economic activity and donor reluctance to provide more confessional aid unless the 
country softened its position on the IMF conditionalities, the new Mwinyi 
government slightly deviated from the economic policies of the former President 
Nyerere, (if one goes by the economic recovery programme Tanzania presented
Ibid., p .l
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to the donors at the June 1986 consultative meeting in Paris). Mainly as a result 
of the implementation of the "Economic Recovery Programme" earlier embarked 
upon, the Tanzanian economy performed better during the 1986/87 period than the 
previous year. Both the manufacturing (including agricultural) and mining sectors 
(which had been crippled by lack of inputs and machinery) have shown signs of 
improvements under the new programme.
In Zambia, despite the good agricultural season of 1985/86 (registering an all-time 
record harvest of nearly 11 million bags of maize), economic performance 
remained depressed due to foreign exchange scarcity as a result of the depressed 
copper prices. Copper alone accounts for more than 90% of Zambia’s export 
earnings. Although the system of auctioning foreign currency during the October 
1985 to May 1987 period brought some relief to importers, it resulted in higher 
consumer prices (as the value of the Kwacha fell significantly) while the country’s 
ever-worsening inflation led to a substantial depression in demand and 
consumption. The country’s GDP grew by only 0,75% during the July 1986 - 
August 1987 period amidst an escalating balance of payment crisis, budget deficit, 
and depressed export prices.6 Nevertheless, the agricultural sector performed 
much better in Zambia during the 1987/88 period due to a combination of price 
incentives and several policy changes.
Lastly, in Zimbabwe, an appreciable level of economic growth was registered in 
almost all the economic sectors during 1985. After political independence in 1980, 
the country’s manufacturing sector responded positively to the consumer boom 
through increased capacity utilisation. This was facilitated by the government’s 
ability to remove sanctions-induced internal constraints on production. This 
positive growth permitted remarkable improvements in the country’s external trade 
in which exports increased by 27% in 1980 and 7% in 1981. GDP also grew by 
26 % in the first two years of independence7.
SADCC, Annual Progress Report, July 1986 - August 1987,
p.6.
Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Review o f  Zimbabwe 
(Annual Supplement), EIU, 1985, p .7.
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However, like in most of the other SADCC countries, the Zimbabwean economic 
recovery was not self-sustained. The 1982/84 period, for example, witnessed a 
decline in GDP mainly due to the drought-induced low agricultural output. Sales 
of maize dropped by close to 70% between 1981/82 and 1983/84. The mining 
sector, similarly, suffered from both the fall in world prices and the strength of 
the Zimbabwean dollar, while the resultant foreign exchange shortages have had 
serious effects on the performance of the manufacturing sector. Due to the 
mounting balance of payments deficit, the government reimposed import controls. 
Meanwhile, Zimbabwe’s debt service rose from 2,6% of its exports earnings in 
1980 to over 30% two years later8. Against the above background, the shortage 
of imported inputs in production principally explained the 1986/87 real GDP 
growth of only 0,18%. This period also witnessed a 11 % drop in Zimbabwean 
agricultural production, mainly because of drought conditions. Notwithstanding 
the above, the country’s agricultural exports rose by 31,6% during the 1986/87 
period9.
In addition to the country-specific problems analysed above, there are several other 
related constraints that have affected the SADCC region as a whole. Firstly, the 
worsening terms of trade is such that prices of most regional export commodities, 
largely raw materials, have remained either static or declined while the prices of 
their manufactured imports continue to rise. For example, the raw materials price 
declined by 1 % between 1985 and 1986 while that of manufactured goods rose by 
18%. This has worsened the balance of payments position of almost all SADCC 
countries, most of which presently suffer from a critical shortage of foreign 
exchange and declining export performance, especially Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Thus, as the 1987 SADCC report observed, "foreign exchange 
shortages have reduced import capacity, particularly for inputs, spare parts and 
plant. As a result, capacity underutilisation of as much as 70% in some instances 
has been reported. In 1986, output declined by 6,7% and 1,04% in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe respectively"10.
Ibid., p .8.
SADCC, Annual Progress Report, July 1986-August 1987, p .6. 
Ibid., p .4.
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Secondly, with regard to mounting external debt, the OECD put the total 
outstanding debts of SADCC countries at US$14,64 tfillion at the end of 1985 - 
which was equivalent to approximately 50% of the region’s GDP.
SADCC Cooperation in Industrial Project
Against the background of the general SADCC performance vis-a-vis the 
international and local environments, this part examines SADCC cooperation in 
one of its strategic sectors: industrial project. Generally, per capita manufactured 
output in Africa is the lowest in developing countries and of the little 
manufacturing that exists on the continent, as much as 85 % is concentrated in only 
one-third of the African countries. The Central, Eastern and Southern African 
regions (excluding South Africa) have registered the lowest rate of growth of the 
manufacturing sector in Africa." The pattern of industrial growth on the 
continent has also remained undiversified, with the light industrial, largely 
agricultural sector being predominant, accounting for 68% of manufactured value 
added.
The general performance of individual SADCC economies has already been 
presented. Suffice it to mention here that the SADCC countries industrial sector 
is relatively underdeveloped, with Zimbabwe being by far the most industrially 
developed country in the region, with the manufacturing value added contributing 
roughly 30% to the country’s GDP in 1983 - while this was as low as 5,5% in 
Tanzania and Lesotho, 7,7% in Botswana, and 12,8% in Malawi.
Recent trends in SADCC industrial growth have generally been unfavourable and 
the principle constraints accounting for this include South African destabilisation 
efforts; the regional manufacturing sectors import-intensive characteristic amidst 
foreign exchange scarties and balance of payments problems; restrictive national 
markets and, quite often, an unfavourable investment climate due to a combination 
of geopolitical factors and faulty government policies.
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Survey o f  
Economic and Social Conditions in Africa, Part 1, E/CN., 
14/802, p .66.
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Investment Policies and Mechanisms
Under the SADCC system of decentralisation of sectoral functions, Tanzania was 
allocated the responsibility of coordinating both the industrial and trade sectors. 
Although SADCC was established in 1980, the institutionalisation of actual 
coordination of the industrial sector was effected only by the end of 1982. 
According to the 1981 Action Plan in the Memorandum for Industrial Cooperation, 
SADCC countries agreed on five objectives, namely:
a) to reduce external dependence, nationally and regionally, on imports of
industrial products and inputs from outside the region;
b) in particular, reduce dependence on the Republic of South Africa, which
is the largest single source of such products and inputs for five of the nine 
SADCC states and a significant one for two more;
c) to increase the size (absolutely and relative to total national production)
of the industrial sector, both nationally and regionally;
d) to increase the scope and diversity of the industrial sectors of the member 
states and the region through increasing the range of final products, 
intermediate goods and capital goods produced;
e) to increase the linkages within the national and regional industrial sectors 
to make particular industries and industrial activities as a whole more 
integrated and self-reliant and less dependent on raw materials, 
intermediate inputs and spares from outside the region.12
To realise the above objectives, the SADCC Council of Ministers resolved in 1981 
that the industrial coordination function should Consist of three phases. In the 
short term, SADCC should aim at greater utilisation of installed plant capacities 
so that supply gaps in other countries are filled. In the medium term, it was 
agreed that "trade matching could be applied to projects already under
SADCC, Industrial Cooperation, Blantyre, November 1981, pp. 
1-2 .
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implementation or planned which could have a national surplus to meet regional 
supply gaps. Such integration could be planned in advance and also modify 
priorities in national plans to take account of parallel projects, thus fostering 
specialisation".13 In the long run, the SADCC Council of Ministers maintained 
that there is need to plan regionally relevant investment decisions within the 
context of industrial complementarity and realisation of economies of scale. To 
achieve the above broad policy guidelines, SADCC recognises that both the private 
and public enterprises that are involved in productive and commercial undertakings 
should be supported.
According to the 1981 Memorandum on SADCC industrial cooperation, the 
priority industrial project areas in the region relate primarily to the satisfaction of 
the people’s basic need in food, clothing, housing, health care, water and its 
supply, transport and communications, and education. At the level of 
implementation, priority is given to the following sectors:
food and agro-industries; 
building materials and construction; 
metal and metal products; 
engineering and engineering products; 
chemical and 
forest-based industries.14
In the long-term perspective, the development of such core industries as those 
relating to the manufacture of basic fertilisers, pesticides and pharmaceuticals has 
been recognised in SADCC.
The mechanisms adopted by the SADCC in order to realise the priorities above 
included the expansion of existing industrial capacity, in addition to creating new 
capacity so as to meet regional demand. Paramount to this is SADCC’s 
recognition of the need to rehabilitate existing industries within the region. It has 
been discovered that although the earlier analysed level of industrial development
SADCC, SADCC Industry and Trade Activities, Arusha, 
January 1988, pp. 2-3.
SADCC, Industrial Cooperation, op.cit., p .5.
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in the SADCC region is quite modest, the existing industries generally operate far 
below their full potential. In SADCC, the underutilisation of installed capacities 
is not so much because of market limitations (i.e. lack of demand for the 
commodities produced) but principally because of inadequate inputs as a result of 
foreign exchange scarcity.
At the August 1985 SADCC workshop on rehabilitation, it was recognised that 
industrial rehabilitation should be undertaken on a selective basis, focusing 
primarily on industries using indigenous resources, those with export possibilities 
and those with potential to satisfy basic needs. It was further recognised that in 
carrying out a project rehabilitation exercise, there was need to take into account 
existing and potential interlinkages between the industrial sector and other sectors 
of the economy, especially agriculture and transport. Such supportive facilities as 
the provision of trained manpower in industrial skills, research in cost reduction 
and technology upgrading, standardisation of quality control, preventive 
maintenance schemes and manpower service were equally perceived to be 
essential in the rehabilitation programme." By January 1988, six projects were 
under rehabilitation; the Basotho Fruit and Vegetable Canners in Lesotho; Portland 
Cement Company in Malawi; cement plants in Mozambique; printing ink in 
Tanzania; the crushed stones project in Zambia; and Zimphos sulphuric acid in 
Zimbabwe.
Although rehabilitation has been recognised as one of the most effective 
approaches towards increasing industrial production in a region where existing 
industries are working inefficiently and below capacity, there is still room for 
improvement in the area of coordination. The current practice in SADCC is to ask 
member states to present their lists of projects that require rehabilitation. The 
nature of the lists presented by countries has varied significantly principally 
because these were drawn up before the SADCC agreed upon the earlier presented 
criteria for rehabilitation. As a result, in drawing up their lists, countries hardly 
considered the importance of taking into account existing and potential 
interlinkages and complementaries within the region.
Another aspect that deserves mention is the criteria of selecting and promoting 
regional projects. To qualify for promotion, a project is expected to contribute
SADCC, Industry, Harare, January 1988, p .9.
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towards the SADCC goals of economic independence. In addition to this general 
criterion, the project must satisfy any of the following conditions: "the ability of 
the project to meet internal consumption and have surplus to export particularly to 
the SADCC region; obtain raw materials within SADCC; the possibility of 
transporting raw materials and products within the region; a funding gap in foreign 
exchange; bankability; and a reasonable implementation period".16 The 
implementation of such approved regional projects is the responsibility of the 
appropriate institution(s).
Lastly, SADCC recognises the role of intra-regional trade in the realisation of 
enhanced industrial production. Trade in manufactured products within SADCC 
presently accounts for about 50% of total intraregional trade and the products 
involved include textiles, clothing, footwear, chemicals, soaps, pharmaceutical 
products and agricultural machinery. A system of direct trade measures and 
bilateral agreements is being developed in the region and these include multi-year 
purchase contracts, counter-purchases, preferential import licensing and product 
specific tariff reductions. The current efforts towards the creation of export pre­
financing revolving funds in SADCC countries and the development of a Regional 
Export Credit Fund are all in line with the new SADCC realisation that
the regional market has to be accessible to regional producers in order 
to stimulate both regional production and investment... The priority, 
therefore, is fully to utilise the regional market as a basis for
industrial development since  the development of modem industrial
enterprises often requires the expenditure of large amounts of capital 
and the national markets of the SADCC member states are not of 
sufficient size to sustain these investments.17
What all this means is that trade in SADCC is seen not as an end in itself but as 
an instrument for the realisation of expanded material production, in line with the 
production/project oriented approach to iniegration.
SADCC, SADCC Industry and Trade ,4crivjries,op.cit.,p.5. 
SADCC, SADCC Investment in Production, op.cit.,p .36.
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With regard to the implementation status of the SADCC industrial programme, it 
required a total of US$1,434,81 million (excluding the trade element) by 
December 1987, of which US$282,19 million had, by then, been secured. 
Additionally, of the original 55 projects in the industrial field, 39 were under 
implementation of which seven had already been completed.18
One noticeable feature of the pattern of industrial projects distribution among 
SADCC members is that it is highly skewed in favour of the country coordinating 
the industrial sector, Tanzania. By 1986/87, for example, 99,2% of all completed 
SADCC capital investment projects (foreign exchange component) were 
concentrated in Tanzania while 81% of all capital investment projects under 
implementation were located in the same country. Furthermore, Tanzania got the 
lion’s share (55,5%) of all the SADCC capital investment projects under 
negotiation during the same period. Table 2 shows the accumulated distribution, 
by country, of industrial projects by 1986/87. While this bias in favour of 
Tanzania could be justified on redistributional grounds given the relatively low 
level of industrialisation in the country vis-a-vis other SADCC members, a genuine 
concern could still be raised over the low distributional priority being accorded to 
countries such as Malawi, Swaziland, and Botswana which have a similar status 
to Tanzania in the industrial field.
Transnational Corporations and SADCC Industrialisation
Direct foreign investment is presently encouraged, to varying degrees, in all the 
SADCC states. While in some countries foreign investment is allowed in 
restricted areas, in some it is promoted in all sectors of the economy as joint 
ventures and/or wholly-owned private companies. Foreign investment is currently 
receiving priority within SADCC in the following broad areas:
(i) production of those consumer goods that meet the basic needs of 
the people;
(ii) resource-based ventures such as agro-based industries;
SADCC, SADCC Industry and Trade Activities, op.cit., pp. 11, 
30-31.
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Table II: Accumulated Distribution by Country of Industrial Projects - 
Foreign Exchange Component, 1986/87
Category Total Mill. US $
Ang Bots Lea Mai Moz Swa Tan Zam Zim
AI 188/422 1/416 187/006
100% - - 0.8% - - - 99.2% - -
AJ-AII 264/058 0 0/835 1/164 0 25 0 214/307 12 10/5
100% 0% 0.5% 0.55 0% 9.5% 0 81% 4.5% 4%
AI-Affl 386/888 0 3/595 2/166 109 32/28 1/04 214/307 14 10/5
100% 0% 1% 0.5% 28% 8.5% 0.5% 55.5% 3.5% 2.9%
Al-ATV 1/272/122 0 3/595 2/166 109 337/88 1/04 723/941 8410/5
100% 0% 0.5% 0% 8.5% 26.5% 0% 57% 6.5% 1%
AI-AV 1/304/352 0 5/005 6/076 110/41 337/88 1/04 724/841 10019/1
100% 0% 0.5% 0.5% 8.5% 26% 0% 55.5% 7.5% 1.5%
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A1 = Completed capital investment projects 
All = Capital investment projects under implementation
AIII = Capital investment projects under negotiation (with foreign
funder)
AIV =  Capital investment project requiring funding
AV =  Capital investment projects being revised
Source: Haarlov, J., Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa..., op.cit.,p. 102.
(iii) investment in such core industries as petrochemicals, iron and 
steel;
(iv) export oriented industries which have the potential to diversify 
the economies export base and generate foreign exchange;
(v) development of intermediate goods industries.19
SADCC maintains that foreign enterprises are in control of investment resources 
of finance, technology and expertise and hence, hopes, to progressively involve 
them in the process of consultations with the regional enterprise.20
Although direct foreign investment in Southern Africa is concentrated in the more 
profitable South Africa, many transnational corporations (TNCs) used that country 
as a convenient bridgehead for their subregional operations. While a considerable 
number of mainly British and American firms have diversified their operations 
from South Africa into the neighbouring SADCC countries, some have 
independently penetrated the SADCC region in such areas as mining, banking and 
major agricultural estates and agro-industries.
SADCC, Investment Policies and Mechanisms o f  SADCC  
Countries, Dar-es-Salaam, 1986, pp. 6-7.
SADCC, Industry and Trade, Mining, Tourism, op.cit.,p .5 .
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South African investments have also been exported to SADCC states. A closer 
examination of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho can illustrate this.21 
The dominance of Western and especially South African-based TNCs in Zimbabwe 
is quite remarkable and they are concentrated mainly in the manufacturing, mining, 
finance, distribution and property sectors. In 1975, for example, over 75% of 
manufacturing holdings were owned by foreign companies.22 During the 1980s, 
Zimbabwe held an estimated one-third of SADCC’s total foreign investment.23
South African investment is considerable in Zimbabwe because the pre­
independence sanctions and UDI in Rhodesia worked to the disadvantage the of 
British and American investment and, thus, consolidated the South African 
position. As has been observed,
most investment in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) between 1965 and 1979 was 
from funds "locked-up" behind the sanctions wall, but a substantial 
portion of the fresh capital from external sources originated from South 
of the Limpopo. In addition, the Rhodesian private sector received up 
to US $40 million a year in credit loans from South African banks 
during the 1970s.24
For the Zambian Case, see Saasa, O .S ., Z am bia’s Policies 
Towards Foreign Investment: The Case o f the Mining and Nn 
mining Sectors, Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute o f African 
Studies, 1987.
Thompson, C .B ., "Regional Economic Policy Crisis 
Conditions: The Case o f  SADCC", Current African Issue, 
S1AS, N o.6, 1986, p .10.
Clarke, S. Financial Aspects o f  Economic Sanctions on South 
Africa, London, Africa Bureau, 1981, p .88.
Bowman, L., Bratton, M. and Murapa, R., "Zimbabwe and 
South Africa: Dependence, Destabilisation and Liberation", 
Callagny, T.M . (ed), South Africa in Southern Africa, New
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By 1979, it was estimated that South African investment in Zimbabwe was 479 
million 25 and that approximately one-quarter of the country’s total capital was 
contributed by South Africa.26 For Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the BLS 
states), geographical proximity to and economic intimacy with South African have 
facilitated effective integration of their economies in the South African matrix, thus 
allowing for extensive foreign investment from that country. In Botswana, almost 
all South African investment is directed towards the mining sector. The Anglo 
American Corporation (AAC) controls Botswana’s copper-nickel mine which is 
jointly held with Amax. Nickel, dominated by Western interests, represents one 
of Botswana’s largest exports and its production and is the second largest employer 
next to government. In 1984, exports of Botswana diamonds, also dominated by 
foreign interest, totalled P616 million or 76% of the country’s total export 
earnings.27
In Swaziland foreign investment is also well consolidated. In commercial 
agriculture, which dominates external trade, the country is dependent on a few 
foreign-owned establishments which are responsible for over 90% of total 
production.28 Foreign capital is also pronounced in tourism. Swaziland’s present 
open policy is designed to solicit foreign investment. Combined with South 
Africa’s current "deconcentration" policy designed to diffuse its industrial 
establishment into the Bantustans and adjacent neighbours, the Swazi government’s 
policy has continued to attract foreign investment through generous tax incentives;
York, Praeger, 1983, p .328.
Clarke, D .G ., Foreign Companies and International 
Investment in Zimbabwe, Gwelo, CIIR, 1980, p. 133.
Hanion, J. Conflict and Dependenoe in Southern Africa, Third 
World Affairs, 1985, p .216.
Economic Intelligence Unit, op.cit., p .30.
ILO (JASPA), Reducing Dependence: A Strategy fo r  
Productive Employment and Development in Swaziland, Addis 
Ababa, ILO, 1977, p .2.
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commitment against nationalisation; liberal policies on dividend and profit 
repatriations and a guaranteed supply of cheap docile labour.
Lastly, Lesotho is also dominated by Western and South African investments. De 
Beers has substantial investments in the country’s diamond mining and processing. 
Foreign trade interests dominate the manufacturing sector and in 1982 accounted 
for 6 % of GDP at factor cost, employing about 6000 people, which is 46 % of the 
number employed by the government in a country in which 85% of the total 
population is dependent on cultivation and herding.29
Overall, the preceding analysis demonstrates a very high level of transnational 
corporate activity in most SADCC economies. The degree and pattern of foreign 
direct investment in the region have, thus, remained as important considerations 
in analysing the integration of production among SADCC countries vis-a-vis the 
sharing of benefits from cooperation (see below).
Critical Review and Conclusions
This paper has so far revealed several salient features of the SADCC economies, 
their performance, and the regional group’s industrial objectives as well as 
investment policies and mechanisms. Emphasis has been placed on identifying the 
constraints that have slowed down progress in the realisation of SADCC goals. 
These have included the generally poor economic performance of SADCC 
economies; regional political instability; mounting external debt; inadequate 
development finance from both local and external sources; foreign exchange 
scarcity amidst import-intensive production systems; and idle capacity in industry.
Several issues have emerged in the preceding analysis. Firstly, the level of foreign 
finance in SADCC, constituting 86,26% of the total requirements as of August 
1987, raises issues regarding the extent to which SADCC’s objective of "reduction 
of economic dependence particularly, but not only, on the RSA", is being realised. 
Hence, although there is a lot of enthusiasm within SADCC at the level of project 
identification, one notes that those regional projects which fail to attract foreign 
blessing usually lag behind, or are completely abandoned. As a result, since
Economic Intelligence Unit, op.cit., p .45.
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SADCC was created in 1980, the pace and pattern of project implementation has 
been critically influenced by the availability of foreign finance.
Notwithstanding the above concern, it could still be argued that dependence on 
foreign development finance in itself may not necessarily conflict with the SADCC 
objective of self-reliance as long as such finance is directed towards those projects 
and programmes with long-term dependence-reducing effects and as long as the 
terms under which donor assistance is received do not compromise the attainment 
of the set goals. For example, if the conditions under which foreign finance is 
received promote the development of physical and human resources; promote intra- 
and inter-sectoral linkages and industrial diversification; lead to the acquisition of 
the required technologies and related inputs; and promote research and 
development (R&D), then the long-term effects of such dependence should be 
positive. Nevertheless, greater efforts should be directed towards the mobilisation 
of SADCC-based financial and human resources to complement externally derived 
ones. In the final sphere, this could be realised, inter alia, through enhanced 
cooperation among national development banks within SADCC, and the promotion 
of joint ventures between regional investors.
Several developments in the SADCC industrial sector merit re-examination and re­
focusing. Firstly, the current main preoccupation of the SADCC industrial 
coordinating country has been project identification. As UNIDO noted, "the role 
of Tanzania is restricted mainly to project identification, largely through sub- 
sectoral studies. It does not cover harmonisation of industrial policies, 
legislation... and overall industrial promotion activities and machineries".30 If 
this problem is not taken seriously under the current SADCC initiatives (started 
in 1986 focusing on harmonisation of SADCC investment policies and 
mechanisms), it will continue to lead to the development of industrial programmes 
that are isolated from each other. In the past, this had led to the absence of inter- 
and intra-sectoral linkages, duplication of industrial projects resulting in excess 
capacity and thus wastage of scarce regional resources, both human and material.
UN ID O , Industria l C ooperation through SADCC, 
Preliminary Report prepared by UNIDO Regional and Country 
Studies Branch, Mimeo, 1983, p. 16
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Secondly, the 1982 guidelines for industrial projects are hardly used in regional 
industrial planning. There has been a tendency among SADCC countries to submit 
for funding regional projects that were already under way at the national level so 
at the time of their selection the SADCC criteria were not used. Besides, 75 % of 
all investment costs covered a few large projects, mainly in the textiles and 
pulp/paper subsectors, thus confirming the assertion that SADCC industrial 
planning does not follow the agreed strategy and criteria for project proposals.31
Thirdly, SADCC has recognised the need to give priority to plant rehabilitation 
rather than escalating the number of new projects. This position is held against 
the background of the region’s general problem of capacity underutilisation.
In practice, however, this has not been the case. The 1986 SADCC macro- 
economic survey revealed that "in practice, the balance of investment resources 
has weighted heavily (85 %) in favour of new investment, compared to investments 
in rehabilitation (14% )".32 SADCC thus needs to re-orient its implementation 
programmes in accordance with its stated strategies. This calls for greater effort 
towards implementing carefully selected rehabilitation activities in a way that 
would ultimately produce the required structural changes in the SADCC 
economies.
Lastly, the level of foreign investment in the SADCC region as presented in the 
last section raises issue regarding, for instance, who would be the principle 
beneficiary when the right investment climate (i.e. a stable political climate in the 
region, an efficient national administration, and appreciable rate of return on 
investment) is created. In the SADCC region where TNCs have dominated the 
productive and intra and extraregional export sectors, it appears that the 
interrelationship between policies towards foreign investment and those relating to
See Wangwe, S.ML, "Planning for Industry and Mining in 
SADCC"; SADCC, Macro-economic Survey: Report on the 
Lilongwe Workshop, August, 1986, p .91.
Ibid, p .91 .
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1regional economic integration is very strong.33 It has been noted that several 
incentives have been extended to provide investment. These include tax holidays 
for infant industries; taxable allowances linked to technical training expenses; 
refund or draw back on import taxes for inputs required to produce exportable 
commodities and double taxation agreements. And yet TNCs main attributes and 
operational strategies have given them an advantage over local entrepreneurs. For 
example, TNC’s technological dominance, company-specific assets such as 
trademarks, managerial skills, corporate controls, etc., all place these giant firms 
at an advantage over their local competitors.34
Regarding TNCs and their effect on redistributional considerations in regional 
cooperation, the observation by Vaitsos is quite revealing:
Regional cooperation, if it is pursued solely on the basis of commercial 
integration...implies, by definition, an increase in the bargaining power 
of transnational enterprises (TNEs). The merging of several domestic 
markets while retaining various autonomous governmental authority 
with the power to independently set or accept terms with the foreign 
investors, will imply that the TNEs will promote investments in the 
country which offers them the more favourable conditions. Thus, the 
member countries are competing with each other as to which will 
provide the most favourable terms to foreign firms.35
For an empirical application o f this theoretical relationship, see 
Tiront, E., Economic Integration and Foreign Direct Investment 
Policies: The Angean case, Ph.D dissertation, MIT, Cambridge 
Mass, 1976.
For a more detailed analysis o f the strength o f TNCs as applied 
to Tanzania and Zambia, see Saasa, O ., The Control o f  TNCs 
in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis o f  National 
Policy-making towards InternationalInvestmentin Tanzania and 
Zambia. Ph.D. Thesis, University o f  Southampton, 1982.
Vaitsos, C .V ., "Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation 
(integration) among Developing Countries: A Survey. World 
Development, V ol.6, N o .6, June 1978, p.290.
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Furthermore, although the reduction of obstacles to effective flow of capital into 
SADCC is important, several studies have doubted the ability of special incentives 
to attract direct foreign investment. In its 1985 Report, for instance, the World 
Bank concluded that "the impact of specific incentives for direct investment is 
uncertain. Numerous studies have suggested that business executives tend to 
ignore or downplay incentives in making decisions on where to invest".36
SADCC seems to have recognised the potential negative effects of member states 
engaging in "wars of incentives" among themselves in their efforts to attract 
investors. Following the compilation and publication of Mechanisms o f  SADCC 
Countries in 1986, SADCC is examining the possibilities of how to effectively 
harmonise the member countries’ investment policies vis-a-vis the recognition that 
"unbalanced and competitive development can be avoided by seeking and 
emphasizing strategies which are clearly beneficial...and by emphasizing that 
regional balance is essential not only for sustained cooperation but also for 
sustained development".37 Memories of Kenya’s industrial dominance in the East 
African Community and Southern Rhodesia’s lead in the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland are still fresh in the minds of the SADCC leaders, thus prompting 
them to be cautious on the issue of distribution of benefits from cooperation. As 
Green commented over the general manufacturing dominance of Zimbabwe in the 
region, "great care and imagination will be needed to devise trade agreements with 
its neighbours which both facilitate Zimbabwean production for export and give 
some guarantee of relatively balanced new production and export opportunities for 
its partners".38 One cannot put it any better.
Whatever approach SADCC intends to pursue in its industrial cooperation efforts, 
it is clear from its document presented at the January 1990 Lusaka meeting with
World Bank, World Bank Development Report, 1985, Oxford 
University Press, 1985.
SADCC, SADCC Investment in Production, op .c it., p .25.
Green R .H ., "Towards Southern African Regionalism: The 
Emergence o f  a dialogue", Africa Contemporary Record, 
Vol.XI, 1978/79, p .46.
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donors that while the redistributional considerations are important, the Group is 
increasingly determined to depend on a combination of market forces and limited 
controls to attain its industrial goals. The 1990 document outlined the following 
macro-economic policies that are perceived to be conducive to industrial growth 
in the SADCC region:
a system of flexible and market-oriented foreign exchange rates that will 
encourage exports; foster greater utilisation of domestic, rather than 
imported inputs; and increased industrial efficiency by ensuring that 
investment decisions reflect the underlying regional and international 
competitive position of member states;
a tariff-based system of industrial protection, with a reasonably uniform 
tariff schedule, designed to avoid investment in inefficient projects 
protected by import bans or very high tariffs;
effective anti-inflationary policies;
a stable tax structure that encourages both domestic and foreign 
investment and;
freedom from arbitrary government intervention in business decision­
making.
Against the above background, the present SADCC approach is to exploit the 
benefits of planned and coordinated industrial and trade strategies while at the 
same time recognising the importance of responding positively to market signals 
in their industrial cooperation efforts.
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HEALTH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
GWENDOLYNE M. MALAHLEHA 
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho
"It is changes that are chiefly responsible for diseases, especially the greatest changes, the 
violent alternations both in the seasons and in other things" Hippocrates.
Introduction
This assertion, made 3 000 years ago, is as apt today as when it was made. In 
recent decades Southern Africa has experienced violent alterations which cannot 
be adequately expressed in words, and the changes which have occurred have had 
repercussions on the life style and health status of the peoples of the region.
The next time you ask someone "how are you?" and you get the automatic 
response "fine", be grateful. For if that person told you how he/she really felt 
physically, emotionally and mentally you might wish you had never asked, as you 
would be likely to hear a recital or an "Ode to my health".
It is always easy to define illness, but the opposite of this state, which is health, 
is a very difficult quality to define. It is partly a biological status, a matter of how 
well all the body’s component parts are working. It is partly a consequence of 
behaviour, a reflection of our ability to coexist with other people, yet at the same 
time it is also a product of personal and philosophical values intimately tied to our 
concept of self, that is what we think we ought to be and what we think we really 
are. Therefore any venture into research on maintaining a healthy state as against 
research on ailments is indeed almost a mission impossible as it is fraught with 
innumerable imponderables.
The World Health Organisation’s definition of health is enough to discourage 
scientific investigation. It views health as an idealistic "state of complete physical,
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mental and social wellbeing and not merely absence of disease or infirmity". 
Psychiatrist Alexander Lowen views it as "the truth of the body",1 while to the 
Scottish poet James Thompson health was "the vital principle of bliss".
These are latter-day conceptions of health. Somehow provision for health seems 
to have done a complete circle; first it was an art, then a science, and now it is a 
combination of both. Where one lays emphasis depends to a great extent on one’s 
inclination, background training and area of operation in the health field. This 
influences one’s approach to the provision of health and also to the studies in that 
field. It is difficult to identify an exact point in history when medicine became 
established as a science. However, this process had profound consequences, as 
the profession moved from the emphasis on "art" to mechanical business. A 
person requiring treatment has come to be regarded as a piece of hardware. To 
the outsider the world of medicine is a closed community. Its workings are 
protected by a code of secrecy and surrounded by an aura calculated to induce an 
attitude of submission in those being treated . The former director of the WHO 
lamented that "the major and most expensive part of medical technology as applied 
today appears to be far more for the satisfaction of the health profession than for 
the benefit of the consumer of health care".2
It may appear as if one is being harsh on the medical profession and also 
undermining the tremendous achievements in medical research. The technological 
advances in the battle against disease are considerable. For example, immunology 
has resulted in the control of many of the ills that plagued our ancestors for 
centuries. Vast stores of information about measures useful in solving health 
problems have been gathered through scientific methods of investigation. We have 
tremendously powerful tools with which to work: the laboratory, the
epidemiological method coupled with statistical techniques for studying disease as 
it affects masses of people, our intricate and highly developed hospitals and other 
health facilities. Nonetheless it is becoming evident that there are unresolved 
issues and gaps in our knowledge; the great breakthroughs of tomorrow will 
almost certainly come from the behavioural rather than the medical sphere. That
Lowen, A ., 1970. Pleasure. Coward-McCann, New York, 
p .140.
Mahler, H ., 1977. The Listener. August, p .130.
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is, in a greatly expanded understanding of why we behave as we do, and more 
particularly how we can go about changing behaviour that is harmful to our health. 
It is in the "public" area of health that we are weak.
The concept of research for the development of national health systems is as old 
as the World Health Organisation. Yet only in 1976 was there was an explicit 
recognition that in order to achieve this it is necessary to provide financial support 
and to consider it as a research priority. From then on a different approach was 
considered. That consideration may have been the catalyst which enabled the 
Alma Ata conference to take a major leap into Primary Health Care (1979) and 
produced a further commitment in 1981 with a declaration of the Health For All 
(HFA) strategy (which led to a Health Research Strategy for HFA [1986]).
Exactly what was the Alma At^ Declaration? An extract from the declaration 
reads
Emphasizing that enough is known about primary health care for 
governments to initiate or expand its implementation, but also 
recognizing that many long-range and complex issues need to be 
resolved, that the traditional systems o f  medicine calls fo r  further 
research and that new problems are constantly emerging as 
implementations proceed.
RECOMMENDS that every programme should set aside a percentage 
of its funds for continuing health service research, organizing health 
service research and development u n its .......
The sub-committee of the WHO on Health Research Strategy for HFA/2000 was 
even more precise on these issues:
Considering that health needs of a particular country are specific to that 
country, and that the practice of health and technology can play only a 
limited role towards fulfilment of the goal of HFA/2000, the crux o f  the 
problem and the challenge fo r  the future be in the assimilation, 
adaptation and modification of the technologies already available sc as 
to make them more relevant, appropriate and applicable to the needs of
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the community and the health care system into which they are to be 
with integrated.
All this can best be achieved through a systematic compilation and analysis of 
information on people’s behaviour in health.
Extensive quotation is deliberately employed here not only for emphasis but also 
to provide a comprehensive understanding of the rationale behind the actions that 
followed these declarations. It is ironic that while the Northern hemisphere thought 
for many years it had discovered a new approach, the Southern hemisphere had 
already been providing health services from a broadly based understanding of 
health. Consideration of health within a social milieu is more in keeping with the 
developing world’s perception of the provision of health.
These noble declarations did not necessarily result in a flurry of activity. It 
requires a reconciliation of the philosophies of numerous disciplines to establish 
a coherent ground theory. Hitherto the few who dared to present a different view 
from that of the medical profession had been in the fields of anthropology or 
psychology. All along followers of these disciplines had understood the structure 
and functioning of medicine and viewed health from a systems point of view. Yet 
more often than not they were dismissed and accused of engaging in polemics. 
Now there is a new bandwagon which all and sundry can ride on: "Health Systems 
Research" (HSR). With the aim to optimise the utilisation of techniques and 
resources within countries, health systems research is recognised as a vital tool for 
improving organisation, functioning and utilisation of health systems at all levels. 
It is based on the understanding that no one discipline has the sole prerogative of 
finding answers for health problems.
Health Systems Research
For some time now health policy, programmes and finances have been conceived 
and implemented without the benefit of adequate and appropriate or country- 
specific knowledge and information. Health Systems Research is based on the 
belief that each country has unique characteristics and a unique environment, and 
so each has a potential to contribute to global understanding of a wide variety of 
health and disease issues.
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Over the last four decades different disciplines seem to have expressed substantial 
agreement on what health systems research is, its scope and distinctive 
characteristics. While it is not considered necessary to provide a definition of 
HSR here, or to describe it in detail, it is necessary to emphasise certain features 
because of their relevance to the status of health research and the problems being 
encountered by the Southern African countries in their endeavour to promote and 
to strengthen health research strategy. It is possible that these problems are not 
necessarily peculiar to the region and that what applies here could well be 
generalised to other countries.
Health Systems Research is designed for action and indeed is a prelude to action. 
This is a characteristic shared with much of the traditional bio-medical and 
scientific research. However the difference, apart from subject, lies in its time- 
scale and immediacy. Traditional medical or epidemiological research may take 
years before it is approved for application, as precise findings are tested and fitted 
into a gradually developing and occasionally receding body of knowledge and 
practice. On the other hand health systems research identifies relevant knowledge 
and principles from an array of disciplinary areas and then combines these in a 
problem-solving exercise using the principle of unity derived from the various 
disciplinary areas. The results of such an exercise are expected to be integrated 
into current and planned policies, allocation of resources, utilisation and 
reorganisation of services and many other areas which would enhance health 
utilisation and improve the quality of service in administration, finance and actual 
delivery.
The subject matter of health systems research is two-fold. In the first instance its 
concerns are with quantities and distributions relating to consumers of health 
services, be they individuals, groups, communities or areas. While it also deals 
with the more traditional areas of mortality and morbidity it goes beyond to look 
into health behaviour, socioeconomic characteristics, health needs and resources, 
manpower and technologies. Secondly it addresses issues relating to the structures 
and processes wherein health is produced, managed and treated: policies, priorities 
and the need for balance in managerial and professional demands; and procedures 
on all the different levels from the individual to the national level.
The major tenets of Health Systems Research are that every country, no matter 
how poor, needs to conduct health systems research. This can enable it to better
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understand its own problems, enhance the impact of resources, improve 
management, foster innovation and make a contribution to regional health issues.
It is quite evident that most of these subject areas, especially in the second 
category, are not in the field of traditional medical scientific research. Indeed 
there is such a sharp difference that followers of both the bio-medical and social 
sciences, in relating HSR to familiar practices, frequently ask whether it is 
research or science on the other hand, it is difficult for the majority of decision­
makers and managers, whose expertise is acquired through practice and whose 
mode of operation is based on "gut feeling" or tradition to recognise that some 
issues are researchable and to see how research could contribute to their 
understanding, or to the modification and application of their practices.
The factors affecting health and health care go well beyond the health sector. If 
Health Systems Research were to confine itself to issues conventionally labelled 
"health" or "medicine" it would fall short of its major goal of providing a broader 
and deeper understanding of existing technologies and science in the areas of 
health and disease. It would not be in a position to tackle the factors that promote 
or hinder prevention, treatment and care, or to discover effective or efficient 
means of optimising health.
As Hippocrates clearly stated, changes are chiefly responsible for disease. It has 
been established that problems of poverty, nutrition, housing, pollution and life 
style (such as abuse of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs, and promiscuity), are 
now major determinants of health. While some of the consequences could perhaps 
be mitigated within the health sector, prevention lies in other sections of the 
society and relates to culture and the economy. The actions of other government 
departments and local offices, for example those concerned with taxation policies 
and industrial and commercial practices are also crucial. Above all the activities 
of these departments need to be combined with educational and social services. 
Policies in all these sectors need to be analysed for their health implications.
It is very clear from the above that Health Systems Research inevitably requires 
multidisciplinary activity. It follows therefore that the research team must 
comprise people of different disciplines. Some people may have adequate 
knowledge in more than one discipline, but this is an exception to the rule. One
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important aspect that needs to be seriously recognised is that scientists of different 
"persuasions" often find it difficult to accept, share and integrate each others’ 
perspectives and knowledge. The practicalities of mobilising the necessary skills 
are formidable.
Health Systems Research in Southern Africa
Following the international declaration, the WHO organised workshops in the 
Southern African region to promote HSR. The first workshop, held in 1987, 
primarily assessed health research in the different countries of the region. 
Delegates outlined the position of health research resources in their respective 
countries, as well as their achievements and needs. As would be expected the 
status of health research in these countries varied; some paid very little attention 
to health research, some recognised its importance and others placed more 
emphasis on epidemiology and medical research. After a week of intensive 
deliberations researchers felt they might have established some strategies for 
understanding health problems. This workshop was followed by training 
programmes and other workshops. Most of these have been intercountry 
workshops which in some instances have arrived at specific research assignments 
to be carried out in the various countries. Constant supervision has assured 
completion of studies.
Reports from countries at these periodic meetings have been used to assess 
progress in health systems research. Although in most cases one gets the 
impression that there has been increased recognition and acceptance of this 
approach, it is difficult to assess the quality and impact of health systems research 
nationally. Lack of progress is often not reported, while half-hearted attempts and 
failures rarely get publicised. In addition, the reporting focuses on research for 
health rather than health research for development.
Shortcomings and Criticisms
The criticisms voiced about Health Systems Research for development ring 
familiar to social scientists. The main criticism concerns relevance, because it is
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often argued that the perspectives are externally derived and therefore hardly 
appropriate. It is argued that the activities reflect the interests of the researchers 
from the north, who more often than not are founders, rather than the interest of 
the local health services and decision-makers. Furthermore it has been argued that 
the priorities often do not relate realistically to local health resources that are not 
immediately relevant to development issues. Yet the Health Systems Research 
aims to reduce costs, and to determine the impact of development on health; 
factors which are immediately relevant to development issues.
It is not surprising that one area most likely to come under fierce criticism is 
methodology and the conduct of research. Can you imagine trying to convince a 
statistician to consider talking to five people then generalising to a population of 
two hundred or so? Consensus also becomes a major obstacle, especially because 
of poor communication among researchers and between researchers, founders and 
services. Another major problem, which is not only confined to this HSR, is 
utilisation of the results.
The existence of the "application gap" raises fundamental questions among 
communities and the organisational structures responsible for health policy and 
services. In the eyes of its proponents, research is good and useful. But rightly 
or wrongly it may not have that image in the minds of action-oriented decision­
makers and managers. They might see it as
an esoteric and costly academic exercise;
a barrier to action or an excuse to postpone action;
a threat to existing plans and programmes.
The problem is that in reality bio-medical and clinical research predominates in 
most countries, and the mechanisms which would create an appropriate Health 
Systems Research mentality either do not exist or do not function properly. The 
public health concept may be supported verbally, but this does not necessarily 
result in action. Yet this concept not only ensures sustained health but also bears 
directly on development issues, as it allows communities to make decision on 
health.
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Each of the Southern African countries has been exposed to the concept of Health 
Systems Research, but acceptance and application of the concept has varied. In 
most cases there is room for improvement. The question which needs to be asked 
is: do the 1990s seem to hold greater potential for drastic changes? There are of 
course no simple or universal solutions. Existing resources in funds, manpower 
and institutions, and the past and existing volume of research, differ in the various 
countries of the region.
The first consideration is strengthening HSR as a research and service strategy. 
A great volume of research has been done from this perspective, but much of what 
has been written is hidden in the fugitive literature. Furthermore it has to be 
accepted that the dominance of bio-medical science in research funding and 
practice will not change. It is a constraint within which HSR has to work. But 
more consideration should be given to attracting the bio-medical and allied 
professions to work within the framework of HSR. More importantly the HSR 
manpower capability should be strengthened.
This approach would strengthen health research and will enable the Southern 
African countries to strengthen health action. It would also help the most 
disadvantaged and accelerate progress towards the fundamental goal of equity in 
health.
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POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN  
AFRICA: THE 1980s AND BEYOND
I. SEMBAJWE 
Department of Statistics, National University of Lesotho
Introduction
The relationship between population and development is a subject that has 
produced intensive and extensive debate since the eighteenth century, especially 
after Thomas Malthus presented his theory linking population change to subsistence 
(Thomlinson, 1965). Although Malthus’s theory had a number of flaws, it 
provoked serious and intensive debates on the population-development nexus. 
Among his critics was Karl Marx, who called him an apologist for the capitalist 
system. Subsequent developments, however, indicate that the role population 
factors play in the development process has no ideological boundaries. Today, 
both communist/socialist and capitalist countries have acknowledged that 
population factors play an important role in the process of socioeconomic 
development, just as socioeconomic development plays an important role in 
enhancing the wellbeing of the population. Although they were first popularised 
in Western Countries, the strictest population management programmes in the 
world today is that of the Republic of China. Among other things, this 
programme requires that (except in a few circumstances) couples have only one 
child.
The developing countries have lagged behind in paying adequate attention to the 
role of population factors in development. In Africa, some people believe that our 
countries are sparsely populated and that more population is required to exploit the 
resources we have and to provide a market for our produce and products before 
we can achieve meaningful development. While others believe that rapid 
population growth frustrates our efforts to achieve socioeconomic development 
since it leads countries to devote almost all the national income to consumption,
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retards investment in capital formation and stagnates output. Unemployment and 
related social and political disorders therefore occur.
It should be mentioned, however, that while the debate goes on we risk putting 
undue emphasis on one side of the relationship and forgetting that it is a complex 
one that requires the construction of complex analytical models that can take into 
account every relevant variable on population and socioeconomic development in 
order to come out with a situation which at one point in time can be regarded as 
ideal or optimal (Ahlburg, 1987; Lam, 1987; Wallis, 1987; Easterlin, 1980; King 
1987). "One point in time" is stressed for the simple reason that both population 
and socioeconomic factors are dynamic to such an extent that what is optimal at 
a particular point in time may not hold after the passage of some time.
In spite of the complexity of the relationship, simple and suggestive indicators can 
be provided to show that population and development affect each other in a 
number of ways. This is the purpose of this paper. It covers the Southern 
African region.
The paper will first examine the effect of socioeconomic development on 
population and then the effect of population on development. Finally the overall 
demographic and socioeconomic situation in Southern Africa as well as the 
population and development implications for the region for the 1990s and beyond 
will be discussed. Given the inadequacy of data, the size of the region and the 
heterogeneity of its socioeconomic, cultural and political setup, it is difficult to 
carry out a satisfactory analysis of the situation pertaining to each country. Hence, 
the generalisations in this paper should be seen within this context.
The Influence of Socioeconomic Development on Population
The influence of socioeconomic development on population is transmitted through 
the basic population factors of fertility, mortality and migration. When 
socioeconomic development is faster in some areas than in others, people move 
from the poorly developed areas to the better developed ones. This is reflected, 
for example, in the exceptionally rapid population growth rates of urban areas and 
in the large number of nationals who move out of their countries to countries 
where economic conditions are perceived to be relatively bearable compared to 
conditions in their home countries. For examples, see Prah’s analysis of skilled
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migrants to the Bantustans (Prah, 1989). Many professionals (teachers, doctors, 
nurses, etc.) have migrated from independent African countries to work in the 
Bantustans. This creates a braindrain.
While it is possible today to reduce death rates significantly without major 
socioeconomic development (by the use of antibiotics and insecticides; the 
evolution of effective public health organisation and programmes and the adoption 
of suitable low-cost methods of sanitation) investigations show that beyond a 
certain level, further reductions in mortality cannot be achieved unless substantial 
economic improvement takes place.
The relationship between fertility and socioeconomic development is somewhat 
complex because of the different mix in each society of social and cultural norms 
and values which initially support high fertility. However, if we take a few 
selected indicators of socioeconomic development such as education, employment 
opportunities in the modem sector (especially for women), overall increased status 
of women with respect to access to credit and income and improved health 
conditions - especially those which increase the survival of children -they generally 
turn out to be negatively related to fertility. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
overall effect of a balanced socioeconomic development process is to generate an 
acceptable redistribution of population, to reduce mortality and to influence fertility 
to drop to lower manageable levels.
The Influence of Population on Socioeconomic Development
The influence of population on development is examined by discussing three 
population factors: size, growth rate and age structure. While a large population 
may eventually provide a large productive force and a market for products of the 
economy, it is difficult to determine the optimal size. Moreover, both population 
and the socioeconomic environment are so dynamic that at a given moment a 
population with a given size and in a given environment may be in a stage of 
diminishing returns if the population has not received skills through education and 
appropriate technology. Yet, if the same population in the same environment is 
given appropriate skills through education and access to technology, it may be of 
optimum size. Therefore, it is not merely a question of providing numbers to fill 
empty spaces but providing numbers in the right age group and with skills, 
knowledge and appropriate technology. High population density does not have a
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direct relationship to economic development because there are many examples of 
densely populated countries which are developed, as well as many that are not 
developed, and examples of countries which are sparsely populated in both groups.
It has been shown that a high rate of population growth necessitates a higher level 
of investment to achieve a given per capita output, (see Coale and Hoover, 1958). 
Therefore, under normal circumstances, the burden of increasing or even 
maintaining the same level the population’s per capita income is greater in a 
population with a higher growth rate than in one with a low or moderate one. In 
a rapidly growing population, the tendency to invest in duplicating consumption 
is very high and leads to limited investible resources (Mason, 1987; Swatz, 1987). 
Expansion in economic activity is’constrained and undesirable elements such as 
unemployment crop in.
In the case of the age structure of a population, we assume that almost all 
population growth is through natural increase (i.e. the difference between births 
and deaths) and that the society receives new members as babies. These babies 
need to be fed, clothed, sheltered and educated for at least 15 years before they 
can become economically productive. This creates a high dependency burden or 
a high ratio of persons in a dependent status because of their age (too young to 
work) to persons of working age. This situation is typical of many African 
countries.
The Demographic Situation in Southern Africa
Population growth rates in African countries are almost entirely generated by 
natural increase and they are the highest in the world. While the death rates have 
gradually declined in the last few decades, the birth rates are likely to remain 
almost constantly high over the next two to three decades (Table 1 and II). The 
growth rates generated by natural increase are high, ranging from 2,5% in 
Southern Africa to 3.1 % per annum in Eastern and Western Africa; an average of 
2.9% per annum for Africa as a whole for the period 1980-85 (Table III). These 
rates are likely to remain so for the rest of this century and the early part of the 
next century. This growth in the population of African countries warranted the 
ECA to state that the "historical trend scenario" of rapid population growth in 
Africa is "almost a nightmare", and that rapid population growth rates have serious 
implications on the economic growth of Africa (ECA, 1983). Because of the large
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number of young people this type of population growth produces a high 
dependency burden. (Table IV). This implies an increased burden on African 
governments. For example, the demand for classrooms, teachers and teaching 
materials for education and food grows constantly. Yet the current rates of 
economic growth in these countries do not suggest that Africa is capable of coping 
with such a situation.
Although Southern Africa experiences the lowest population growth rate of all 
African regions (Table III), the rate is still extremely high compared to rates of 
1.7% for the world and 0.6% and 2.0% for more developed and less developed 
regions respectively (1980-85). Within Southern Africa, the rates vary from 2.5 % 
in South Africa to 3.8% in Botswana, and although they are projected to 
experience some decline over the period 1990 to 2005, they will remain quite high, 
ranging from 2.3% in South Africa to 3.6% in Botswana in 2005. This suggests 
that the region’s population will double within the next 20 to 30 years.
Among the Southern African states, South Africa is the richest, with a Gross 
National Product of US$2010 in 1985 compared with US$870 for Namibia, 
US$830 for Botswana, US$740 for Swaziland and Lesotho for US$470 in the same 
period. South Africa’s economic dominance in the region is partly reflected by 
the number of labour migrants it receives from the neighbouring countries. While 
it gains cheaper and less militant labour, the neighbouring countries such as 
Lesotho lose an important proportion of the able-bodied male labour force. For 
example, out of approximately 714 000 members of the labour force in 1986, 166 
000 were migrant workers to South Africa. The Basotho constitute about half of 
the foreign labour force in the gold mines (Table V and VI). In terms of gaining, 
Lesotho receives income in the form of remittances and deferred payments, which 
constitute about 55 % of Lesotho’s Gross National Product. What is lacking is an 
appropriate way of investing this money so that it generates more employment 
internally. This is especially necessary given the changing political conditions 
within South Africa which will require that country to provide attractive 
employment to its own population.
Some selected economic indicators suggest that while the population of the 
Southern African countries has continued to increase rapidly, food production has 
increased marginally or even stagnated, and that income per capita has stagnated 
or even declined (World Bank, 1990; EC A, 1990a). In Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, for example, food production has declined from an index of 100 in
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1978-79 to 78 in Botswana, 87 in Lesotho and 89 in Swaziland in 1988 (ECA 
1990:A2). In Namibia, real GDP growth has been in the range 2.6 to 3.1% 
during the period 1983 to 1987 (EIU 1988:2), rates which are not as consistently 
high as those of population growth. In South Africa, a country with the minority 
group enjoying the largest share of national income, the largest racial group lives 
in extremely poor conditions. While about 30% of the population had literacy 
rates of 70 to 80% for females and 69 to 87 % for males in 1980, the majority of 
the population had 50% for females and 53% for males (South Africa, 1980: see 
Table VII for the racial composition). The number of pupils per teacher for 
primary and secondary schools were 18.7 for Whites, 28.9 for Coloureds, 25.0 
for Asians and 47.5 for Blacks in the same period. Given the rapid growth of the 
black population, these rates are likely to grow worse in the 1990s.
Theoretical Framework and General Discussion
This presentation utilises the theoretical postulates that arose from observing 
demographic change in a number of Western countries. The postulates are 
embodied within the theory of the "demographic transition". In brief, it is 
suggested that a country or society which is still in the agrarian stage or just 
emerging from it experiences very high mortality rates because of a number of 
factors (environmental, socioeconomic medical etc) which generate such 
undesirable consequences as famine and poor health. Because of the high 
mortality rates the societies develop norms and cultural values such as early 
marriage and abundant reproduction which lead to high fertility aimed at 
counterbalancing the effects of mortality.
After the agrarian stage, when farming techniques gradually improve, 
transportation and distribution networks develop, general knowledge, medical 
technology and health knowledge increase, the society enters the second stage, 
broadly called the transition stage. There is usually a decrease in the mortality 
rate but the values supporting high fertility take longer to change because children 
remain valuable social, cultural, economic and psychological assets. In other 
words, while the death rate declines the birth rate remains high leading to a high 
population growth rate. The Western Countries experienced 0.5 - 1 % growth rate 
during the demographic transition while within the last 30 years Africa has 
experienced above 2% and sometimes as high as 4% (for example in Kenya). At
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a later stage in the transition, as socioeconomic development intensifies, fertility 
declines and the gap between the birth and death rates narrows.
The third stage, termed the modem stage, is where the now modernised countries 
are. They have well developed agricultural, industrial, transportation and 
distribution systems, advanced medical technology and health knowledge. As a 
result they have gained high control over their survival (mortality levels are low), 
and couples or individuals (rather than culture or society) have acquired adequate 
control over their fertility and sexuality so that fertility rate is low.
The question is whether it makes sense for Africa or other developing regions to 
wait for over 100 years - the time it took the Western countries to evolve to the 
modem stage - or whether new ways should be adopted to accelerate the transition. 
Moreover, although the theoretical framework generally holds for the Western 
countries, exceptions did exist. Africa can borrow the medical technology and 
knowledge and ways of improving sanction which took the Western countries long 
to develop. The more sensible course to take, therefore, is to manipulate the 
variable of fertility so that the birth rates will experience abrupt declines 
compatible with those of the death rates. This would somewhat temper the rapid 
growth rates we are currently experiencing. This suggests that while governments 
of developing countries make efforts to propel the process of socioeconomic 
development forward they should adopt programmes of responsible population 
management aimed at bringing the population growth rates in balance with our 
ability to generate socioeconomic development. Since the growth rates are already 
high, it is unlikely that substantial development will take place to reduce fertility 
without special population management intervention programmes.
Africa’s socioeconomic problems are not only the result of rapid population growth 
rates but also a number of other factors such as stagnation of the productive sector, 
unfavourable terms of trade, high debt burden, poor social conditions, 
environmental degradation and political instability. Nevertheless, rapid population 
growth plays an important role in retarding government efforts to raise national 
income and consequent income per capita. According to the World Bank if 
Africa’s population growth rates had declined since the early 1970s as has been the 
case in some parts of Asia (South Asia in particular), current per capita income 
might have been as much as 10% higher. But instead Africa has "witnessed an 
increasing dependency ratio and, more recently, a fall in the proportion of its
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people who are literate, numerate, adequately fed and healthy, and this has an 
obvious negative effect on long-term productivity" (World Bank, 1989:25).
Moreover, rapid population growth leads to, among other things, a large number 
of new entrants to the labour market, increasing land shortage, ecological 
degradation and social and political tension. Therefore, population factors require 
well thought out management programmes to ensure that population change is 
favourable to national efforts to generate socioeconomic development.
Concerted efforts have been made by the ECA and the UN to emphasise the urgent 
need for member countries to give serious consideration to the population 
variables, and possibly to accord them the same importance as that given to other 
aspects of socioeconomic development such as agriculture and food production, 
industry and technology and foreign debt burden. (For example see UN, 1974; 
UN 1984; OAU 1985; ECA 1983; UNFPA 1989; Sadik 1990) Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland are ranked by the ECA among countries with a high awareness of 
selected population issues (ECA, 1990b; Sembajwe, 1990). What has been lacking 
is an explicit population policy to guide the governments in their population 
management efforts. It is, therefore, hoped that the 1990s will see the formulation 
and official acceptance of explicit population policies although each country must 
align its policies to its own culture and socioeconomic circumstances. What would 
be required to form common elements of these policies are:
1. The commitment of national leaders to the reduction of the rapid 
population growth rates;
2 The availability of family planning services;
3 The need for a public education programme that links population growth
to long-term socio interests as well as to benefits for individual families. 
(Sembajwe, 1987).
The situation for Namibia is not yet clear since it has just achieved independence. 
But given the fact that its problems are similar to those countries discussed above, 
it is imperative that the government of Namibia think seriously about an explicit 
population policy for the 1990s.
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For South Africa, it is reiterated that it needs to continue a programme of reform 
and economic improvement that favours the black majority. (Anderson and Blake, 
1984). Improvements in their literacy, labour skills, job opportunities and freedom 
of movement and expression should be seen as necessary elements in the process 
of greater socioeconomic development for the Republic of South Africa. As 
efforts are made to improve conditions, the government needs a well thought out 
population management programme to counteract the effects of the high population 
growth rate.
What has the South African government done so far in the population field? 
According to Simkins (1990) in 1974 (the World Population Year) the government 
adopted an official countrywide family planning programme. The approach 
consisted of the supply-side measures which emphasised the supply of the means 
to control fertility (Ibid 215). The creation of the Department of National Health 
and Population Development in the late 1980s, with a mandate to implement a 
Population Development Programme (PDP) brought about a change in this 
approach. The policy became broad-based because it incorporated demand-side 
measures which concentrate on the determinants of demand for fertility control. 
These include socioeconomic developmental variables such as organisation of 
production, education, the status of women, as well as mortality and migration.
In all the states discussed, including South Africa which is relatively more 
industrialised, agriculture still provides the livelihood of the largest proportion of 
the population. It is therefore imperative that the governments of Southern Africa 
encourage and facilitate technological innovations in agriculture because population 
pressure alone is not enough for sustained technological change (Boserup 1965; 
1981) Moreover, indigenous technical change is usually confounded by such 
factors as lack of adaptive learning, capital accumulation and high population 
growth. (Pingah and Binswanger 1987; Hayami and Ruttan 1987:93). For 
countries that supply migrant labour, the 1990s will be a period for making 
concerted efforts to create employment internally, both for the labour migrants 
who are going to be displaced by South Africans as the political situation in that 
country stabilises, and the large number of new entrants to the labour market. 
Lesotho, which sends the largest group of labour migrants to South Africa, faces 
the greatest challenge in this respect.
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Conclusion and Directions for the 1990s
Available evidence clearly indicates that Africa is a region with the highest 
population growth rates in the world. Although population growth rates for 
Southern Africa are among the lowest for Africa, they are very high by world 
standards (far higher than rates for more developed and other less developed 
regions). Despite the complex nature of the relationship between population and 
socioeconomic growth, it has been suggested that the rapid growth rates of 
population for the region have, and will continue to have, negative effects on the 
socioeconomic development process of the region.
The need for responsible population management programmes as well as similar 
programmes for agriculture, industry, trade, environmental management, debt 
management and political stability has been highlighted. For the population 
factors, it has been pointed out that whilfe South Africa continues to implement its 
broad-based population policy and to remove barriers which prevent the majority 
of its population from participating in all areas of political and socioeconomic 
development, the other countries in the region should treat the need to formulate 
explicit population policies for guiding the management of their populations as one 
of the priorities for the 1990s.
The changing political environment in South Africa suggests the need for 
neighbouring countries which are still sending a significant proportion of their 
labour force there to increase the rate at which they create internal opportunities 
of employment.
It is, generally accepted that while concerted efforts in the socioeconomic 
development arena may invoke the demographic transition effects over a long-term 
perspective, we do not have the luxury of the 100 years and more the West had 
to experience the transition. We need the support of responsible population 
management programmes to shorten the transition period.
Finally, it is recommended that there is a need for research in the 1990s and 
beyond in the area of population. It is accepted that currently available data 
provide enough evidence to guide policy formulation. But as the policies are 
implemented, there will be a need to carry out research for monitoring programme 
implementation, success and resulting need to provide corrective measures.
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Table I: Birth Rates for Miyor Regions and Southern African States
Area Birth Rates (Per 1000)
1980/ 1985/ 1990/ 1995/ 2000/ 2005/
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
World 27.1 26.0 25.0 23.8 22.3 21.0
More Developed 
Regions 15.5 15.1 14.6 14.1 13.8 13.7
Less Developed 
Regions 31.0 29.4 28.1 26.5 24.4 22.7
Africa 45.9 45.2 43.9 42.2 40.1 37.5
Eastern Africa 49.4 49.1 48.2 46.8 44.7 41.6
Middle Africa 44.7 44.5 44.0 42.8 41.0 38.3
Northern Africa 39.3 36.5 32.8 29.4 26.3 23.9
Southern Africa 39.6 38.8 37.3 35.4 33.3 31.1
Western Africa 49.2 49.2 48.4 47.2 45.1 42.2
Southern African States: 
Botswana 49.9 48.8 47.1 45.6 43.8 41.2
Lesotho 41.8 41.2 40.2 39.0 37.2 34.8
Namibia 45.1 44.9 44.2 43.0 41.2 38.4
South Africa 38.7 37.9 36.3 34.2 32.0 29.8
Swaziland 47.3 47.1 46.3 45.3 43.6 41.1
Source: United Nations, 1986. World Population Prospects; Estimates and
Projections as Assessed in 1984. pp.78-79.
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fable II: Death Rates for Mtyor Regions and Southern African States
Area Death Rates (Per 1000)
1980/ 1985/ 1990/ 1995/ 2000/ 2005/
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
World 10.5 9.9 9.3 8.8 8.5 8.3
More Developed 
Regions 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.8 10.2
Less Developed 
Regions 10.8 10.0 9.3 8.7 8.2 7.9
Africa 16.6 15.1 13.7 12.3 11.1 9.9
Eastern Africa 18.3 16.9 15.4 13.8 12.4 11.0
Middle Africa 17.7 16.2 14.8 13.4 12.1 10.8
Northern Africa 12.3 10.5 9.0 7.9 7.0 6.6
Southern Africa 14.2 12.9 11.7 10.5 9.5 8.5
Western Africa 18.3 16.7 15.2 13.7 12.3 10.8
Southern African States 
Botswana 12.6 11.3 10.1 9.0 7.9 7.0
Lesotho 16.5 15.2 13.8 12.6 11.4 10.2
Namibia 17.3 15.9 14.5 13.2 11.8 10.5
South Africa 13.9 12.7 11.5 10.3 9.3 8.4
Swaziland 17.2 15.8 14.4 13.0 11.6 10.3
Source: United Nations, 1986. W orld Population Prospects: Estimates and
Projections as Assessed in 1984. pp.90-91.
147
Table III: Annual Rates of Change for Regions and Southern African States
Area Annual Rates of Change (%)
1980/ 1985/ 1990/ 1995/ 2000/ 2005/
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
World 1.67 1.63 1.58 1.51 1.38 1.27
More Developed 
Regions 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.52 0.45 0.39
Less Developed 
Regions 2.01 1.94 1.88 1.78 1.62 1.48
Africa 2.92 3.02 3.03 2.99 2.91 2.76
Eastern Africa 3.10 3.24 3.30 3.24 3.06 2.79
Middle Africa 2.71 2.84 2.92 2.94 2.89 2.75
Northern Africa 2.64 2.59 2.38 2.15 1.93 1.74
Southern Africa 2.54 2.59 2.57 2.49 2.38 2.26
Western Africa 3.12 3.26 3.32 3.35 3.29 3.14
Southern African States: 
Botswana 3.82 3.70 3.66 3.63 3.59 3.43
Lesotho 2.52 2.61 2.64 2.65 2.59 2.46
Namibia 2.78 2.91 2.97 2.99 2.94 2.79
South Africa 2.48 2.53 2.49 2.39 2.28 2.14
Swaziland 3.02 3.14 3.20 3.23 3.20 3.09
Source: United Nations, 1986. World Population Prospects: Estimates and
Projections Assessed in 1984. pp.54-55.
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fable IV: Broad Age Structure and Dependency Ratios (1990)
Area Percentage in Age Group Dependency
Ratio
World
<15
31.9
15-64
62.0
65 + 
6.2 61.3
More Developed 
Regions 27.7 66.6 11.7 50.3
Less Developed 
Regions 34.9 60.6 4.5 64.9
Africa 45.3 51.7 3.0 93.3
Eastern Africa 47.2 50.2 2.6 99.1
Middle Africa 44.5 52.2 3.3 91.5
Northern Africa 41.2 55.2 3.6 81.1
Southern Africa 41.6 54.5 3.9 83.4
Western Africa 47.4 50.0 2.6 100.0
Southern African States: 
Botswana 49.4 48.5 2.1 106.1
Lesotho 42.6 53.8 3.6 85.8
Namibia 44.8 52.0 3.2 92.3
South Africa 40.0 55.9 4.1 78.9
Swaziland 46.5 50.6 3.0 97.8
ource: United Nations, 1986. World Population Prospects: Estimates and
Projections as Assessed in 1984. pp. 140-223.
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Table V: Black Labour in Gold Mines, 1980-1985 (000)*
Area 1980 1985
From Outside SA 183(44) 195(43)
From SA 233(56) 256(57)
TOTAL 416(100) 451(57)
* The figures for South Africa include workers for Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei; The figures in brackets are in 
percentages.
Source: Sunday Times (Business Times). September 28, 1986, p .3. (Taken from 
latest Chamber of Mines Statistics).
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Table VI: Foreign Black Labour in Gold Mines, 1980-1985 
(000)*
Country Year
1980 1985
Lesotho 96(52) 98(50)
Botswana 18(10) 18(10)
Swaziland 8(4) 12(6)
Mozambique 40(22) 50(26)
Malawi 14(8) 17(9)
Zimbabwe 6(3) 0(0)
Others 1(1) 0(0)
TOTAL 183 195
* The figures in brackets are in percentages.
Source: Sunday Times (Business Times). September 28, 1986:3. (Taken from the 
latest Chamber of Mines Statistics).
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Table VII: Racial Compositions of South Africa
Year Total
Population 
(millions) %
Asians Blacks Coloureds Whites
1904 5.2 2.4 67.5 8.6 21.6
1951 12.7 2.9 67.6 8.7 209
1970 21.8 2.9 70.4 9.4 173
2000 47.6 2.7 73.5 9.8 13.8
2020 72.7 2.3 75.6 10.1 12.0
Source: Anderson and Blake (1984:25).
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Introduction
In the economic sense, self-sustaining development ought to make "people in 
general better-off by increasing their command over goods and services and by 
increasing the choices open to them" (Elkan 1973:15). For the purpose of the 
discussion that follows, it is important to stress that the human resources of a 
country constitute a critical cooperant factor of production, without which such 
other inputs as accumulated capital and natural resources cannot produce the 
desirable effect of fostering human welfare. A necessary adjunct to this is the fact 
that it is the quality rather than the sheer quantity of the human resources of a 
country that is central to the generation of directly productive labour. The 
productivity of labour can thus best be assured through the inculcation of skills and 
knowledge in the population by articulated education and training programmes. 
An important footnote to this is however the fact that high quality labour is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for attaining the desirable level of labour 
productivity.
In addition to skills, the necessary socioeconomic environment must exist for 
labour to effectively and efficiently exert its creative potential towards increasing 
output. In this regard, there must also be employment possibilities, a favourable 
working environment, adequate pecuniary and other incentives and a reasonable 
degree of equity in the distribution of the fruits of labour. Thus, development 
efforts should be geared towards the generation of adequate employment
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opportunities such that citizens can apply themselves to both socially and 
personally rewarding preoccupations. This should also make the distribution of 
income fairly equitable.
The corollary to this is that any development strategy that does not generate a 
reasonably high quantum of employment would be characterised by greater 
disguised or open unemployment as the large proportion of the workforce would 
be engaged in what Ropper (1958:31) described as "defensive labour" with its 
attendant low levels of living. Meaningful manpower development should attempt 
to match skills to the requirements of the economy as defined in relation to 
available natural resource endowments. Here, the principle of comparative cost 
advantage becomes handy.
The labour situation in Lesotho will be discussed within the ambit of the above 
conceptual framework. However, in order to put the subject in a proper 
perspective, it is necessary to present a brief resume of the economic context of 
labour supply and demand in Lesotho.
The Economic Context of Labour Supply 
and Demand in Lesotho
In Lesotho, labour demand and supply can best be appreciated within the context 
of its natural resource potential and physical environment. Being a mountainous 
country, Lesotho is characterised by a severe shortage of arable land and 
exploitable mineral resources (Ecket and Wykstra 1979:15; Cobbe 1977:452). The 
severity of landlessness is evidenced by the fact that in 1986, 25,4% of rural 
households were landless as compared to 12,7% in 1970 (Bureau of Statistics 
1990:57; Kingdom of Lesotho 1986: 20). It has also been stated that only 13% 
of the land is cultivable and this is largely located in the west of the country where 
population densities are in the region of 200 per square kilometre as compared to 
the national average of 45 (Braby 1989:35). Despite this situation, available 
evidence suggests that 28% of households depend on agriculture as their main 
source of income and about 66 % of currently employed members of the labour 
force are engaged in this sector (Kingdom of Lesotho 1986:221; Bureau of 
Statistics 1986). Agriculture contributes 21 % to GDP, 9 % to GNP and about 50% 
to total exports. (BOS 1990; Braby, 1989). Lesotho also lacks an industrial base
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and the growth of manufacturing "has been erratic" since 1966 (Kingdom of 
Lesotho 1986:43).
Given these circumstances, employment generation has remained an arduous task, 
a disproportionately large component of the country’s productive labour makes a 
beeline to South Africa for employment at higher wages. It is thus estimated that 
36% of Basotho households rely on miners’ remittances as their main source of 
income, just as the government itself relies heavily on miners’ remittances for its 
sustenance. For instance, it has been pointed out that "The value of miners" 
remittances in the balance of payments was estimated at M583,6 million in 1986 
and contributed about 48% to GNP (Bureau of Statistics 1990:57).
Of very great significance and relevance to Lesotho’s economic survival is also the 
fact that its geographical and ecological circumstances have made the country very 
highly dependent on South Africa. Not only is it a market for South African 
goods and services, but also wages and prices, interest rates, customs receipts and 
exchange rates are all determined by the economic trends in South Africa (see 4th 
Plan pp. 19,23,43; JASPA 1979:1). Moreover, the landlocked nature of the country 
has grave implications for transport and communication and the conduct of 
international trade which, in any event, are unavoidably also currently controlled 
by South Africa.
Given this scenario, the development and utilisation of Lesotho’s human resources 
must invariably be made in the light of the absorptive capacity and the employment 
generation potentials of the economy, and the international migrant labour 
situation.
The Stock of Human Resources and the 
Absorptive Capacity of the Economy
The Second Five-Year Development Plan 1975-80 (p.42) portrayed Lesotho as 
possessing a "reservoir of human resources". This conclusion was drawn from the 
fact that out of the de ju re  population of 1,2 million in 1975, about 664 000 (or 
55%) were of working age (15-64). Of these about 540 000 (representing 45 % 
of the total population and 81 % of the population of working age) were estimated 
to be employed at home and abroad. The plan then quickly hedged this seemingly 
impressive activity level with the reservation that "—it should not be taken as an
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indication of a satisfactory employment situation". The reasons adduced for this 
were that most of the employed worked outside Lesotho, particularly in the South 
African mines, and even among the resident labour force, most were engaged in 
the low productivity and low income generating agricultural sector.
In general, therefore, a clearer picture of quality of available manpower can be 
obtained by classifying the working population according to occupation and area 
of expertise.
Manpower and Employment Situation
No other nation experiences the same percentage of its labour force 
working abroad, the degree of dependency on foreign employment for 
its national income or the drain of its male labour force domestically. 
Similarly, few countries, if any, have domestic economies that employ 
relatively so little of their own labour force. (Eckert and Wykstra. 
1979:1).
Given the peculiar employment situation in Lesotho, as summarised in the above 
quotation, one immediately comes to grips with the significance of international 
migrant labour in the analysis of Lesotho’s manpower situation. Commenting on 
Lesotho’s employment situation, the Second Five-Year Development Plan (p.42) 
identified the problem of inadequate utilisation of the country’s human resources 
which it attributed to "the lack of opportunities for productive labour" which, in 
turn, "has led to massive outflows of Basotho to work elsewhere in the Southern 
African region". The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (p.213) however draws 
attention to the important fact that "Lesotho has a relatively small stock of skilled 
manpower in the midst of abundance of unskilled labour", while the Third Five- 
Year Plan (p. 84) points to the fact that even this relatively small number of skilled 
labour is largely "attracted by higher wages to South Africa".
In attempting to analyse the above points statistically, one is however confronted 
with the difficulty that "comprehensive and detailed figures on Lesotho’s
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manpower situation are not available" (Fourth Plan, p.213 ) and hence "the 
employment situation in Lesotho is difficult to access— ". (Second Plan, p.43) The 
analyses that follow will rely largely on an attempt to draw together thin threads 
of available labour statistics from various sources, the most recent of which is the 
1985/86 Labour Force Survey (Bureau of Statistics). It should however be pointed 
out that the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey includes the people aged 12 years and 
above in the economically active population. This does not synchronise with the 
concept of the population of working age (15-64); nor does it allow much room 
for comparison with other data sources. Moreover, the survey adopted two 
methods of deriving information on the economically active population. The 
"gainfully occupied" approach sought information on "usual" activities engaged in 
within the 12 months preceding the survey while the "labour force" approach 
sought information on activities engaged in during the week prior to the survey. 
The latter approach understandably reports a much higher figure (716 270) of 
economically active persons than the former (623 384). The following section 
examines data from the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey based on both the current 
and usual status of economically active population.
(a) Economically Active Population
Over time, the de jure  population of working age in Lesotho has constituted about 
55% of the total population. The results of the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey 
show that out of the usually economically active population 72% of the population 
was of working age in 1986. They further show that out of the usually activ^ 
population of 623 384, 73 % (or 457 740) were in Lesotho while 27 % (or 165 644) 
were outside. Of those inside, 69% were employed as compared to 99,4% of 
those outside (Table I). It is also evident from Table I that of the employed 
usually active population (i.e. 316 181) who were in the country, 35% were paid 
employees on regular salary/wages, 34% were own-account workers, 17% unpaid 
family workers, 10% casual and "other" workers and 4% were employers. In 
contrast, 96,2% of their counterparts outside (165 644) were paid employees on 
regular salary/wages. 73% (or 121 450) of the usually active population outside 
Lesotho in 1986 worked in the mines of South Africa.
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Table I: Usually Economic Active Population by Employment Status (1985/86)
Inside Lesotho Migrants Outside
Employment Status
1. Paid Emploees on 
regular salary/ 
wages 110 244 159 303
2. Casual Workers 
and Others 31 855 3 226
3. Employer 14 010 275
4. Own-account workers 107 416 1 604
5. Unpaid family 
workers 52 208 169
6. Members of producer 
cooperatives 448 -
7. Unemployed 141 559 1 067
Total Labour Force 
(12 + years) = 457 559 165 644
Source: Bureau of Statistics. The Labour Force Survey 1985/86, Maseru, 1989.
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Table II: Labour Force (Usually Economically Active Population 12+yrs)
Distribution (1985/86)
MALE FEMALE BOTH
empl. unempl. empl. unempl. empl. unempl.
1. Workers 166 307 87 979 149 872 53 580 316 182
141 559
inside
Lesotho
2. Migrant 153 683 702 10 894 365 164 577 1 067
workers
outside
Lesotho
Total: 319 990 88 681 160 769 53 945 480 759 142 626
Source: Bureau of Statistics. The Labour Force Survey 1985/86, Maseru, 1989.
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Table III: Current Employment by Area of Expertise/Occupation Category 
(Percentage Distribution)
Occupation % Currently employed 
in Lesotho
1. Professional, technical and 
related fields 1.3
2. Administrative and managerial 0.3
3. Clerical and related fields 1.6
4. Sales workers 2.8
5. Service workers 17.9
6. Agriculture and related workers 66.4
7. Production, transport 
and related fields 8.5
8. Inadequately defined 1.3
Total Number Employed 716 987*
Note: * The figure includes some migrant workers present in the household
(717). Otherwise the figure is 716 270 for currently employed within 
Lesotho.
Source: Bureau of Statistics. The Labour Force Survey, 1985/86.
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Table II further indicates that 35% of the male and 26% of the female usually 
active population inside the country were unemployed in 1986. This compares 
with only 0,5% of males and 3% of females outside.
Data on current employment (Table III) shows that agriculture and related fields 
accounted for about 66% (or about 474 000) of total current employment (of 716 
270). This is followed, but not too closely, by the services sector (18%). 
Overall, the point has been made that the majority of the workforce in Lesotho is 
involved in poorly paid activities (See Second Plan:42).
(b) The Demand For and Supply o f Skills in the Modern Sector
An important and relevant issue which is not evident in the data discussed above 
relates to the quality of labour. As the Fourth Development Plan (p. 190) rightly 
observes, skilled manpower is concentrated in the modem sector, which employed 
only a small proportion (about 6%) of the total labour force in 1980. All the 
same, the Plan notes that "employment in the modem sector is characterised by 
acute shortage of managerial, professional, technical, craft and other production 
levels of skills in all spheres of economic activity". An indication of the level of 
skill shortage may be discerned from Table III which shows that, taken together, 
professional, technical, administrative and managerial occupations accounted for 
only 1,6% of the currently employed workers in the country. Similarly Table IV 
shows that in government salaried jobs requiring mathematics/science-based 
professional and technical skills (500), 25% of the jobs were held by Basotho and 
43% by expatriates while 32% of the jobs remained unfilled. In contrast, in non­
mathematics/science based sub-professional, skilled or semi-skilled fields, the 
proportion of Basotho employees rises to about 70% while the proportion of 
expatriate employees drops to 1 % or less. What is however pertinent is that even 
in those job categories in which the Basotho are fairly well represented, the 
vacancy rates are still as high as 30% (see also Table V.) Table VI not only 
points to higher levels of employment in industry (both private and parastatals) 
than in the government service but also shows that in industry, just as in 
government service, the Basotho do not feature significantly at the 
professional/technical levels of employment. They maintain greater representation 
(than non-citizens) in the other employment categories (i.e. sub-professional, 
skilled/semi-skilled and unskilled.)
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Table IV: Salaried Employment in Government Ministries/Departments 
According to Areas of Skill and Citizenship Vacancies 
(1984/85)
Skill No o f  Jobs No o f Jobs Total
Categories Held by Held by Vacan­ No of
Basotho Expatriates cies Jobs
Pmvi-
sions
1. Maths/Science-Based 126 215 159 500
Professional 25% 43% 32% 100%
and Technical
2. Maths/Science-Based 742 96 585 1 423
Sub-Professional 52% 7% 41% 100%
and Technical
3. Non-Maths/Science-Based 417 345 284 1 046
Professional and 40% 33% 27% 100%
Technical
4. Non-Maths/Science-Based 606 11 273 890
Sub-Professional and 68% 1% 31% 100%
Technical
5. Skilled Office and Manual 1 739 22 770 2531
Jobs 69% 1% 31% 100%
6. Semi-skilled ad.and Manual 1 843 . 706 2 549
Jobs 72% 28% 100%
7. Unskilled Jobs 2 268 _ 285 2 553
89% 11% 100%
TOTALS 7 741 689 3 062 11 492
Source: Computed from Table 16.12 (Appendix), Fourth Five-Year Development 
Plan (1986/87-1990/91), Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower 
Development, Maseru, p .225.
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Table V : Salaried Employment in Government Ministries/Departments 
(1984/85)
Ministry/ Total No of Vacan­ Vac:
Department No of Jobs cies rate
Jobs Filled %
1. Agriculture & Marketing 2 504 1 979 525 21
2. Health 1 697 1 210 487 29
3. Education, Sports & Culture 725 521 204 28
4. Finance 908 692 216 24
5. Trade & Industry 135 105 30 22
6. Planning & Economic Affairs 480 356 124 26
7. Justice and Prisons 939 865 75 8
8. Interior 723 461 262 36
9. Office of Military Council 829 609 220 27
10. Information & Broadcasting 170 137 33 19
11. Foreign Affairs 108 94 14 13
12. Works 614 343 271 44
13. Transport & Communication 623 421 202 32
14. Coop & Rural Development 539 286 253 47
15. Water, Energy & Mining 323 201 122 38
16. Audit Office 49 32 17 35
17. His Majesty’s Office 52 51 1 2
18. National Assembly 54 48 6 11
19. Public Service Comission 20 19 1 5
Total 11 492 8 430 3 062 24.5%
Source: Table 16.1 Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1986/87 - 1990/91) 
Vol.l, Ministry of Planning, Economic and Manpower Development,
Maseru, p. 192.
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Table VI: Private and Parastatal Employment by Industry, Occupational 
Group and Citizenship 1980
A B C D E F G H T I
C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC T
Profes- - 1 
sional & Technical
1 3 3 21 2 - 4 10 4 40 20 2 34 76 110 30.91
Other 71 29 
Profes­
sional
6 5 60 33 1 5 2 7 10 5 106 62 12 3 268 149 419 64.27
Sub- 2 1 
Profes­
sional & Technician
2 5 19 5 - - 1 - 1 3 39 26 50 8 114 48 162 70.37
Other - - 
Sub-
Professional
- - - - - - 3 45 - - - - - - 3 45 48 6.25
Skilled 298 45 
Office 
& Manual
134 1 221 107 1023 84 101 39 94 10 676 28 145 16 2692 330 3022 89.08
Semi- 1180-
Skilled
Office &
Manual
67 - 1552 30 4838 36 455 - 241 - 35 - 57 6 8425 72 8497 99.15
Unskilled 2280- 263 - 2542- 2558 - 807 - 288 - 2 9 7 - 147 - 9132- 9182 100.00
Toial 383 1 75 473 14 4397 196 8442 125 1369 91 638 28 1167 156 431 35 20718 720 21438
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Note: C - Citizen, NC - Noncitizen, T - total for both C & NC.
A - Manufacturing, B - Utilities Electricity only, C - Construction.
D - Wholesale and Retail trade, E - Restaurants, Hotels, Tourism.
F - Transport, G - Business Service, Insurance and Banking.
H - Other services excluding no-profit Health Institutions.
I - Localised position (citizen %).
Source: Fourth National Development Plan, Table 16:15.
It is important to note that in spite of the fact that private sector employers 
(particularly in the medium-sized and large firms) are often more willing than the 
government to pay higher wages to obtain the required cadre of employees, they 
also suffer from skills shortages (c.f. Cobbe 1977:454). This fact was evident 
from Jone’s (1979) study of personnel requirements in selected vocational and 
middle level technical occupations and in selected professional, managerial and 
administrative middle-level occupations. His findings (pp.49-52) show that in the 
former category of occupations, out of a total of 2 346 jobs, 84% were occupied 
by Basotho, 6% by non-Basotho and 10% were vacant. Similarly in the latter 
category of occupations, 80% of the total establishment (3 516) was filled by 
Basotho and 9% by non-Basotho, with 11% remaining vacant.
While these findings corroborated the pattern observed earlier (Table IV) for 
government salaried jobs with regard to middle-level skills, there are significantly 
higher response rates and lower vacancy rates in the private sector than in 
government service. The wage-incentive factor seems to lie at the root of this 
difference. In general, however, the point should be made that in spite of the 
relative positions of the private and public sectors in terms of wage payments, 
which gives a certain advantage to the former over the latter with regard to skill 
recruitment, the inability of both to meet their skill requirements may be attributed 
to three factors. Firstly, since wages are generally lower in Lesotho than in South 
Africa, skills migrate to South Africa and this is a legitimate economic response. 
Secondly, the output from the various technical and vocational schools is, at the 
moment, not adequate to contend with both the domestic skill demand and the skill 
flight to South Africa. Finally, some of the skilled personnel within the country 
choose to remain as own-account workers rather than work for an organisation.
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The coexistence of a shortage of skills, vacancies and unemployment reflects the 
degree of distortion in the development and utilisation of manpower. This 
situation poses a grave challenge to the government in terms of evolving and 
implementing salient strategies that would lead to an increase in the stock and 
retention rate of productive labour and the generation of adequate employment 
opportunities. In the case of Lesotho, the question of employment creation is 
compounded by the possibility of South Africa phasing out the migratory labour 
system. The anticipation that the employment in South Africa will continue to 
decline and may eventually be phased out is predicated on the following factors:
(a) South African internalisation policy aimed at replacing migrants;
(b) the status of the homelands as an alternative source of cheap labour;
(c) possibilities of an increasing application of labour-saving technology in
the mining industry, and
(d) increased unemployment within South Africa (c.f.ILO/SATEP 1987; 
Fourth Plan: 194).
A test case for the magnitude of employment requirements in the event of massive 
migrant labour return was the "sudden return of about 10 000 workers within a 
short period of time in early 1974, resulting from particularly violent disturbances 
in some Southern African mine-labour compounds" (Cobbe 1977:455). Under 
such circumstances, there would naturally emerge a revolution of rising 
expectation on the part of the returnees that the government would help them out 
by providing them with alternative means of livelihood. Cobbe however noted that 
in 1974 this was not forthcoming and the returners either rapidly drifted off from 
the capital to their rural places or returned to a new migrant job in South Africa. 
The government itself realises the possibility of such an eventuality occurring again 
and the need to plan how to accommodate it. Thus the Fourth Plan (p. 194) notes 
that "If the migratory labour system is eventually phased out alternative 
employment opportunities for the migrant labour will have to be found in 
Lesotho". The enormity of the problem becomes even more glaring given the fact 
that "the wage sector in Lesotho is very small and the rate of job creation is very 
low". In this regard, only a small fraction of migrants who have acquired a few
(c) Job-Generation in the Economy: Needs and Constraints
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skills on-the-job can be absorbed into the relatively few job openings available in 
the modem sector. The rest, together with the mass of unskilled returners, would 
either be left to ponder the irony of their fate or would be offered an alternative 
job that would offer far less pay than their previous jobs. They could for 
example, be used in labour-intensive programmes to carry out public works. This 
programme was in fact initiated in the aftermath of the 1974 experience on the 
basis of the recommendation made by "an international interagency financed by 
UNDP and consisting mainly of World Bank personnel with ILO and FAO 
members" (Cobbe 1977:455). The recommendation included the creation of a 
Labour Intensive Construction Unit. The government initiated this experiment 
during the Second Five-Year Development Plan period as a means of job creation 
by using labour-intensive technique in the execution of such public works as road- 
building, soil conservation, establishment of woodlots and construction of fish 
ponds (Second Plan, p .46). The programme was however confined to food-for- 
work in the construction and improvement of roads and access track construction 
and soil conservation works. It was estimated that some 13 500 persons (of which 
80% were females) were involved in the programme "at any given point in a 
year". Given the facts that the employment was seasonal and remuneration made 
in kind it is doubtful whether this programmes would be sufficient to stem the kind 
of disequilibrating forces that could be unleashed on the economy in the event of 
a mass return of migrant workers a situation that would require a lot more than a 
palliative. Even among the resident population who participated in it, it appears 
to have served as a useful stopgap during the off-peak fanning season and it had 
to be mounted during such seasons in order for it to work. It is equally doubtful 
whether it would attract much response (even in the face of their predicament) 
from returnees who have been accustomed to earning pecuniary returns for their 
labour. For the programme to be reasonably effective, some cash-wage must be 
tagged onto it and it must be institutionalised. It would serve a very useful 
purpose in the face of the limitations on the employment generation capacity of the 
modem sector of the economy. For instance, the bottlenecks to effective 
implementation of the government’s avowed policy of encouraging the 
development of manufacturing as a means of creating employment opportunities 
have been identified to include:
shortage of natural resources;
scarcity of export markets and the small size of the domestic
market;
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the fact that problems of transport and communication, arising 
largely from the landlocked nature of Lesotho, hamper transfer
of goods;
the great lead of South Africa in the manufacturing field makes 
competition difficult within the customs union market;
the overvaluation of the rand.
(See ILO 1978:2; ECA 1978: 329).
The implications of these macro-economic problems affecting job generation within 
the modem sector of the economy are thrown into bold relief when one attempts 
to match employment generation targets with estimated achievements. A glaring 
example is the abysmal underfulfilment of the rather ambitious employment - 
generation targets set in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1975-80). 
Given that the labour force was estimated to increase from about 540 000 to 600 
000, the plan objective was the creation of 60 000 new jobs during the 1975-80 
period, out of which 18 500 would be in the modem sector comprising 
manufactoring, building and construction, civil engineering, tourism, mining, the 
services sector and the public services. Burke (1981:65) however noted that three 
years into the plan, only 1 697 jobs had been added in the private sector in the 
following proportions - industry (36%), commerce (16%), tourism (8%) and mines 
(40%).
This situation of gross underfulfilment is also the case with the parastatals - the 
Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) and the Basotho Enterprise 
Development Corporation (BEDCO). Burke (Ibid.67-75) identified the following 
internal problems faced by both agencies: job selection, administration, 
performance and disappointing loan-grants experience and returns on investment 
(BEDCO was said to be more progressive than LNDC with respect to job 
selection, loans and returns). These difficulties exert negative effects on the job- 
generation potentials of the two agencies. Although Burke noted the difficulty of 
assessing the employment generated by LNDC because of "data problems", she 
however managed to arrive at a total employment figure of 2 251 in 39 companies 
as at May 1981. This compares with a figure of 3 800 Basotho employees in 1976
172
(after nine years of its operation) produced by Cobbe (1977:455) and another 
figure of 1 975 new jobs between 1975 and 1977 deriving from the joint venture 
contract between LNDC and Chinese investors (ECA 1978: 326).
The purpose of presenting these figures is simply to underscore the abject situation 
of indeterminacy of the real employment generation capacity of the corporation 
due to lack of data. But more importantly, the few data available at LNDC in 
regard to the employment potentials to companies are in fact based on both 
approved and already operational projects. Such estimates are bound to be 
unreliable since some of the approved projects may never actually be put into 
effect or they may be delayed, while some operational ones might fail even before 
they get to the stage at which projections had been made in regard to their 
employment capacity.
BEDCO, on the other hand, was reported to have created 780 jobs in 69 
companies between 1979 and May 1981 (Burke 1981:71) in the following 
proportions in such major areas including clothing (26%), construction materials 
(19%), furniture and upholstery (12%) and retail food and restaurants (12%). 
These four areas accounted for 70% of total new jobs. Many more projects were, 
and continue to be, envisioned for the future but here again employment generation 
potentials of the companies depend largely on their resilience in standing up to 
competition from goods imported from South Africa as well as their ability to 
overcome the internal difficulties which confront them (as listed earlier). As 
BEDCO itself had earlier pointed out, "the single most serious constraint on 
growth and survival of small scale industry under the BEDCO umbrella, is the 
lack of basic work skills in the available labour force— the most numerous and 
pressing shortages lie in the following areas: woodworking, metalwork,
dressmaking, machine knitting and tailoring" (Burke, p .73). Thus if they did not 
have the requisite skills to man the companies in the first instance, the objective 
of employment generation by the companies would remain elusive.
An Assessment of Efforts Towards Meeting the Middle and High-level 
Manpower Requirements
It is widely acknowledged that education and training are veritable instruments of 
skill development and improvement. The government of Lesotho has, since
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independence, paid significant attention to the education sub-sector judging from 
the fact that 20-23% of the total recurrent budget between 1981-85 was allocated 
to it.
In assessing the impact of the government’s investment in education and 
manpower development, one is struck by the rather high rates of attrition and 
wastage as well as the low levels of performance at the primary and secondary 
school levels, which incontrovertibly constitute the bedrock of the educational 
system. There is also the added problem of the considerably higher enrolment of 
girls than boys in schools, as most school-age male children continue to play their 
traditional role as herdboys.
Available education statistics show that up to the mid-1980s, the wastage rate 
between standards 1 and 7 (primary school) was as high as between 55 and 65%. 
Of those who eventually passed the standard 7 examination (usually 75 % of those 
who took the examination) about 70% enrolled in Form A of secondary school. 
At this level, the wastage rate between Form A and C is about 40%. Between 
60 and 70% of those who eventually get to Form C pass the Junior Certificate 
examination, out of which 40% or more proceed to Form E and 85% of these 
finally get to Form E. The rather worrisome development at this stage is the fact 
that only a third of the candidates for the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate 
(COSC) obtain a pass grade. Worse still for instance only 4% and 10% of the 3 
126 candidates who passed the examination in 1989 were in the Division 1 and 2 
categories of pass respectively while 62% were in the GCE category, which is 
actually not a pass grade (for more details, see Okore, 1990). The implication of 
this poor level of performance is that relatively few candidates are qualified for 
entry into National Teachers Training College (NTTC), the higher level 
Vocational/Technical college (LTI) and the University (NUL), at which institutions 
middle and high-level manpower is largely trained. Moreover, the level of 
profiency of secondary school graduates in science and mathematics is generally 
low; this has been attributed largely to poor teaching by ill-qualified teaching staff 
and to inadequate teaching facilities. Thus the science/mathematics-based 
disciplines are starved of qualified candidate in the institutions of higher learning.
In general, the rate of training remains inadequate to meet the needs of the 
education, public and private sectors of the economy. This also explains the 
continuing heavy reliance on expatriates in these sectors at the professional, and
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managerial levels of manpower development. To shed further light on the 
problems of manpower development a brief review of the training schemes in 
vocational and technical schools and the university is necessary.
Technical and vocational education is visualised as the main source of middle-level 
manpower for the public and private sectors (Second Development Plan: 173). The 
programme of vocational and technical education has witnessed considerable 
expansion since the 1970s; such that by 1986 there were nine schools with a total 
enrolment of 1 335 students. There has also been an expansion in the range of 
course offered for primary, junior and senior secondary school graduates who 
spend between one and three years on their respective programmes. Enrolment of 
COSC (Senior Secondary Certificate) holders has however remained low as less 
than 25 candidates are enrolled for such courses as architecture, basic electronics, 
electrical and mechanical engineering. This again is due partly to the poor level 
of performance of secondary school students in science and mathematics. 
Moreover, due to the low prestige accorded to technical and vocational training 
and the lower pay offered to the vocationally/technically trained compared with 
their university-trained counterparts the best students opt for university education. 
These conditions have negative effects on the government’s efforts at promoting 
middle-level skill development.
In terms of output, Burke (1981) estimated that 3 280 students graduated from all 
vocational/technical schools between 1980 and 1984. The Fourth Development 
Plan (p.73) notes that the Lerotholi Polytechnic alone produced 568 graduates 
during the 1980-85 plan period in the various courses it offers.
While these figures might appear encouraging, there remains the sad fact that not 
all the products of the training programme stay in the country. Cobbe (1977:454), 
for instance, pointed out that by mid-1976, only 8% of the bricklayers, carpenters 
and electricians who graduated from the Lerotholi Polytechnic between 1974 and 
1976 were in Lesotho. This kind of trend does not augur well for the efforts 
aimed at meeting the skill requirements of the domestic economy.
At the high manpower level, NUL remains the major training centre. At this level 
of training, we shall restrict our attention to the skewness in the distribution of 
student output. The Fourth Development Plan (p.214) envisaged on output of 1 
824 Basotho graduates from NUL between 1980 and 1989. Assuming that this 
number graduated roughly in the proportions in which they were admitted (i.e.
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according to the admission criteria of humanities (25%), social sciences (38%) 
science (29%) and law (8%) proposed by NUL Second Plan (1981) this would 
amount to 456 graduates in Humanities, 693 in the social sciences, 529 in science 
and 146 in law during the 1980-89 period. Thus the humanities and the social 
sciences account for over 60% of the graduates. In actual fact, the 1989 output 
figures show that out of a total of 245 graduates from the degree programmes, 
31% obtained degrees in education, 19% in commerce, 16% in humanities and 
social sciences and 14% in Law.
The NUL Second Five-Year Development Plan (p.7) however, draws attention to 
the need to restrict intake into Department of Accounting and Commerce. The 
plan document puts the case as follows:
Although the requirement may be high for B.Comm. graduates, the 
effective demand is currently very low. Entrepreneurs in the private 
sector, apart from parastatals, have been reluctant to employ B.Comm. 
graduates. Unless governments were to enforce a vigorous employment 
policy in the private sector, the B.Comm. graduates will soon find it 
difficult to find employment.
The fact however remains that in a market economy the demand for factors of 
production, including labour, is determined by market forces and the government 
cannot unilaterally force the private sector employers to take on additional labour 
when they have no need for it. Nor can the government itself afford to offer jobs 
to surplus labour on the basis of mere humanitarian considerations. The solution 
therefore lies in greater efforts towards aligning manpower training programmes 
to the needs of the economy. For example, the NUL Second Plan (p.58) again 
noted that "Given the likely long-term development on the Lesotho Highland Water 
Project, as well as other civil engineering needs of the Lesotho National Economy 
in roads, water, sewage and general infrastructural development", the 
establishment of an Engineering/Technology faculty at NUL "warrants serious 
consideration". Here again, given the prevailing difficulty of recruiting enough 
qualified candidates for the technical and university science/mathematics-based 
courses, the priority of the education system should lie first in the strengthening 
of the science and mathematics curricula and the supply of adequately trained 
teachers to produce enough candidates for the institutions of higher learning.
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Already we are aware of the difficulties faced by the National Manpower 
Development Secretariat (NMDS) in recruiting enough candidates for its Overseas 
Fellowship training programme in specialised fields for which there are no or 
inadequate training facilities within Lesotho. This problem has been attributed to 
the unavailability of qualified candidates due to "the weakness in the preparation 
of secondary school leavers especially in the fields of mathematics and science" 
(Third National Development Plan, p .84). Furthermore, the government realises 
that in the light of some prospects of mining that have been looming since the 
1970s (see Fourth Plan, P .47), there is a need to train personnel in geology, 
geophysics, mineralogy and geochemistry. Yet as the Plan notes, the training 
programme "was not very successful" during the Third Plan period (1980-85). 
From the 1990 NMDS list of overseas trainees, the situation has not changed 
much.
There is therefore a dire need to launch a vigorous campaign to improve the 
training of mathematics and science teachers for the senior secondary schools. At 
the moment, NUL’s modest attempts at such training are not having the desired 
effect owing to the fact that graduates who are expected to teach in secondary 
schools do not often choose to do so. As Burke (1981:103) put it, "most of them 
chose to go into government and parastatals organisations on first appointment, 
benefits and promotion opportunities being superior to those of teaching". This 
situation should be arrested through deliberate government attempts to make the 
teaching profession more attractive.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper have attempted to highlight some of the factors that affect labour 
supply and demand in Lesotho. It is clear that the country’s geographical and 
ecological circumstances pre-eminently lie at the root of the fact that its economic 
fortunes are almost entirely tied to the South African economy. South Africa 
provides a market for Lesotho’s labour while Lesotho provides a market for South 
African goods and services. This relationship is clearly one between unequal 
partners. Consequently, there is little choice of policy options open to Lesotho 
both in terms of its socioeconomic development strategies and its manpower 
development and utilisation strategies. Lesotho’s dilemma is that of maintaining 
a delicate balance between promoting economic policies aimed at lifting herself by
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her own bootstraps and policies that would not run counter to South Africa’s 
dominant economic interests in the Southern African region. Added to the 
limitations to self-sustaining economic development placed on her by geographical 
and ecological circumstances, Lesotho’s membership of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU) also limits the extent to which she can independently 
pursue economic development strategies within the limits of available resources. 
As the Fourth Development Plan (p.43) puts it, "Bearing in mind the problem 
encountered in the 1970's, a cautious approach to import-substitution has yielded
success ". The government is therefore constrained to restrict herself to a
"careful use of the infant industry clause in the customs agreement " All these
restrictions impinge upon the economy’s potential to expand and create jobs.
The migrant labour system is clearly a mixed blessing. At face value, migrants’ 
remittances stimulate domestic economic activity. As was noted earlier, miners’ 
remittances contribute 48% of Lesotho’s GNP. Given this fact, the Bureau of 
Statistics (1990:57) notes that "should the observed 1984-87 upward trend change, 
the situation could have considerable repercussions on the national disposable 
income" as well as on the "country’s capacity to sustain the balance of payment 
on current account". This conclusion derives from the fact that in 1986 the visible 
trade balance showed an estimated deficit of M756 million and the contribution of 
miners remittances to balance of payment was estimated at M583,6 million.
Despite the benefits that accrue to Lesotho from the mine labour system, it has 
been suggested that the largest part (55%) of miners’ remittances is spent on food 
and clothing, with much smaller proportions being used to finance private 
investments in livestock (11%), building (7%) and agriculture (5%). (ECA 
1978:324). This evidence tend to suggest that the bulk of the remittances filters 
back into South Africa by way of purchase of South African goods and services 
by citizens. Be this as it may, the weight of the evidence is that Lesotho has a lot 
more to gain than she has to lose from her present relationship with South Africa. 
The paradox, however, is to be found in the declared policy of the government 
that "the continued heavy dependence of Lesotho’s economy on South Africa calls 
for concern and an urgent need for the creation of more jobs in the country" (BOS 
1990:57). Yet, given Lesotho’s present economic circumstances characterised by 
slow development in the manufacturing sub-sector, increasing landlessness among 
the population and low job creation potential of the economy, the call to scale 
down labour migration is definitely impracticable at the moment. This is because 
the economy is currently ill-prepared to absorb a possible mass return of its
178
migrant labour from South Africa. If anything, the state of the economy (the lack 
of rewarding job opportunities and comparative low wages) fosters the continuing 
migration of labour to South Africa with its attendant repercussions on family life 
and the social structure. As long as the demand for Lesotho’s labour by South 
Africa persists, it would prove profitable for Lesotho to maintain the labour 
migrant system. This must not, however, prejudice the continuing efforts to 
prepare the ground in the event of a mass return of migrants in the future. For 
one thing, the government has identified agriculture and rural development as "of 
prime importance in Lesotho’s perceived long and medium term development 
needs". It also stresses the need to develop the country’s natural resources, 
particularly water and energy (Fourth Development Plan, pp.24-25). This brings 
to the fore the need to pursue manpower planning more vigorously.
Effective manpower planning can be facilitated if reliable data exist to "permit the 
computation of reliable transition coefficients to describe the movement from 
infancy to school, from school to employment or higher education, and from 
higher education to employment, and other transitions involving, for example, 
migration, mortality and retirement" (Smith 1976:41). Macro-level manpower 
planning must therefore be linked to economic, educational and demographic 
planning with a view to balancing manpower supply and demand in such a way 
that available skills are utilised to the best possible advantage and the legitimate 
aspirations of individuals are duly met {Ibid. pp.20-21). Availability of reliable 
data will thus facilitate the drawing up of viable manpower plans based on 
demographic accounts of the population and the making of plausible projections of 
manpower availability and needs based on population projections and activity rates. 
These processes will assist the analysis of labour mobility and manpower 
utilisation. They should also form part of the macro-level plans towards self- 
reliant economic development within the limits of available resources.
Lesotho’s population is growing at a rather rapid annual rate of 2,6%. Various 
population projections suggest that the population of working age would be over 
one million by the year 2000 (see Sembajwe, mimeo.). It is also projected that 
the labour force would be between 900 000 and one million. Given this scenario, 
the task ahead in regard to employment generation is titanic. If population growth 
remains unchecked then there would be even greater difficulties in the future. 
These situations call for serious efforts to refurbish the educational system in such 
a way as to reduce the levels of attrition and wastage, and the rates of repetition 
and drop-out. Related to this is also the need to improve standards and hence the
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quality of output. Technical/vocational education should be more rigorously 
pursued since most of its output can be encouraged to set up own-account 
establishments rather than wait for government employment. There is also the 
need for the school system to equip future migrants with necessary skills that 
would make them more marketable and able to offer competitive labour in private 
and public sectors outside Lesotho. Technical and vocational education would 
therefore ensure that there are enough middle-level skills to meet the demands of 
the modem sector of the economy, produce persons who can work on their own 
and gradually replace unskilled with skilled labour-export.
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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: 
FOCUS ON LESOTHO
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Introduction
Labour migration constitutes one of the perennial problems of the political 
economy of Southern Africa. That is why in academic discourse the region is 
commonly referred to as "Africa of the Labour Reserves".1 This paper deals with 
the future of this problem, focusing primarily on the prospects for the 
transformation of the regional economy from a labour reservoir to a more 
productive, growing and labour-absorbing one.
In order to achieve this task we start off with a sketchy periodisation of labour 
migration in the region: the pre-mineral revolution phase; the mineral revolution 
(1889-1906); 1906-39 state-capital pressures to extract cheap African labour for 
the South African mines; increased migration (1940-74) and the 1975-92 era of a 
steady decline of migration from independent Southern African states to the South 
African mines.
The second part of the paper deals with Lesotho as a case study. The impact of 
migration on Lesotho’s economy, particularly agriculture and then the options
Amin, S. (1981). "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - 
Origins and Contemporary Forms", in D.Cohen and J.Daniel (eds), The 
Political Economy o f  Africa, Longman, London.
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available to Lesotho in order to lessen its dependence on the migrant labour system 
are discussed. The conclusion is that Lesotho has to rethink and redefine its rural 
development strategy in order to open up more domestic jobs within the rural 
economy. To this end, it is argued that the government public works needs to be 
advanced and the National Union of Mineworkers’ (NUM) cooperative strategy 
strengthened and expanded. The paper primarily focuses on labour migration to 
the South African mining industry, since this is the sector which continues to 
absorb a huge proportion of foreign African labour. The paper concentrates more 
on male rather than female migration because after the 1960s border restrictions, 
official female migration from Lesotho to South Africa virtually stopped.
Overview of Past Trends of Migration in Southern Africa
International labour migration in Southern Africa has a fairly long history which 
can be conveniently divided into five broad phases.2 The first is the period before 
the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa. During this period 
international labour migration was largely a result of the 1820s Lifaqane wars and 
the colonial conquest although the white farms, particularly sugar plantations in the 
Cape and Natal used to attract seasonal migrant labour from African societies.3 
However, pre-mineral migration was primarily a factor of political exigencies 
rather than socio-economic imperatives.
The second phase is the mineral revolution era (1889-1906) when the then 
burgeoning mining industry in South Africa was being firmly established. As the 
South African mining industry emerged, three major factors of production became 
necessary to ensure profit maximisation and cost minimisation. These were 
sufficient capital to finance production, supply of cheap labour and the
For a closely comparable periodisation o f  International Labour Migration 
in Southern Africa see S.Sautho and N.Pule, "ILO Research and 
Evaluation", NUL, 1989.
For a detailed account o f  how the Basotho were dispossessed o f large 
tracks o f  fertile land thus resulting in the over-population see D.Innes, 
Anglo-American and the Rise o f  M odem  South Africa, Raven Press, 
Johannesburg, 1984.
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maintenance of a low-cost wage structure for a predominantly migratory and semi­
peasant workforce. To achieve the last two objectives, the mining houses 
established various institutional frameworks to facilitate the inflow of sufficient 
cheap labour to the mining enclaves.
In 1889 the Chamber of Mines (COM) was formed with the express objective of 
co-ordinating, regulating, controlling and standardising cheap labour supply to the 
affiliated mines. First argues that the formation of the COM was to guarantee a 
large and constant flow of African labour at a controlled cost. Attempts in the 
early 1890s by the COM to co-ordinate recruiting, impose a maximum average 
wage and prevent labour poaching, repeatedly broke down. If low-grade mines 
were to be developed it was imperative of mining policy that the COM guarantee 
ways of bringing down the cost of reproducing the labour force.4
Initially the mining companies tried to fulfil their labour demands by engaging 
local convict labour and importing indentured Chinese labour because during this 
period African migration to the mines was more discretionary than necessary. The 
COM set up the labour importing agency to control imported Chinese labour. 
Between 1904-6 about 63 296 Chinese men were contracted and shipped to South 
Africa. However the importation of Chinese labour was terminated in 1906.
The COM, also established recruiting agencies in different parts of the Southern 
African region to fulfil its mandate. In 1902 the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association (WENELA) was formed to recruit migrant labour from Malawi, 
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) 
was formed in 1912 to recruit cheap labour from South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland. In the mid-1970s, the COM decided to consolidate WENELA and 
NRC into the Employment Bureau of Africa Limited (TEBA), which is presently
The COM was primarily intended to monopolise recruitment o f  mine 
labour, reduce competition for labour among affliated mining houses and 
fix a standard labour cost. For more details on foreign labour to South 
Africa see R.Davies et.al, The Struggle fo r  South Africa. Zed Books, 
London, 1988; R.First, Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletariat 
and Peasant, the Harvesler Press, Sussex, 1983; D.Clark, "The South 
Africa Chamber o f  Mines: Policy and Strategy with Reference to foreign 
labour Supply", DSRG Working Paper N o.2, University o f Natal, 1977; 
Sautho and Pule 1989.
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the main agency responsible for the supply of migrant labour from the region to 
the COM-affiliated mines.
It was in the third phase (1906-39) that mining capital, in close alliance with the 
South African state, set out to apply vigorous economic and extra-economic 
pressures on the African peasantry to extort cheap migratory labour for the mining 
industry. Firstly, the South African state enforced discriminatory trade and pricing 
policies on agricultural produce, which favoured Afrikaner farmers at the expense 
of African peasants. Secondly, heavy taxation was imposed on African peasant 
producers. Thirdly, substantial tracts of fertile land were usurped from African 
peasants through the notorious 1913 Land Act and 1936 Natives Land and Trust 
Act. Fourthly, the Pass Laws and other influx control laws were enforced on 
Africans in order to restrict their freedom of movement and channel cheap labour 
where it was needed.
The Pass Laws were also meant to confine and barricade surplus population (i.e. 
the unemployed) in the rural slums of the unproductive tribal reserves. Finally, 
the South African government entered into covert agreements with the colonial 
regimes in the neighbouring countries on the constant supply of cheap migrant 
labour to the mines. For example the 1909 Mozambican Convention signed 
between the Transvaal Republic and Portugal, provided for a stable annual 
exportation of 100 000 Mozambicans to the Transvaal gold mines.5 This 
agreement remained in force until the mid-1970s when Frelimo took power in 
Mozambique. This agreement was a vivid example of the South African state- 
capital collusion with colonial regimes in Southern Africa in extracting cheap 
oscillatory labour from the colonies and thereby undermining peasant subsistence 
economies.
The fourth phase (1940-74) was a period of increased migration from the 
neighbouring states to the South African mines, particularly gold mines. Table 1 
shows that foreign migrant labour as a proportion of total African labour on the
Cohen, R. (ed), Forced Labour in Colonial Africa, Zed Books, London, 
1979; Magubane B ., The Political Economy o f  Race and Class in South 
Africa, Monthly Review Press, London, 1979; Stahl, C ., "Recent 
Changes in the Demand for Foreign African Labour in South Africa and 
Future Prospects", in de Vletter (ed), Labour Migration and Agricultural 
D evelopment in Southern Africa, FAO, Rome 1982; R.First op.cit.
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gold mines rose from 52% to 78%. The higher wages in the South African 
manufacturing industry attracted more domestic African labour, which came to 
despise mine jobs.
It was, therefore, during this phase that Southern African states’ dependence on 
the migrant labour system was deepened. The profundity of this dependence is 
clearly reflected in the fact that the attainment of political independence by these 
states had no significant effect on reversing this unhealthy economic environment. 
The editorial of Moeletsi oa Basotho bemoaned the failure of political 
independence in Lesotho to translate into economic independence as follows:
Political independence has not redressed Lesotho’s massive labour 
drainage to South Africa. This economic dependence on South Africa 
gravely undermines Lesotho’s international stature as a sovereign state. 
The country’s socioeconomic stability is largely contingent upon 
external factors. Once international aid is not forthcoming Basotho 
become more desperate. Thus we are not masters of our own destiny.6
The Southern African states’ dependence on the migrant labour system strengthens 
the apt depiction of the region as a labour reserve economy.
Moeletsi oa Basotho 1990 Editorial Comments. The text is translated by 
the author.
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Table I: Africans Employed on the Gold Mines: Selected Years Between 1906 
and 1984
Year Number Employed 
(thousands)
Percentage Foreign
1906 81 77
1911 190 60
1916 204 56
1921 173 61
1926 182 62
1931 210 50
1936 297 48
1941 368 52
1946 305 59
1951 299 64
1956 336 65
1961 399 64
1966 370 66
1970 370 72
1971 371 77
1972 362 78
1973 379 79
1974 350 78
1975 322 68
1976 343 58
1977 374 49
1978 389 47
1979 399 46
1980 416 44
1981 422 43
1982 418 43
1983 428 43
1984' 437 42
Source: Santho and Pule, 1989, from Wilson (19.72); WENELA TEBA Annual 
Report various years; COM Annual Report various years.
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During the fifth phase (1975-90) inflow of foreign labour to the South African 
mines declined steadily. Table 1 shows that between 1975-84 the proportion of 
foreign African labour of the total African labour on the gold mines dropped from 
68% to 42%. Both regional and internal developments in South Africa played a 
contributory role in the decline. In 1966 Zambia withdrew its workers and in 
1974 Malawi withheld its mine labour force from South Africa following a plane 
crash in which about 74 miners were killed. After lengthy negotiations with the 
COM, Malawi agreed once again to send its labour to South Africa in 1977. By 
this time the COM had established a severely restricted quota for Malawi.
With the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Southern Africa, the COM regarded 
the future labour supply from Mozambique as politically uncertain. It therefore 
reduced the number of Mozambican recruits in 1974 and unilaterally phased out 
the 1909 Mozambique Convention. From 1*18 000 in 1975 the number of 
Mozambican recruits was reduced to 42 000 in 1978. Currently, Mozambique 
supplies about 50 000 miners to South Africa (see Table II). Thus, Mozambique 
remains one of the crucial labour suppliers to the South African mines, second 
only to Lesotho which currently supplies about 93 000 miners to the TEBA 
member mines. In 1981, the decision by the Zimbabwean government not to 
renew the recruiting licences of TEBA led to the repatriation of Zimbabwean 
miners at the end of their contracts.
These regional political developments led the COM to reduce its dependence on 
foreign African labour. In spite of that the migrant labour quotas from Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland stabilised, and in some cases increased, while recruitment 
of novice labour from these countries has been systematically declining.
There were mainly two domestic factors which precipitated a decline in foreign 
African labour intake on the South African mines after 1975. Firstly, the increase 
in miners’ wages as a result of workers’ struggles and the rise of the gold price 
on the international market. This increase provided the necessary economic 
incentive for domestic African labour to take up mine jobs in large numbers. 
Secondly, the COM’s inward-looking labour recruiting strategy was a result of the 
pressing need for the state and capital to address the chronic structural 
unemployment crisis in South Africa.
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Table II: Labour Compliment on TEBA Member Mines, February 1992
Origin Num ber Percentage
Lesotho 93 Oil 23.44
Botswana 14 012 3.53
Swaziland 16 712 4.21
Mozambique 50 149 12.64
Transkei 87 230 21.98
Bophuthatswana 36 718 9.25
Kwasulu 25 106 6.32
Ciskei 7 356 1.85
Other (RSA) 66 440 16.74
Total 396 737 100.00
Local 222 853 56.17
Foreign 173 884 43.83
Source: TEBA - Lesotho, April 1992.
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As a concrete expression of the above influences and concerns, the COM 
embarked on three main strategies aimed at reducing the foreign African labour 
on the mines. These were (a) internalisation of labour supply policy (b) 
stabilisation of labour force policy and (c) mechanisation of production. 
Internalisation of labour supply refers to the COM policy of replacing foreign 
migrants with domestic workers, thereby reducing the dependence of the mining 
industry on external and precarious sources of labour supply. The disruptions of 
the early 1970s had evidently exposed the COM’s vulnerability to the political 
vicissitudes of external labour supplies. The South African state also exerted a lot 
of pressure on the COM to employ domestic labour so as to reduce internal 
structural unemployment. As a result of internalisation, it is estimated that the ratio 
of domestic to foreign labour on the mines is at most 60:40. Stabilisation policy 
is aimed at creating a professional and disciplined mine labour force. Hence the 
contract period for migrants has increased substantially. As a result of this policy 
valid re-engagement guarantee or "bonus" certificates have been introduced. Tough 
measures are taken against migrants who contravene contract obligations. 
Mechanisation of production refers to the transformation of the mining industry 
from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive enterprise. This process is at an 
advanced stage in the coal mines. The obvious effects of these three processes 
have been the retrenchment of foreign labour and a substantial reduction of novice 
labour supply from the South African Labour Commission (SALC). It needs to be 
emphasised, though, that this three-pronged strategy of reducing foreign labour has 
been (at least before the De Klerk era) tied to South Africa’s regional strategy of 
exerting pressure on neighbours who have been sympathetic to the liberation 
struggle in that country while rewarding those supportive of the apartheid regime.7
It was in response to this changing pattern of labour demand and supply for the 
South African mining industry that the Southern African Labour Commission
See F. De Vletter Labour Migration to South Africa: Recent Trends end 
Prospects, ILO, Lusaka, 1984; K. Matlosa "International Labour 
Migration in Lesotho: Current Dimensions and Context", Paper Presented 
to the Canadian Association for African Studies Annual Conference, 
Carleton University, Canada, 1989; K. Matlosa, "The Changing Labour 
Demand in South Africa and Prospects for Re-absorption o f Returning 
Basotho Migrants in Lesotho’s Economy", in Santho S ., and M. 
Sejanamane (eds) Southern Africa After Apartheid, SAPES Books, Harare, 
1990.
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(SALC)8 was formed in 1980. Its primary mandate is to coordinate and stabilise 
migrant labour supply to South Africa, through collective bargaining with the 
South African state and mining capital on labour agreements in order to establish 
mutually acceptable quotas of mine labour from member states. The SALC is 
further charged with the responsibility of striving towards gradual withdrawal of 
member states from the migrant labour system. To this end is to facilitate 
members’ contingency plans for absorbing returning migrants in case of either 
gradual or sudden repatriation.
In the early 1980s the apartheid regime threatened to repatriate all foreign migrants 
in the event of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. How real this threat was 
is a moot point. It is very likely that it was being used as a deterrent to the 
imposition of sanctions per se. Whatever the case, the SALC took this threat, and 
many others which followed, quite seriously. In 1984 South Africa threatened, to 
repatriate about 140 000 Basotho migrants and replace them with Mozambicans 
unless Lesotho considered signing a Nkomati-type non-aggression pact with South 
Africa.9 As Lesotho adamantly refused to enter into a non-aggression pact with 
South Africa, the latter country imposed a devastating economic blockade on the 
former in 1985. This economic stranglehold precipitated the military coup of 20 
February 1986 and the demise of the Basotho National Party (BNP) government. 
It is not clear whether the military government signed a non-aggression pact with 
South Africa, but what is obvious is that relations between the two countries 
became very cordial and Lesotho’s migrant labour quota to TEBA member mines 
increased from about 101 000 in 1985 to about 109 000 in 1987 (see Table III).
The SALC is basically a consultative body composed o f ministers 
concerned with labour matters in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Angola holds 
observer status in SALC. Independent Namibia has not affiliated. Two 
other components o f  the SALC besides- governments are worker 
organisations and employer associations. The Lusaka-based ECA and ILO 
form the Secretariat o f the SALC. The Commission holds annual 
conferences to consider and assess among other things, members’ labour 
agreements with South Africa, domestic job creation plans to absorb 
repatriated migrants and migrant working conditions in South Africa.
De Vletter (1984) op cit.
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In 1986, after the collapse of the Nkomati Accord, South Africa threatened to 
repatriate about 60 000 Mozambicans upon termination of their contracts in 
retaliation for a landmine blast attributed to the then proscribed African National 
Congress (ANC) whose activists were purportedly being harboured by 
Mozambique.10 Mainly because of these persistent threats of migrant 
repatriation, the task of the SALC has become much more burdensome. 
Paradoxically, the SALC has not as yet initiated well-coordinated contingency 
programmes for the reabsorption of returning migrants even in the face of all these 
threats. In this context then, the vexed question is the future of the migrant labour 
system. To what extent can the Southern African states continue to rely on this 
system? What are the likely future scenarios and options for the SALC member 
states?
Table III: Lesotho Labour Compliment on TEBA Member Mines 1960-1991
1960 45 698
1970 62 576
1980 100 458
1985 101 120
1986 106 379
1987 108 895
1988 105 116
1989 105 000
1990 103 040
1991 93 319
Source: TEBA - Lesotho, April 1992.
10 De Vletter, F. "Foreign Labour on the South African Gold Mines: New 
insights on an old problem", International Labour Review, Vol. 126, N o.2, 
1987.
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International Labour Migration and Future Scenarios
It is quite evident from the above account that since the mid-1970-s there has been 
a systematic and deliberate reduction of foreign migrants working on the South 
African mines through four main strategies employed by state and capital. These 
have been identified as internalisation, stabilisation, mechanisation and South 
Africa’s regional strategy of sustaining and perpetuating its sub-imperialist politico- 
economic domination in Southern Africa. Given the soaring structural 
unemployment, particularly among blacks, in South Africa, we can justifiably 
project that the decline of foreign labour intake for the mining industry will 
continue even in the 1990s.
The political independence of South Africa and the establishment of a unitary, 
democratic and non-racial state is not likely to reverse this trend. The SALC 
member states will have to reckon with the high employment expectations of black 
South Africans under a democratic state in the aftermath of independence. The 
ANC, which is likely to form part of the new government, is clearly aware of the 
enormous employment challenge that will confront the post-colonial state in South 
Africa." Furthermore, the SALC has to take cognisance of the employment 
pressure that the return of approximately 30 000 exiles will pose for a post­
apartheid state in South Africa.
Clearly, the democratic state in independent South Africa will be saddled with the 
daunting tasks of (a) fair redistribution of economic wealth, opportunities and 
income (b) resettlement of returnees and their engagement in gainful economic 
activity and (c) reversal of the upward spiral of the unemployment rate currently 
estimated in the region of 30% .12 In order to address the above problems and 
other social inequalities in South Africa, the ANC argues for the nationalisation 
of major industries, including the mining monopolies.
Central to the ANC economic strategy for a future non-racial 
democratic South Africa would then be nationalisation of major 
industries. The State would also play a central role in ensuring
11 New Nation 5-11 October 1990; Sechaba V ol.24, No. 10, October, 1990.
12 • •New Nation ibid.
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economic growth so that equitable redistribution of the country’s wealth 
can be a reality.13
With particular reference to the future government programme for the mining 
industry, the African Communist proposed three policy guidelines. Revision of 
the terms of mining leases so as to increase the state’s share of the proceeds of 
mining; use of anti-monopoly legislation to breakup the largest of the mining 
finance houses and nationalisation of one or more, but not all, of the resulting 
smaller mining groups.14
The ANC nationalisation strategy does not explicitly guarantee the continued 
participation of foreign migrants in the mining industry. It is not far-fetched to 
project that when social inequality in South Africa is addressed and nationalisation 
is embarked upon, foreign migrants are likely to be left in the lurch. Under these 
circumstances various options ranging from the SALC withdrawal of its migrant 
labour from South Africa to surviving within the status quo, have been advanced.
Stahl and Bohning argue that the SALC member states should take concrete steps 
towards a phased withdrawal of their migrants over a 15-year period. Such a 
withdrawal should be undertaken collectively to ensure co-ordination and avoid a 
situation whereby SALC states could be played against one another by the South 
African state and mining capital. In order to cushion the adverse effects of such 
a move on SALC economies, it is argued, the United Nations should be 
approached to establish a special fund in line with the resolution on accelerated 
economic development and international action adopted by the 1978 Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) Conference on migratory labour in Southern Africa.
The above proposal further notes that creating alternative employment within 
SALC economies is of utmost importance and the highest priority in the process 
of withdrawal. It is estimated that the job-creation process may cost the SALC 
states some US$2 500 million over a 24-year period. It is argued that this money 
could be raised by charging a levy on South African employers for each migrant 
worker employed during the phased withdrawal. The suggested levy is R1 500 per
New Nation ibid.
14 African Communist No. 123, fourth Quarter, 1990.
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man-year for the COM and R 100 for other mining houses. A threat of sudden en 
masse withdrawal would be used if South Africa were to default.
The withdrawal option suggested by Stahl and Bohning however, has its own 
shortcomings. Firstly, given the SALC states’ extreme economic dependence and 
political linkages to South Africa, it would be adventuristic for them to withdraw 
migrant workers without a meaningful reformulation of their economic strategies 
in order to absorb that labour. Secondly, the question of levying the South 
African mining capital some US$2 500 million is impracticable because presently 
the COM does not need foreign African labour.
Thus, if the SALC states were to withdraw their workers, the mining capital would 
still extract cheap migrant and commuter labour from the South African Bantustans 
and townships. Thirdly, the suggestion that the SALC use the sudden and en 
masse withdrawal of labour threat if South Africa defaulted on the levy is 
completely unrealistic. It is incontrovertible that South Africa has much more 
political and economic capacity to repatriate foreign migrants than the SALC has 
to withdraw, let alone absorb, their migrants.
The second option is that of the SALC states attempting to stabilise the migrant 
labour system in order to survive within it despite its socioeconomic consequences.
This particular school of thought views the Southern African states as almost 
helpless politico-economic hostages of South Africa with limited powers, if any at 
all, to extricate themselves. The SALC activities since 1980 bear testimony to the 
organisation’s conviction that this option is optimally viable. SALC member states 
have concentrated on negotiating labour agreements with and improving conditions 
of migrant workers in South Africa (SALC 1990) rather than restructuring their 
domestic economies to absorb their growing labour force.
The past decade has shown that instead of the SALC initiating new economic 
strategies, policies and programmes geared towards extracting its members from 
the migrant labour system, it is South Africa which has in fact embarked upon 
migrant repatriation and retrenchment. This is the major weakness of the SALC. 
It continues to react to South African pressure rather than create domestic job 
opportunities. Instead of the SALC governments creating alternative income- 
generating projects for the repatriated/retrenched migrants, the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) seems to have effectively seized this initiative, particularly 
since the 1987 strike. It has to be borne in mind that the central policy of the
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NUM is to dismantle the migrant labour system. As part of its strategy towards 
this end, the NUM has established mineworkers labour cooperatives in Lesotho, 
Transkei and Swaziland. The main objectives of these cooperatives are to identify 
and initiate labour-intensive income-generating projects and engage 
repatriated/retrenched migrants in gainful economic production.
Focus on Lesotho
Lesotho’s dependence on labour migration to the South African mining industry 
is much more pronounced than that of the other SALC member states. It may be 
argued that Lesotho as a landlocked mountainous country with paltry resources 
stands to gain through the following spinoffs:
(a) Deferred Payment, which has increased quite phenomenally in the last decade. 
In 1980 deferred payment to Lesotho was about M24 million. In 1989 this figure 
shot up to M242 million - a net increase of 908% over a nine-year period.15 
Deferred Pay is the 60% of migrants’ wages which is transferred to Lesotho by 
mining companies. It contributes a substantial amount to government revenue and 
finances a large slice of the country’s trade deficit. It is presently estimated that 
the 93,000 Basotho miners in the COM mines alone earn Lesotho the sum of M 1.1 
billion per annum.16
(b) Migrant remittances which accrue to the migrants’ families and are used 
largely to finance household consumption and production needs. Presently migrant 
remittances account for about 80% of most rural households’ gross income. This 
proportion underlines the serious decline of agriculture as an income earner in 
Lesotho’s rural economy. Migrant remittances accruing to Lesotho rose from M 18 
million per annum in 1980 to M166 million in 1989 - a net increase of 822%.17
Stahl C ., and Boning W ., "Reducing Dependence on Migration in 
Southern Africa", ILO/SATEP, 1983.
16 Central Bank, Quarterly Review, Lesotho, 1989.
17 Information received from TEBA, Lesotho Branch, April 1992.
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(c) Finally it may also be argued that the migrant labour system is a 
socioeconomic blessing for the resource-poor economy of Lesotho. It relieves the 
economy of a large proportion of the domestic labour force which could not be 
absorbed by the domestic economy given its low labour-absorptive capacity. Table 
IV provides a succinct synopsis of the labour force participation and 
unemployment rates in Lesotho. It is estimated that the labour force participation 
rate was about 56% while the unemployment rate was about 23% in 1985/86. 
Thus labour migration from Lesotho could be seen as a "safety-valve" for the 
domestic employment crisis. This is one of the factors that explains the 
government’s inertia in creating productive employment opportunities, not only for 
the returning migrants but also for the unemployed Basotho who can no longer be 
absorbed by the mining industry in South Africa.
The above-mentioned spinoffs are not real socioeconomic benefits for Lesotho in 
the long run. A closer scrutiny of the migrant labour system will reveal that these 
spinoffs tend to be ephemeral. They are illusory and devoid of any long-term 
development dynamic and social stability. Consequently these apparent benefits 
translate into a high socioeconomic cost for the country. Elkan captures this point 
cogently in relation to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.
While one can argue that labour migration provides benefits in the form 
of income- earning opportunities that would not otherwise exist, the 
degree of dependence on this source of income, especially in the case 
of Botswana and Lesotho, must also be regarded as a cost. Whatever 
may be true of the long run, there is no question but that in the short 
run if South Africa were to close her frontiers to prospective migrants 
all the three countries would be worse off, and in Lesotho there would 
be severe distress. Such a degree of dependence on a particular source 
of income must be counted as a cost.18
As reflected in the above quotation, the migrant labour system may be regarded 
as both a benefit and a cost for the labour supply states like Lesotho. As
Elkan W ., "Labour Migration from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland", 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, V ol.28, N o.3, 1980.
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dependence on labour migration becomes deeply entrenched, economic, 
particularly agricultural, decline becomes much more intense.
We are in no way trying to construct a mechanistic correlation between the 
migrant labour system and agricultural decline in Lesotho. The uni-dimensional 
linkage between migration, labour shortage, low agricultural productivity and low 
income in rural Lesotho is somewhat tenuous. In another formulation, migration 
and shortage of labour per se do not sufficiently explain Lesotho’s agricultural 
crisis.19 There are many other endogenous and exogenous variables to Lesotho’s 
agricultural decline besides labour migration. These variables, however, are not 
the subject of this study.
The emphasis, therefore, is on the extent to which migration has become a 
disincentive to agricultural pursuits in Lesotho.
The Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1986/87-1990/91) confirms this 
observation by arguing that:
Dependence on mine wage income has grown since 1978 from 35.5% 
of GNP to over 50%. The GNP more than doubled but agriculture’s
share declined from 17% in 1978 to 7.1% in 1984 As a result of
rural residents dependence on off-farm income, total farming effort has 
declined.
Central Bank, op.cit.
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Table IV: Labour Force Participation and Unemployment Rates by Age and 
Sex: Preliminary Report of the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey
Participation Rates
(%)
Unemployment Rates
(%)
Age Group Male Female Total Male Female Total
12-19 40.7 17.5 28.5 28.9 37.1 31.6
20-34 90.8 47. 68.8 22.1 29.4 24.6
35-54 94.7 49.5 71.0 16.1 19.6 17.3
55 and over 77.5 31.9 51.6 25.9 17.1 22.8
Not stated 27.9 2.8 10.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL 76.3 37.1 55.8 21.8 25.4 23.0
Source: GOL 1987 Socioeconomic indicators of Lesotho.
Table V shows that during the 1970s even when mine wages substantially 
increased, agriculture’s contribution to GNP continued to decline. In 1970/71 
mine wage income contributed 32% to GNP while agriculture only 22%. In 
1979/80 mine wage income and agriculture’s contributions to GNP were 41 % and 
14% respectively. This may mean that mine remittances are rarely invested in 
agricultural productivity. Even in cases where remittances are invested in 
agriculture, smallholder farmers are confronted with a myriad of problems which 
inhibit increased productivity. These include labour shortage; lack of institutional 
backup and instruments of production; precarious climatic conditions; the nature 
of state rural development policy, which has an explicit bias in favour of 
progressive farmers at the exclusion of small farmers; soil erosion; landlessness; 
overpopulation and overstocking.
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Table V: Sector Distribution of Gross National Development Product of 
Lesotho: Selected Years
Year/Percentage
Sector 1970/71 1974/75 1975/76 1977/78 1979/80
Mine wages 32.0 38.2 47.3 44.1 41.1
Agriculture 22.4 20.1 14.7 16.5 14.5
Mining 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.4 2.9
Manufacturing 2.8 3.1 2.7 2.1 2.2
Trade 13.9 8.3 7.6 * 5.8 5.3
Construction 1.9 3.1 2.8 6.7 4.4
Private 16.4 14.7 14.6 13.1 13.5
Government 5.8 3.3 3.7 3.7 4.6
Other 4.0 8.6 7.6 7.6 11.5
Total GNP 74 772
(in million maloti) 
158 125 211 990 331 406 444 994
Source:Plath et al. 1985 as extracted from IMTF (1983).
201
Not surprisingly, therefore, farming in Lesotho has virtually become a part-time 
and very marginal occupation for most rural households.20 Many studies21 have 
shown that a considerable portion of migrant remittances is earmarked for the 
purchase of livestock and other household items rather than direct investment in 
profitable agricultural assets.
This explains why the 1970s mine wage increases resulted in a massive rise in the 
number of goods imported from South Africa rather than real and sustainable 
development of the domestic economy. It has also subjected Lesotho to an 
extreme external dependence whose vicissitudes are beyond the control of the 
government.
Reduction in the Employment o f  Mine novices
At least since the 1930s economic crisis in Lesotho, it has been very clear that the 
demand and supply of cheap Basotho migrant labour would be controlled by the 
COM and not the Lesotho government. The 1970s measures adopted by the 
COM’s to reduce foreign black labour through internalisation, stabilisation and 
mechanisation are a clear testimony of the COM absolute control over migrant 
labour. Though the 19/Os changes did not affect Lesotho drastically, the COM 
has gradually tightened its employment screws on mine novices from Lesotho.
In 1981, 5% of TEBA’s Basotho recruits were novices. This figure plummeted 
to 3% in 1982 and 1% in 1983.22 For the gold mines alone the figures for 
Basotho mine novices as a proportion of total TEBA recruits from Lesotho
ILO/JASPA, Options fo r  a Dependent economy; Development, 
Employment and Equity problem s in Lesotho, ILO, Ethiopia, 1979.
21 Inter-ministerial Task Force Progress in Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development, Masery, 1983; Plath,J. el al. "International Labour 
Migration and Agricultural Development in Lesotho; Farming Systems", 
Research project, Ministry o f Agriculture, 1985.
22 Plath ibid; Eckert, J. and Wykstra, R. "The Future o f Basotho Migration
to the Republic o f South Africa", Research Report N o.4, Lesotho 
Agricultural Sector Analysis Project, Ministry o f  Agriculture, 1979.
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dropped from 17% in 1975 to 5% in 1985.23 This reduction of mine novice 
recruitment effectively translates into a two-pronged socioeconomic disadvantage 
for Lesotho.
Firstly, since the 1980s a conspicuous trend of internal rural- urban migration in 
Lesotho has been exacerbated. This comprises largely female migrants24 who, 
since the 1960s border restrictions, have been barred from seeking employment in 
South Africa. This trend is being further aggravated by the retrenchment of some 
experienced Basotho miners from South Africa. Secondly, the reduction of mine 
novice recruitment further deepens the employment crisis in Lesotho. This means 
that the country’s annual labour market entrants, estimated at 20 000 in 1988, are 
being increased.25 The World Bank projects that by the year 2000 Lesotho’s 
annual labour market entrants will shoot up to 26 000.26 Presently Lesotho’s 
unemployment rate ranges above 30% with a population growth rate of about 3 %.
As argued earlier, drastic cuts in Basotho migrant labour to South Africa are 
likely to continue in the 1990s. This process may include more repatriation of 
Basotho miners in favour of the local African labour from the South African 
townships and Bantustans. Cobbe27 and Wellings28 have, however, argued that 
as long as the gold mining industry does not collapse, some 100 000 Basotho will
W ellings, P. Development by Invitation: South African Corporate 
Investment in Lesotho, working papers N o . l l ,  University o f Durban, 
1984.
~4 Wilkinson, R., "Migration in Lesotho: Some Comparative Aspects with
Particular Reference to the Role o f W omen”, Geography, V ol.68, N o.300, 
1983.
25 World Bank, Lesotho Country Economic Memorandum, Washington, 1987.
~6 World Bank op cit.
27 Cobbe, J. "Emigration and Development in Southern Africa with Special
Reference to Lesotho", The International Migration Review, Vol. 16, N o.4, 
1982.
28 •W ellings op cit.
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be assured of employment in South Africa.29 This likelihood notwithstanding, the 
on going processes of internalisation, stabilisation mechanisation in the South 
Africa mining industry as well as the declining price of gold on the World Market 
warrants a fundamental re-thinking and redefinition of Lesotho’s development 
strategy.
Alternative Development Strategy Geared towards 
Domestic Employment Creation
As far back as 1979, the ILO/JASPA Report30 observed that with regard to the 
quantitative outflow of Lesotho’s labour power, with its attendant socioeconomic 
disadvantages and political uncertainties, the government is faced with four policy 
options:
(a) laissez-faire, the outcome of which might mean more or fewer migrants;
(b local job creation and rural development, creating domestic income-
generating opportunities at a rate that is hopefully equal to the natural 
population and labour force growth, while exporting surplus labour to 
South Africa.
(c) deliberately cutting down the growth in migration and perhaps 
eventually the absolute numbers of migrants while reabsorbing as many 
of the returned migrants as possible in domestic productive employment; 
,  and
Cobbe and Wellings argue that the COM may retain a stabilised quota cf 
about 100 000 Basotho miners even at the height o f the internalisation, 
stabilisation and mechanisation processes so long as the gold mines 
continue to operate. The rationale for this policy would be to (a) preserve 
the diversity o f  labour sources, (b) hold on to more skilled and 
experienced Basotho miners and (c) sustain the political grip that South 
Africa has on Lesotho via the nexus o f the migrant labour system.
30 ILO/JASPA op.cit.
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(d) a radical policy of banning all migration to South Africa as was done in 
Tanzania (1961), Zambia (1963) and Malawi (1974), combined with an 
appeal to the United Nations to finance adjustment costs.
A closer examination of these options leads one to conclude that option (b) above 
is the most optimally practicable if Lesotho is to gradually lessen its dependence 
on the migrant labour system. Thus Lesotho’s redefined and reformulated 
development strategy needs to be conceptualised within the confines of this option.
The Lesotho government should work out a comprehensive agricultural and rural 
development strategy that will provide gainful employment for the rural 
population. This alternative development strategy should be worked out as a 
matter of urgency given the present political developments, which are likely to 
bring about a democratic and non-racial state in South Africa. In case of this 
eventuality we project three scenarios in terms of Lesotho’s participation in the 
migrant labour system in a post-apartheid South Africa.
Firstly, migrant repatriation accompanied by training of the local labour to fill up 
vacant positions formerly held by Basotho will continue. This is highly likely 
particularly if nationalisation of the mining industry becomes part of the new 
regime’s agenda. Secondly, Lesotho also has a choice of becoming part of a 
larger confederal system in a future democratic South Africa. In this manner 
Lesotho constitutionally becomes part of South Africa and her migrant labourers 
to the mines are likely not to be repatriated, since they would not be regarded as 
foreign labour. This is the most intricate and indeed, politically sensitive scenario. 
As such it is highly dependent on the nature of political relations of Lesotho and 
with post-apartheid South Africa. Thirdly, assuming that nationalisation of the 
mining industry does not become part of the economic policy package for a new 
regime in South Africa, the COM will still exercise its absolute discretion and 
monopsony on labour demand and supply sources. In this case, the assumption 
by Cobbe and Wellings, that at least some 100 000 Basotho will be ensured of 
mine employment as long as the gold mines do not collapse, may not necessarily 
hold. The present trend shows that COM mines alone have already cut Lesotho 
labour to about 83 000.31
ILO/JASPA op cit.
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Scenarios (b) and (c) above may prove favourable to Lesotho. The possibility of 
scenario (a) should, however, not be disregarded. It is precisely because of the 
possibility of scenario (a) that Lesotho needs to open its own domestic employment 
opportunities particularly in the rural areas. Such a venture would not only stem 
international migration in the long run, but would also off-set internal rural-urban 
migration.
Since 1978, the Lesotho government has embarked on public works projects 
through the Labour-Intensive Construction Unit (LCU) in order to redress both 
rural-urban and international migrations. In two fundamental ways this public 
works strategy falls short of opening up viable employment avenues in the rural 
areas for the retrenched and prospective mine migrants. Firstly it has not been 
able to absorb retrenched migrants, particularly after the 1987 mineworkers’ strike 
which culminated in the expulsion of about 9 000 Basotho miners. Secondly, it 
has not been able to transcend mere road construction and maintenance into 
agricultural productivity and other rural income-generating projects which could 
attract labour away from migration. In order to be viable, a labour-intensive 
public works strategy should not only be able to create local jobs and develop the 
rural area, it should also provide many standby jobs through a readily available 
"shelf" of projects, should an emergency occur.
NUM has been more successful in catering for its members. In 1988 it established 
the Basotho Mine Labour Cooperative (BMLC). The BMLC has already initiated 
income-generating schemes for the retrenched Basotho miners. These schemes 
include (a) a taxi operation in Maseru with prospects and plans for expansion to 
other areas (b) brick-making projects which have so far engaged about 100 ex­
miners and (c) a variety of income-generating projects for migrants’ wives 
through their own women’s cooperatives involving about 100 women in the Butha- 
Buthe district. With a strong infrastructural base and financial support these 
embryonic NUM rural development projects stand more chance of succeeding.
Conclusion
The evidence provided in this paper points to the grave uncertainty and 
precariousness of Lesotho’s continued participation in the migrant labour system. 
This is mainly a result of two factors: the reduction of foreign labour on the South 
African mines by the COM through internalisation, stabilisation and mechanisation
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and the current political transformation in South Africa which is likely to lead to 
the establishment of a unitary, democratic and non-racial state. Such a state will 
certainly have to grapple with the increasing structural unemployment in South 
Africa itself.
Consequently Lesotho needs to create more viable employment alternatives at 
home to absorb retrenched and prospective migrants. This strategy, we have 
argued, needs to be sharply focused on agricultural and rural development. Both 
the government and the NUM have made a start in this direction. We argue, 
however, that the government’s public works strategy has serious shortcomings as 
a contingency plan for re absorbing returning Basotho migrants. The public works 
strategy, therefore, needs to be broadened, diversified and expanded in order to 
provide employment in the rural economy. Embryonic as it is, the NUM labour 
co-operative strategy seems to augur well for a reformulated rural development 
strategy in Lesotho. What makes the NUM co-operative strategy even more ideal 
is the fact that it is solely an initiative of migrants themselves. Put differently, it 
is a "bottom-up" rural development strategy which needs support from the 
government itself.
The government is not totally oblivious of the dire need for a reformulated rural 
development strategy in Lesotho. For instance, in a representation to the 1990 
Donor Round-table Conference, the government noted that despite the fact that 
80% of Lesotho’s population lives in rural areas, these regions are characterised 
by low and stagnant agricultural yields, poor off-farm incomereaming opportunities 
and lack of government services. The main income source of rural people, 
migrant incomes from South Africa, has probably peaked and its future is 
uncertain. The government has committed itself to increased income-generation 
and employment opportunities in the rural economy. While a mere commitment 
is very easy to make, implementation is something else.
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INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN LESOTHO IN THE 1980s 
AND THE CHALLENGES FOR THE 1990s
JOBERE MOLEFI 
Institute of Labour Studies 
National University of Lesotho
Introduction
As we enter the last decade of the 20th century, it is imperative that we should 
critically assess the lessons of the past, which will invariably have a bearing on the 
future. This paper attempts to assess the industrial relations scene in Lesotho in 
the 1980s with a view to ascertaining whether the 1990s and beyond will be restful 
or otherwise, given the changing internal and external socio economic and political 
reality around us.
To begin with, the economic and employment situation that obtained in the 1980s 
up to the present will be described. Some theories or systems of industrial 
relations will also be examined, together with the contexts in which they operate. 
Industrial relations in Lesotho in the eighties will be explored mainly from the 
viewpoint of certain major industrial unrest incidents and the role played by 
various industrial relations actors. In conclusion, prospects for the future of 
industrial relations in Lesotho, given both the past and the present, will be 
explored.
The Economic Employment Situation in the 80s
The Lesotho economy is described by various authors as a besieged economy, a 
classical labour-reserve economy, a hostage economy, a captive economy, a 
dependent economy, a neo-Bantustan economy and other equally pessimistic
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terms'. It is thus described because of its excessive dependence on the South 
African economy as the following table, which depicts the direction of Lesotho’s 
external trade in 1984, shows.
Table I: Direction of Lesotho’s Trade 1984
Exports
Destination %
Republic of South Africa 93
European Economic Community 5
Rest of the world 2
Imports
Origin %
Republic of South Africa 95
EEC 2
Rest of the world 3
Source: Statistical Year Book 1987, Bureau of Statistics, Maseru.
Paul Malimate, "Lesotho - A Besieged Enclave Economy" 
Lesotho Congress o f Free Trade Unions country paper prepared 
for Intemationl Confederation o f  Free Trade Union, Quoted in 
M.Phafane The Economic Structure o f  Lesotho - An Overview - 
p a g e l. R. Southall, "Trade Unions in Lesotho" in South African 
Labour Bulletin, Vol. 10, N o.3, 1984, Braamfontein, RSA, and 
others.
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Table II: Production in 000 Tonnes and Average Yield in 00 Kg per Hectare 
of Main Crops 1979/80 to 1988/89
Maize Sorghum Wheat Beans Peas
Pro- Pro- Pro- Pro- Pro-
Year due- Yield due- Yield due- Yield due- Yield due- Yield
tion tion tion tion tion
79/80 105.6 9.6 59.3 9.8 28.2 9.7 3.6 5.2 4.6 7.8
80/81 105.7 8.5 47.7 8.0 17.0 8.5 3.5 4.8 3.2 6.8
81/82 83.0 7.3 26.2 5.4 14.5 6.1 4.9 3.6 4.5 4.9
82/83 76.2 7.3 30.7 6.6 14.8 5.1 1.6 3.5 3.4 3.9
83/84 79.4 6.8 33.8 6.2 17.1 5.8 1.3 1.6 3.6 4.6
84/85 92.4 7.8 54.8 7.3 18.4 5.1 2.5 3.4 3.3 4.4
85/86 86.5 7.1 33.5 6.4 11.0 5.8 3.8 2.2 1.5 4.3
86/87 94.9 6.7 31.2 4.4 18.5 6.7 3.3 2.6 1.5 3.9
87/88 158.6 9.2 53.1 7.0 19.2 6.3 7.4 3.2 2.6 4.8
88/89 98.3 7.5 24.2 5.6 22.9 8.4 6.8 4.0 0.7 4.2
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho. Annual Report fo r  1989, p. 8, in which they quote Bureau of Statistics 
Figures.
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Table III: GDP by Kind of Economic Activity at Current Prices (in Million 
Maloti)
Economic Activity 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Primary Sector: 88.2 96.9 95.0 115.9 182.9 168.5
Agriculture 87.6 95.3 93.1 114.0 182.1 164.1
Mining & Quarrying 0.6 1.6 1.9 1.9 0.8 4.4
Secondary Sector: 95.8 131.6 137.9 173.0 234.2 297.1
Manufacturing 42.7 49.6 63.7 82.7 111.8 136.0
Electric & Water 2.5 3.7 5.5 4.1 8.4 8.3
Building & Construction 50.6 78.3 68.7 86.2 114.0 152.9
Tertiary Sector: 211.2 253.4 288.2 316.6 403.1 477.9
W/sale & Retail 36 .4 44.3 51.9 60.0 72.0 85.0
Catering 6.1 7.4 8.7 10.9 12.7 15.3
Transport & Communications 11.6 14.2 19.2 26.3 35.2 41.5
Finance & Insurance 29.4 29.5 27.2 27.2 41.9 54.4
Real Estate <St Business
Services 12.1 13.0 14.9 17.0 20.4 28.3
Ownership o f  Dwellings 27.7 29.9 35.6 38.3 43.0 52.5
Public Admin. 39.1 54.1 60.3 61.0 79.8 87.5
Education 32.4 40.3 45.5 49.1 63.7 74.7
Health 8.6 11.4 13.5 13.6 19.4 21.4
Other Services 7.8 9.3 11.4 13.2 15.0 17.3
Sub-Total 395.2 481.9 521.1 605'5 820.1 943.5
Less Imputed Bank
Charges 29.9 31.1 28.7 27.8 41.8 50.9
GDP at Factor Cost 365.3 450.8 492.4 577.6 778.4 892.5
Plus Indirect Taxes 89.1 98.4 122.0 155.5 196.2 207.2
GDP at Market Prices 454.4 549.3 614.4 733.0 974.6 10997
Notes: 1. The 1989 figures were all preliminary figures during the
complication of the CBL annual report.
2. Totals do not agree with constituent items due to rounding.
Source: Central Bank of Lesotho. Annual Report fo r  1989, p. 12, in which they 
quote Bureau of Statistics figures.
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In the 1980s, the national economy had its ups and downs. The agricultural 
sector, which is referred to as the mainstay of the economy, was particularly hard 
hit by the prolonged drought in the agricultural years 1981/82, 82/83 and 83/84. 
Again in 1986/87 crop production was adversely affected by (a) excessive summer 
rains which delayed planting and did not allow proper weeding, (b) early frost 
which was particularly devastating in the foothills and mountainous regions, (c) 
winter drought which curtailed wheat production, and (d) a cutworm epidemic 
which dealt the final blow to agricultural production in that year. Because of its 
importance in the national economy, the reduced agricultural production affected 
the rest of the economic performance. Tables II and III bear testimony to this 
state of affairs, although unfortunately Table III does not depict the GDP by kind 
of economic activity prior to 1984.
On the employment situation, the economy did not fare any better. The 
unceremonial closure of the Letseng-la-Terai diamond mine and the resultant loss 
of almost 800 jobs in 1983 is a typical example of the unemployment crisis that 
the economy faced in the 1980s. It should be noted that the loss of income not 
only affected the said workers, but well over 4 000 people if it is conservatively 
assumed that each worker has, on average, five dependants according to extended 
family relationships. The loss of foreign exchange earnings through diamond sales 
was another blow to the economy.
According to the Central Bank of Lesotho, which bases the domestic employment 
statistics on the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey (LFS), the labour force was 
estimated at about 604 800 in 1989 out of a total de jure  population of about 1,6 
million people. The labour force participation rate for males is about 76% 
whereas for females it is only 37 %. The labour force is estimated to increase by 
about 20 000 people every year, of which only 10% are employed in the domestic 
formal sector. The unemployment rate for the whole country for both sexes stands 
at an alarming 23%. It should be remembered that in terms of the so-called 
"advanced market economies" of the West which most of the developing 
economies, including Lesotho’s economy, are emulating, the acceptable and/or 
unavoidable unemployment rate is set at 5 %. It should further be noted that the 
unemployment figures, in terms of Labour Force survey of the Bureau of 
Statistics, exclude the seasonal agricultural workers. In terms of Lesotho’s 
agricultural practices, such workers toil during the ploughing/planting season, the 
weeding season where applicable, and the harvesting season. In between these
seasons they are engaged in practically no economic activity.(See Tables IV and
V).
Table IV: Lesotho Population and Employment Rate
Usual activity /age Males Females Total
Labour Force
Participation rate, %
12-19 41.1 17.1 28.5
20-34 90.8 45.8 68.3
35-54 94.7 49.2 70.8
55 + 77.5 32.1 51.8
Not stated 27.0 2.4 10.5
Total 76.4 36.5 55.5
Unemployment rate, %
12-19 29.0 37.5 31.7
20-34 22.1 29.3 24.5
35-54 15.9 19.1 17.1
55 + 25.6 16.7 22.5
Not stated 0 0 0
Total 21.7 25.1 22.9
Population 12 + years 534 826 588 086 1 123 512
Employed 319 991 160 768 480 759
Unemployed 88 681 53 945 142 626
Total economically
Active 408 671 21 714 623 385
Source: Adapted from Table 3.2, page 27: The Labour Force o f Lesotho, 
Bureau of Statistics, July 1990.
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Table V: Distribution of Employment by Industrial Activity
ISIC* Industry Period
Code 1982/83 83/84 M/85
290 Quarrying 46 - -
31 Food & Beverage 1 540 1 579 1 210
31 Textile, Wearing
apparel & Leather 887 1 038 2292
332 Furniture & Fixtures 572 153 238
342 Printing & Publishing 313 326 325
352 Other chemical
products 136 196 190
369 Non-metal products 219 332 609
371 Iron & Steel 208 263 277
390 Other industries 298 164 55
3 Total manufacturing 4 173 4 377 5 196
4 Electricity & Water 878 618 885
2-4 All industries 5 097 4 995 6 081
International Standard of Industrial Classification.
Source: Bureau of Statistics, Socio-economic Indicators o f  Lesotho, 1987.
The Lesotho government remained the single largest employer in the 1980s. In 
1989 it employed a total of 10 787 people in both the civil service and the 
disciplined forces, which comprise the army, police and the prisons staff. The 
1989 employment figure represents a 10.6% increase over 1988. This was despite 
the IMF/World Bank dictated structural adjustment programme which, among 
other things, required a reduction in the government payroll. South Africa, 
particularly its mining industry, remained the largest employer of Basotho 
nationals, specifically the males. In percentage terms, Basotho employed in South 
Africa constitute about 70% of all the formal sector employment in Lesotho. 
Incomes of these migrant workers, taking into account both remittances and 
deferred pay, account for over 70% of the Lesotho GDP. Development Associates 
Inc. in 1988 succintly stated that "A basic fact about Lesotho’s economy is that 
half of its GNP is generated outside its borders... (this) income is used to sustain
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consumption levels and patterns far beyond what Lesotho’s resource endowment 
and current production could support..."2
Table VI: Statistics of Basotho Miners and Their Income
Period No. employed Remittances ( ’000 Maloti) Deferred Pay (’000M)
1980 120 733 17 662 24 440
1981 123 538 26 928 35 813
1982 117 641 51 004 76 720
1983 115 327 74 207 103 568
1984 114 041 82 923 123 550
1985 116 223 92 675 141 546
1986 121 450 104 776 178 594
1987 125 934 124 354 188 568
1988 124 781 - -
1989 126 264 - -
Source: Adapted from M. Phafane: The Economic Strucutre o f Lesotho. An 
Overview, P .8, in which he quotes the figures from the Department of Labour. 
The 1988 and 1989 figures are quoted from the Central Bank of Lesotho Annual 
Report for 1989.
Development Associates Inc. "Assistance to Lesotho on Mining 
Repatriation Issues", March 1988, NP. P .8.
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Given the above tables, it is self-evident that when referring to industrial relations 
within the context of Lesotho, we are talking about a very tiny workforce which 
is operating amid massive underemployment and unemployment.
Industrial Relations and their Contexts
Broadly speaking, the term "industrial relations" in this paper, is used to mean 
relationships between the employees, collectively, and their employers within the 
context of the workplace, work community and/or within an industry. It is about 
the network of rules and regulations which govern the workplace, the character of 
such rules and the manner in which they are formulated, administered and altered 
where necessary. In other words industrial relations is about the maintenance of 
stability and regularity in an industry so that production can continue even if the 
employees and the employers in any particular workplace do not see eye to eye on 
any aspect of the job. Trivial matters such as personal relationships, conservation 
or horseplay that takes place between workers, or allocation of tasks by 
supervisors to their subordinates, are clearly not included in the definition of 
industrial relations in this context. This is so despite the fact that major industrial 
disputes and conflicts sometimes originate from these interactions.
Given this definition, four distinct and yet interrelated theories/systems of 
industrial relations can be identified.3 Firstly is the unitary/pluralist approach to 
industrial relations. In this theory, every work organisation is regarded as an 
integrated and harmonious entity which exists for a common purpose. Each 
employee identifies with the aims of the organisation and the methods of operation. 
Both the management which represents the owners of capital, and the workers, 
who own nothing but their labour power, are said to be complementary partners 
to the common aims of production and profits. In other words, management and 
the workforce are merely parts of the same team. Strong leadership of the 
organisation is required to keep the working order and to ensure commitment to 
tasks, to managerial office holders and ultimately to the organisation itself.
For more details on these theories/systemsofindustrial relations 
see R. Hyman, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, 
MacMillan, London, 1975, and K.Von Beyme, Challenge to 
Power: Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in Capitalist 
Countries, Sage publications, London, 1980.
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Factionalism is seen as a disease, like trade unionism, which is regarded as an 
illegitimate intrusion into a unified and cooperative structure of the workplace. In 
fact trade unions are said to compete with the management for the loyalty and 
commitment of employees.
The second approach is the industrial conflict perspective, also known as the 
Oxford approach. In essence, this theory is based on corporate capitalism of the 
post-19th century era in which managers of workplaces are not necessarily the 
owners of such industrial enterprises. Industrial conflict is accepted as a norm, 
but politically motivated conflicts in industries are not. Conflicts are not violent, 
but essentially arise over economic issue/disputes which can readily be solved 
through dialogue in appropriate conflict-resolution mechanisms. Trade unions are 
welcome outgrowths of the informal grouping of workers and they serve two 
useful purposes of being representatives of employees as well as regulating the 
inherent industrial conflicts, rather than causing them. The management of both 
public corporations and private establishments no longer constitutes a class on its 
own due to open and competitive labour markets and mobility as a result of the 
widening of educational opportunities and the democratisation process in various 
societies.
The third theory of industrial relations is the systems model approach, which is a 
US contribution in this field. In this perspective, industrial relations is equated to 
a system in which there are actors which comprise (a) the hierarchy of managers 
and their representatives in a workplace, (b) the hierarchy of non-managerial 
employees and their spokesmen and (c) specialised third party agencies, whether 
from governmental or private sources, (e.g. industrial courts, tribunals, 
independent labour law specialists, etc.). These actors operate in specific 
technological and environmental contexts, meaning among other things, the 
technological characteristics of the workplace and/or work community, the 
market/budgeting constraints which impinge on the actors, the locus and 
distribution of economic and political power in a society as a whole, and so on. 
The industrial relations system and other systems are bound together by a specific 
ideology and a network of rules created to govern the actors at workplaces and in 
the work community. The network of rules, consisting of procedures for 
establishing rules and substantative rules and regulations themselves, are all the 
products of a system. In this context, the word "ideology" means a body of 
common ideas that defines the role and the place of each actor and defines the
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ideas which each actor holds towards the place and function of the others in the
system.
The last but not the least important theory of industrial relations is the class 
conflict analysis which is Marxist in nature. This approach is not strictly a theory 
of industrial relations per se. It is rather a general theory of any given society and 
of inherent social change following the principles of dialectical materialism, and 
as such it has implications for the analysis of industrial relations, given the central 
position accorded to economics in Marxist political economy. In terms of this 
analysis, industrial conflicts, which arise out of differences in economic power 
between social classes and groups, are rooted in the structures and institutions of 
a society itself, particularly the capitalist societies. Such conflicts (between those 
who buy and sell labour power) are seen as a permanent feature of capitalism. 
Trade unions are seen to challenge all the prerogatives which go with the 
ownership of the means of production, and not simply the exercise of control over 
their members’ labour power. In the final analysis trade unions are seen as the 
inevitable consequence of the capitalist exploitation of wage labour, and as such 
trade unions are ultimately going to dispossess the capitalist class, in conjunction 
with other progressive groups in a capitalist society.
All the above four theories of industrial relations are not without faults, some of 
which are so severe that they almost invalidate the theories outright. But given the 
fact that theory enables one to interpret empirical actions and happenings logically 
and systematically, these theories have been retained despite their weakness. This 
is particularly so because of the absence of alternatives.
So far industrial relations have been examined essentially from the shop-floor level 
and at the level of the work community, without any major reference to national 
policies pertaining to industrial relations. In other words, the national context 
and/or environment in which industrial relations take place has not been described 
in detail. There are three distinct environments in which industrial relations take 
place. Firstly there is the tripartite system, which is typified by the International 
Labour Organization. In this system the three socioeconomic partners, the 
government, the employers’ organisations and the workers’ organisations, sit 
together to decide on the national policies on industrial relations and employment 
matters. Decisions which are made are binding on all employers and employees 
in a nation which uses such a system. Secondly, there is the bilateral system. In 
this system, industrial relations policies and other employment issues are decided
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by the employers and their workers collectively, with a minimal involvement by 
the government. Usually the governments only intervene when the two central 
parties fail to agree. The third system is the unilateral system, in which industrial 
relations policies are totally dominated by the government. The pre-1990 Eastern 
European countries are said to be typical examples. The other partners - 
employers and workers - simply follow what has been decided by the government.
Given these various industrial relations theories/systems and the contexts in which 
they operate, it is appropriate to pose the question: what system of industrial 
relations obtains in Lesotho? Is there any discremable national policy that governs 
industrial relations in Lesotho?
Industrial Relations in Lesotho
Of the four theories of industrial relations described above, there is no single one 
of which the industrial relations system in Lesotho can be said to be a typical 
example. Lesotho’s system can at best be described as a cross-breed covering all 
the theories, with the exception of the class conflict analysis model. The trade 
union movement in Lesotho cannot be said to fall within the group of progressive 
elements who are intending to change the socioeconomic and political order in 
favour of the working class. After all the trade union movement is too fragmented 
and weak to be capable of undertaking any revolutionary restructuring of the 
society.
At the moment there are 38 duly registered trade unions operating in the country. 
It should be borne in mind that these unions are not organising the migrant 
workers nor the civil servants which, as it has been pointed out, constitute the bulk 
of the workforce. The unions’ organisational structure is a mixture of industrial 
unions, general unions and company unions. There are district trade unions which 
organise workers, not in terms of the industries in which they work, but in terms 
of the places where workers live and work. There are also industrial unions which 
organise workers in terms of the industries in which they work. But it is the norm 
to find more than two rival unions organising in the same industry, the typical 
example being the food industry which has more than three unions. Lastly there 
are company-based unions which only organise the employees of a single 
employer. Example of this type include the union of Basotho Enterprises 
Development Corporation (BEDCO) Employees, the National University of
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Lesotho Academic Staff Association (NULASA) and others. At the apex, there 
are two rival trade union federations to which most of the unions are affiliated, 
while others remain independent or unaffiliated.
The Lesotho government openly welcomes the trade unions and coopts them in 
tripartite forums such as the National Advisory Committee on Labour and the 
Minimum Wages Board. This is because it believes that these unions are 
representative and realises the potential of the unions in the settlement of industrial 
conflicts. This understanding is in line with the industrial conflict theory of 
industrial relations, as pointed out above. On the other hand, some employers 
regard trade unions as the cause of industrial unrest. In a recent consultative 
meeting between the government and the employers on the current upsurge of 
strikes in the construction, textile and service industries, some employers alleged 
that "strikes, by and large, occur where workers are unionised and that shows that 
union leaders do instigate strikes".4 That attitude towards trade unions is clearly 
in line with the unitary approach to industrial relations as described above. Again 
at the recent NULASA case against the NUL administration on negotiation with 
the former on salary increase, the administration clearly took the unitary approach 
to industrial relations. In the first instance the administration did not want to 
recognise NULASA as a union: secondly the administration alleged that it did not 
have a mandate to negotiate salaries, arguing that such negotiations can only be 
undertaken by the University Council. On both counts, their arguments were 
invalidated. The Department of Labour, as a principal governmental agency 
involved with labour and employment matters, compelled the administration to 
negotiate with NULASA as a full-fledged and registered union.
In terms of the descriptive American systems model approach to industrial 
relations, the workers through the hierarchy of their spokespersons (from the shop 
stewards to the federation officials), the employers’ associations and groupings, the 
government and the judiciary all represent the actors in the industrial relations 
system of Lesotho.
A report (by the author to the Vice-Chancellor) on employers 
meeting on strikes in commercial and industrial undertaking 
held at the Lesotho Sun on 8th August 1990 at 2 .30 p.m.
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At a national level, tripartite systems of industrial relations are used to a certain 
extent. A mention has already been made of tripartite forum such as the National 
Advisory Committee on Labour, and the Minimum Wages Advisory Board. In 
this board workers and employers representatives sit together with the Department 
of Labour officials to deliberate on desirable changes on labour laws and on other 
policy issues pertaining to labour as well as to decide on new minimum wage 
levels across all job categories and occupations. These bodies are only advisory 
to the minister responsible for labour matters. He can either accept their advice 
and promulgate it into a law, or reject it. In almost all cases in the 1980s, the 
ministers tended to take a middle course, e.g. if the Wages Board had agreed to 
raise the minimum wages, say by 20% on the average, the minister would settle 
on 12 or 15%.
On the other hand, government officials have repeatedly stated that the national 
labour laws and other policy issues on employment matters provide for the 
minimum standards that the government would like to see. The government would 
like to see improvements in salaries, and in conditions and terms of service coming 
out of the collective bargaining processes between employers and their employees. 
This is in accordance with the principles of the bilateral system of industrial 
relations. Unfortunately collective agreements are very rare. Even the few that 
have been agreed to, have very little benefits for the workers. As a matter of fact, 
the present Commissioner of Labour stated that some of the collective agreements 
provide for less favourable benefits than those that law provides for. In such 
cases, the provisions of the law prevail while those of the collective agreements 
are invalidated. This points to the fact that the trade union movement in Lesotho 
has a long way to go before it reaches maturity and achieves noteworthy results.
Given this state of affairs, it would be appropriate to assess the industrial relations 
scene in the 1980s against the background of the somewhat complicated Lesotho 
industrial relations system. The 1980s were not restful in terms of industrial 
relations as compared to the 1970s and preceeding decades. With a rather 
successful expansion of the industrial base in the eighties, domestic employment 
opportunities grew noticeably in the following industries: textiles and other 
clothing, the building construction, general manufacturing, catering and other 
services (see Table III & V). The growth in terms of both employment and 
contribution to the GDP was not without problem such as strikes and other forms 
of industrial unrest. Some of the major strikes and other prolonged disturbances 
included the workers of the following industries: Maluti Sheepskin 1982; J.C. Lai
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1982; the Lesotho Union of Banks 1984, 1985, 86/87 and some in 1988; 
construction companies involved in the Lesotho Highland Water Development 
Project 1988-90 and finally the teachers’ strike of 1990. By major strikes is meant 
those in which more than five man-days of production were lost. In terms of the 
labour laws of this country, all the strikes were illegal in that proper procedures 
were not followed even though in most cases the strikers’ grievances were 
accepted as valid. It should be noted that the right to go on strike in terms of 
Lesotho labour legislation exists only in theory5. In practice, legal strike action 
is almost impossible because of the long and tedious procedures that have to be 
followed. It takes almost six months to go on strike legally if all procedures are 
fully followed. It is very difficult to expect aggrieved workers to be patient for 
such a long time while different offices, conciliators and arbitrators take their time 
in trying to solve the grievances.
Invariably the major cause of these strikes was wages/salaries. This was the case 
with the employees of the Lesotho Highland Development Authority (LHDA) 
construction companies; the Lesotho Flour Mills; the Lesotho Union of Banks; 
Maputsoe Industries and others. In most cases, the management refused to accede 
to the workers’ salary increase demands. The management unilaterally set and 
implement salary increases without consulting union representatives on the plant, 
despite the recognition agreement and provisions of collective bargaining pertaining 
to salary increases. The J.C. Lai employees strike was sparked off by 
management refusal to provide the workers with free protective clothing, as 
required by law. This particular strike was one of the most bloody in the history 
of this country. During the height of the discontent, workers assembled on the 
factory premises and refused to work. As usual the management telephoned the 
police who came and tried to disperse the strikers. Their spokesperson who tried 
to reason with the police against dispersal was instantly arrested and his colleagues 
responded by stoning the police who retaliated with teargas and sjamboks, then 
bloodshed resulted.
M olefi, J. "The Lesotho Labour Laws and their Impact on 
Trade Union Organising", ILS Occasional Paper N o.5, Maseru, 
1987.
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Other causes of strikes, which were identified by the employers at the 8 August
1990 consultative meeting with the Department of Labour referred to above,
included the following:
1 That some union officials do not know the procedures to be followed
when solving grievances. The procedures are laid down in the labour law 
texts.
2. That some union officials encourage workers to violate established
company - grievance handling procedures.
3. That some employers are ignorant about the labour laws of this country.
4. That the government labour offices take sides with workers when there
is a dispute, instead of being impartial.
5. That wage increase demands by workers are generally unrealistic and are
not proportionate to productivity. A wage increase of 40% per annum 
was given as an example of unrealistic demand.
6. That the Labour Department is not doing enough to orientate the newly
contracted international companies on Lesotho labour laws and what to 
expect in the course of their operations in Lesotho.
On their part, some union officials whom I interviewed gave the
following reasons for the strikes:
1. That some multinational contruction companies treat the Basotho workers
unfairly compared to other foreigners, particularly South Africans. They 
pointed out that two people of similar experience and qualifications (one 
being a Mosotho and other being a South African) are not paid the same 
wages. The expatriate workers get more than the local employees.
2. That management, particularly of the Chinese-owned enterprises, do not
want to communicate with unions. They also tend to victimise the 
unionised employees.
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3. That some companies set daily or weekly production targets which are
almost impossible to meet. As a result employees in such cases toil from 
8.00 a.m. to mid-night, without transport provision. This was said to be 
pervasive in the clothing industry firms, which are mainly managed by 
the Chinese and other people from the Far East.
4. That in general managers adopt a very hostile attitude to trade unions.
5. That the police unnecessarily intervene in industrial disputes and always
take sides with the management.
The list of accusations and counter-accusations could be much longer. The fact 
of the matter is that the 1980s was not a very quiet and restful decade for 
industrial relations in Lesotho. The question that remains to be answered is what 
should be done, by whom, and how, in order to stabilise and harmonise industrial 
relations in the 1990s.
Conclusion: Prospects for Industrial Relations in the 1990s
To conclude this paper, it is necessary to consider the nature of industrial relations 
in the 1990s and beyond. While it is very difficult to predict what will happen, 
the past and present industrial relations in Lesotho will have a bearing on the 
future. The economic prospects for the 1990s and beyond are brighter than at 
present provided the Highlands Water Project bears the expected fruits. For 
example the expected revenue from the sale of water to South Africa, self- 
sufficiency in electrical power energy and increased revenue from the energy and 
other spinoff benefits such as increased revenue from the tourism industry 
associated with the project, and others. Manufacturing industry also shows signs 
of steady growth even in the formative stages, and the expectation is that even 
though not very many new investors are likely to come, the present trends and 
growth will be consolidated. New schemes such as export finance facilities are all 
going to boost the manufacturing sector. On the bleak side of the economic 
performance is the anticipated significant loss of South African mining job 
opportunities for Basotho and the resultant growth of unemployment locally. As 
hinted above, the normalisation of the political situation in South Africa and the 
expected democratisation processes in that country are likely to affect us adversely
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because apartheid will end and the economic embargo will be lifted. The South 
African economy is much more attractive for investment purposes than ours in 
terms of size, infrastructure, availability of raw materials and so on. As such 
investors will increasingly be attracted to that country rather than Lesotho.
Locally the current move to return the country to democratic rule and political 
stability also enhances the chances of having equally stable industrial relations. 
The absence of democracy provides a very fertile soil for the growth of 
unaccountability at all levels of responsibility, rampant corruption and nepotism, 
and other social ills.
It goes without saying that harmonisation of industrial relations cannot come about 
like the biblical manna from heaven. An effort from labour-related institutions 
both in government and outside is required. Foremost among these institutions is 
the Department of Labour, particularly its industrial relations inspectorate and the 
legal sections. If these sections were appropriately staffed, some of the industrial 
upheavals could have been avoided or at least they could not have lasted as long 
as they did. The Institute of Labour Studies, is another key institution in the 
sphere of industrial relations. Its research and education section can play an 
important role in minimising industrial unrest. The research section could be very 
effective if it were strengthened so that it could undertake extensive policy-oriented 
research programmes on labour and general employment matters. The education 
section, through its short courses on industrial relations for trade union officials 
and various managerial levels in industries, can also play an important role. After 
all the lists of the causes of industrial unrest by both the workers and employers 
point to the fact that proper industrial relations education and training can do a lot 
to harmonise industrial relations in Lesotho in the 1990s and beyond.
Finally, mention should be made of the new Draft Labour Code which will 
hopefully be in use shortly. In essence, this Labour Code consolidates into one 
text more than ten labour laws and regulations which are all currently in force. 
It also embodies the ILO conventions and recommendations appropriate to the 
prevailing national economic and social conditions. It further introduces long- 
awaited labour courts which will help to expedite the settling of industrial disputes. 
These had hitherto been handled by the overloaded ordinary courts of law, whose 
staff may not be fully conversant with the law and practice pertaining to ordinary
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individual employment relationships and collective labour relations. Again, the 
application of the draft labour code covers practically every employed person in 
Lesotho, unlike the present fragmented labour laws which exclude some categories 
of workers such as domestic workers, public servants and employees of religious 
and charitable organisations. The notorious summary dismissal provisions of the 
present Employment Act, in which a worker may be instantly dismissed for 
allegedly being guilty of unspecified misconduct, are being replaced by more 
humane and fair labour practices provisions. While this labour code is not 
necessarily the. best piece of legislation around, it has a great potential to make 
industrial relations more effective and acceptable to all the parties concerned.
In conclusion, one can confidently say prospects for industrial relations harmony 
are good. The challenge for all industrial relations practitioners and institutions 
is to pull up their socks and to make maximum use of the advantages.
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A CR ISIS IN AFRICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION*. 
ITS ORIGINS AND M EASURES FOR ITS REVERSAL
G. MUTAHABA 
African Association for Public Administration 
and Management, Nairobi
Introduction
As African countries search for solutions to the economic crisis facing them, 
attention is drawn to the issue of whether their public administration systems have 
potential to contribute to the recovery and development efforts. A review of 
public administration systems in most African countries reveals that they are as 
much in a crisis as the economic situation they are trying to rectify. The crisis in 
public administration systems is reflected not only in their inability to shoulder 
such functions as production, transportation and marketing of agricultural and 
industrial products - about which there is some dispute as to whether they should 
be performed by the state - but also those functions which are clearly tasks of the 
state, including the maintenance of law and order, provision and maintenance of 
development infrastructure and provision of social services. The crisis is also 
reflected in a shrinking resource base with declining revenues, both in absolute 
terms and in relation to expenditure requirements.
It is argued in this paper that to a great extent the crisis in public administration 
owes much to inept policy actions taken by various African governments. These 
inept policy actions include taking on loads far in excess of their capacities, 
structural and organisational forms that are inefficacious for effective policy 
management, and giving inadequate attention to productivity and management 
issues in the management of the public service.
While many African governments and the international community have recognised 
the need to take corrective action to reverse the trend, the actions taken so far are
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inadequate to deal squarely with the crisis and in many cases, they seem not to 
recognise sufficiently the incipient character of that crisis.
The fact that the crisis reveals itself in the failure to fulfil assigned responsibilities, 
in the diminution of the resource base, and in the decline of efficiency and 
productivity suggests that the causes are both inherent within the structures and 
processes of public administration as well as in the context within which the 
system operates. It appears that ingrained in the system of public administration 
are structural dysfunctions which undermine the efficiency of the system. At the 
same time, there has evolved in the general context of African development a 
constellation of factors which have imposed momentous challenges and severe 
constraints to the governance process. These dual forces have shaped and 
determined the performance of African public administration.
While there is a case for a detailed specification of measures needed to resuscitate, 
rehabilitate and strengthen African countries public administration and the author 
has done so in a study just to be published soon, this paper is devoted to a broad 
exploration of the crisis in African public administration including the issue of 
origins, current condition and prospects for reversal.
Historical legacies
Before colonialism, African governance systems varied according to the levels of 
development and the socio-political systems in place, but generally their 
administrative systems lacked the attributes of a modem state.
Colonialism, to a great extent, supplanted or suppressed the various traditional 
administrative organisations and with them their administrative cultural values. In 
most parts of Africa the traditional administrative organisations were replaced by 
bureaucratic organisations styled after the system in the mother country. The 
civilizing mission of the colonial masters had limited scope and it was mainly 
concerned with pacifying the natives for purposes of facilitating the exploitation 
of natural resources. As such little investment was put into the development of 
complicated administrative infrastructure. The administrative systems consisted of 
skeletal organisations, large enough only for purposes of extracting revenues and 
ensuring orderly governance.
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Even where the traditional systems were left to operate through what came to be 
known as "indirect rule", as was the case with most of the British colonies, their 
role and perspective changed in that they were called upon to foster the colonial 
masters interests of maintaining law and order and collection of taxes.
The goals of the colonial system naturally dictated the governance system that was 
put in place. Since the goals were to maintain "law and order" and the collection 
of taxes, the public administration system that was fostered therefore was highly 
legalistic; emphasizing loyalty, process, procedures and precedents. Rules and 
regulations became the main instruments for eliciting compliance and discipline. 
Administrative training and practices were similarly modelled along these lines. 
The organisation of the administration was highly hierarchical, inhibiting lower 
level participation in decision-making; and since it was in the service of the 
colonial masters, it was highly suppressive and did not respond to public demands. 
These attributes contributed immensely to the evolution of an administrative 
culture that was conservative, unresponsive and undevelopmental in orientation.
But in so far as the interests of the colonial state remained limited to the goals 
mentioned earlier, the administrative system seemed to operate effectively.
The evolving public administration culture manifested itself more significantly in 
three important aspects: management styles, management of financial resources 
and management of information. Personnel management systems were built on 
rigid rules with over-regulation of personnel practices and policies. Classification 
of personnel was usually in terms of duties rather than tasks and people were paid 
for what they were, rather than for what they did. Furthermore, the systems 
were characterised by vague job descriptions and performance appraisal systems 
which valued compliance rather than productivity. The hierarchical structures and 
administrative practices did not allow for meaningful participation by junior 
personnel. The evolving financial practices, especially budgeting and financial 
accountability, were also deficient. Budgeting relied almost entirely on line-item 
approach to budgeting, using the object of expenditure as the basis for financial 
allocation. Finally, because the information needed for the kind of decisions taken 
then was limited, there was little appreciation of sophisticated information 
management techniques, and moreover, most information was usually treated as 
confidential and this therefore deliberately limited its circulation.
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The attainment of independence ushered in great development expectations as well 
as new and expanded responsibilities that, in turn, demanded changes in the 
administrative culture, orientations and capacities. Public administration had to be 
oriented towards development, as well as be responsive to the interests and 
expectations of the governed. It had to recruit personnel with a greater range of 
knowledge and skills.
Most African countries took early steps to reorganise their administrative systems 
in that direction. Measures taken consisted mainly of organisational restructuring, 
personnel management systems reforms and enhancement of competence levels. 
Countries appointed commissions of inquiry to examine the appropriateness of 
existing structures, processes and procedures and make recommendations on 
desired changes. Examples of such commissions include the Udoji Commission 
in Nigeria (1975) the Wamalwa Commission in Swaziland (1975), the Ndegwa 
Commission in Kenya (1975); to mention just a few.
With respect to competence levels, concerted efforts were made in all countries to 
expand the educational and training facilities and resources, as well as to secure 
training opportunities abroad. A country like Zambia which had only about ten 
graduates when it attained independence, was already graduating more than 500 
people a year by 1975. The over-reliance on expatriates to man the public 
services which was the norm in many countries at independence came to be an 
exception, and such personnel were in very specialised positions.
Despite these efforts African public administration systems are, as we noted 
earlier, not in the best of shape. Evidence available indicate that they still exhibit 
many of the problems inherited at independence. The continued prevalence of the 
problems, and especially the present crisis condition, suggests that the 
administrative reforms and improvements of the 1960s and 1970s were both 
inappropriate and inadequate and left the administrative systems even weaker (in 
relation to the tasks at hand) than the colonial administrative systems were.
Development in the Ecology of Public Administration
When African countries attained independence in the 1960s they shared a number 
of adverse ecological characteristics: they were all economically underdeveloped, 
politically fragile and unstable and many of them were heterogeneous. Other
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common features included a poor transport and communication infrastructure, 
abnormally high rates of illiteracy and a critical shortage of skilled manpower, 
capital and technology for development.
Pitted against this sad state of affairs, however, were high expectations, 
enthusiasm on the part of the leadership and citizenry for fast development and 
better social and economic welfare.
Three decades later and in spite of concerted efforts to ameliorate some of the 
adverse ecological conditions, the enthusiasm and high hopes have disappeared, 
and in their place gloom and despair have set in. The ecology is now so volatile, 
and the challenges so enormous that the administrative systems are almost 
inoperative. What is it that happened to make the situation so desperate?
Changes in the Nature, Size and Complexity o f  Tasks
As independence was attained the functions of governance consisted of maintaining 
law and order and facilitating the productive efforts of a relatively small economic 
sector that was dominated by colonial or metropolitan enterprises, with a small 
insignificant peasant sector. Any other function was carried out in support of these 
two activities. The maintenance of law and order, while still considered as one 
of the most important functions of government, was no longer as simple since it 
now involved the protection of national unity, integrity, sovereignty - task which 
called for different patterns of public service capabilities. Moreover, with 
increased population and greater sophistication on the part of the citizenry, there 
was in many countries an increased incidence of lawlessness which called for much 
greater capabilities than could have been imagined at the time of independence.
In addition the public administration systems were called upon to take up new tasks 
including accelerating economic development. In many cases this entailed the 
ownership and management by government of economic and commercial ventures, 
as well as the provision of facilities and infrastructures to privately owned and 
managed economic ventures. It also required the activation and espousal by the 
government of socioeconomic development by providing social infrastructure like 
roads, schools, health facilities, water supplies, etc.
231
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s attempts were made in many countries to 
strengthen administrative capacities to cope with these new tasks. Many countries 
took steps to reform their administrative structures and organisations, training 
schemes were undertaken, localisation proceeded well and the number and variety 
of skilled persons increased appreciably (A Rweyemamu and G. Hyden, 1982). , 
In spite of this, by the 1980s most experts on public administration were decrying 
the low capacity of African public administration systems, and they were calling 
for its rejuvenation (AAPAM, 1984; 1986).
High Rates o f  Population Growth and Urbanisation
Africa has a reputation of recording one of the highest rates of population growth 
and simultaneously the lowest rate of economic growth. The ECA perspective 
study covering the period 1988-2000 estimates that Africa’s total population will 
grow to 1,1 billion by the year 2008, from a figure of 208 162 000 in 1970 (ECA: 
1988). At the same time urbanization is taking place at an unprecedented rate. 
Statistics show that the urban population increased as follows: (1970) 8.2 million, 
(1975) 105 million (1980) 137 million, and (1985) 177 million (UNFPA: 1985). 
This means the increase over the period 1970-1985) was 216%.
Simultaneous with the increase and urbanization was the increase in the demand 
for education. The cumulative effect of all these developments has been an 
increased pressure on governments to provide more goods and services, jobs for 
growing number of unemployed youths, more schools and health facilities, and at 
the extreme end to cope with increasing crime rate. These have imposed 
constraints on the capacities or the governance systems, many of which have not 
evolved adequate response capacities.
Volatile Economic Performance
Instead of economic growth, the continent has witnessed economic decline. 
Poverty, destitution and famine have become the order of the day. Whereas 
Africa is theoretically part of the developing world, in practical terms, Africa, 
south of Sahara (excluding South Africa), is developing far less rapidly than any 
other region in the same category. Table I compares the rate of growth in Africa
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south of Sahara with countries in East Asia, Pacific, North Africa, and the Middle 
East, classified in three categories.
Table I: Comparison of rates growth of sub-Saharan Africa low-income 
countries, developing countries and middle-income countries 
1965-1986
Average annual GDP growth Average GDP growth
per capita
65/ 73/ 65/ 73/ 80/
73 80 82 83 84 85 86 73 80 86
Sub-Sahara Africa 6.4 3.2 -0.2 -1.5 -1.7 2.2 0.5 3.6 0.3 3.4
Low-income 5.5 4.6 6.6 7.7 8.9 9.1 6.5 2.9 2.5 5.4
Developing 6.5 5.4 2.1 2.1 5.1 4.8 4.2 3.9 3.2 1.5
Middle-income
countries 7 .0 5.7 0.8 0.0 3.6 2.8 3.2 4.4 3.4 -0.3
Source: World Bank: World Development Report 1987. Table A .3 and 2.6.
The table reveals that between 1965 and 1985 Africa (south of Sahara) lagged 
behind in terms of both GNP and GDP per capita. The World Bank put the matter 
succinctly in its 1981 report:
The low-income countries of Africa South of the Sahara were the 
principal exception to the overall trend; their growth was so low that 
per capita incomes actually declined (World Bank: 1981a).
The situation has since worsened. In a document entitled "Beyond Recovery: 
ECA-Revised Perspectives of Africa’s Development, 1988-2008" the ECA reports 
thus:
... the period 1980-1987 was a very difficult one for Africa. During 
this period the region passed through a series of repeated and 
unprecedented crises and growing social and political turbulence and
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economic imbalances. The prevailing economic rigidifies during this 
period were further compounded by natural calamities and adverse 
external developments. The great African drought of 1983-1985 
constituted a real threat to the livelihood of millions of African people.
The drought caused grave damage to agriculture, the mainstay of the 
majority of the population and the major source of external revenues.
The ECA document observes that:
... the slow growth in the world economy, the perverse developments 
in international commodity markets, and in the world’s financial and 
monetary systems which culminated in depressed export earnings, 
reduced resource flows and an escalation of the debt-servicing 
obligations, all interactively brought the African economy to the brink 
of collapse (ECA 1988:6).
The decline in production, compounded by a decline in the demand for primary 
products and a decrease in the value of exports, pushed many African countries 
into chronic balance of payments difficulties, forcing them either to resort to 
massive borrowing at even more stringent conditions, or to curtail their 
consumption and investments. Most countries initially chose the former alternative 
which led to the escalation of the debt burden, or to a further decline in 
production, engineering the economic crisis.
In response to the economic crisis, many African countries adopted structural 
adjustment measures to contain the situation. While it is not the intention of this 
chapter to address at length the various structural adjustment measures adopted by 
African countries, we will briefly mention those measures which have had a 
bearing on the performance of the public administration system.
The stabilisation and adjustment programmes implemented in African countries are 
generally aimed at re-establishing the balance of payments equilibrium, reducing 
the rate of inflation and creating favourable conditions for economic growth. 
Three main types of actions were proposed in this endeavour: the control of
demand, action on the supply side, and the adjustment of the exchange rate. These 
interrelated broad actions were often formulated in the framework of a package of 
macro-economic policies. The specific policies differ from country to country, but 
the following tend to feature in most packages: restriction of demand, devaluation
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of currencies, liberalisation of trade, reduction or elimination of subsidies, budget 
balancing, price incentives, privatisation or rationalisation of public enterprises and 
removal of price control.
To implement these, African countries have to change the nature and character of
their public administration systems with respect to role and scope of government
activities, structure and size of the public service and the skills required by it,
structure and composition of the budget, laws and regulations,
etc. With all these changes, at the end of the day, African public administration
systems will be very different creatures from those that existed before the crisis
period.
The Political System and Political Developments
Developments in the African political arena have also posed challenges to the 
public administration systems in Africa. Many African countries were willed into 
states by the colonial powers. The arrangements for ensuring effective governance 
at independence, often written out in the form of constitutions, had little, if any, 
tradition or heritage to back them. The borders separating the various states cut 
across peoples of common ancestry, having been drawn up artificially by the 
colonial powers.
In the early years of independence the irrationality of the boundaries, as well as 
the fragility of the constitutions, tended to be glossed over. After all, the euphoria 
and goodwill generated by independence were still high. As the years passed 
euphoria wore down and it soon became apparent that people with little love for 
one another were conveniently lumped together into artificial nations and that when 
disputes arose over authority and power to determine resource utilisation and 
allocation, there was little guidance from the constitution as to how such disputes 
could be resolved. In due course authority tended to reside wherever power 
happened to be, and invariably this was where the instruments of coercion resided. 
That was the beginning of military interventions, secessions, rebellions, the 
creation of one-party states, and a host of other actions that were infringing upon 
the inherited constitutions and thereby changing the environment within which 
public administration had to operate.
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The political turmoil that has ensured in many countries has, in turn, created other 
problems including the exodus of people from their countries (refugees), disruption 
of production, neglect of infrastructure and a host of others. A few countries 
such as the Ivory Coast, Kenya and, for some time, Senegal, have been spared 
these political problems and the positive result of this is clear in terms of the fact 
that they have been able to register a consistent growth in GDP and their 
infrastructure is still relatively intact.
Political turmoil damaged the administrative machine, throwing it out of gear by 
denying it the requisite resources. It is worth noting, however, that in some cases 
the public administration systems have kept the countries going. For instance, 
Uganda has been able to survive the political turmoil mainly because of the 
resilience of the public administration system. But even there, the scars of the 
political turmoil show very clearly in that the present administrative system has 
little gear, morale and competence; much of it having been lost during the days of 
Idi Amin and subsequent regimes. The result has been poor performance and low 
productivity on the part of the administrative system.
Incompatible Sociocultural Contexts
Another factor affecting the public administration systems in Africa is the nature 
and character of the sociocultural milieu. In a celebrated study in the 1960s, Fred 
Riggs suggested that public administration systems in the Third World countries 
tended to operate ineffectively because the culture of the societies was not 
congenial to the dictates of a modem administrative machine (Riggs, 1961). In a 
more recent study, Goran Hyden argued similarly, attributing much of the mess 
in African management to the lack of congeniality between the demands of modem 
management and the African cultural milieu (Hyden, 1983).
While one may not want to exaggerate the impact of this factor on Africa’s 
administrative performance, there may be some validity in the assertions. This is 
especially so since few African countries have tried to reorient their administrative 
systems to accommodate their particular cultural proclivities (Balogun, 1986). 
Instead, the cultural proclivities were expected to adjust to the demands of modem 
administration. Although not much research has been done to determine if
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adjustments have taken place, casual observation tends to suggest that it has not, 
with dire consequences for the performance of the systems.
Impact of Historical Legacies and Developments 
in the Ecology of Public Administration
The previously mentioned historical legacies, as well as developments in the 
ecology, had a rather negative impact upon the system of public administration. 
They transmitted characteristics and modalities of operation which were 
incongruent with the requirements of an administration system suitable for rapid 
development. They became too big and over-stretched, highly centralised, 
emasculated, resource-deficient and inefficient. We shall briefly examine some of 
the resultant characteristics below.
Too Large a Public Service
Many commentators on African public administration suggest that the public 
sector has grown considerably in the last 20 years of Africa’s independence. The 
growth is indicated by big increases in the number of people on the public payroll, 
the growth in overall public expenditure and the percentage of GDP and GNP per 
capita that is consumed by the public sector. It is also indicated by the share 
occupied by the public sector in relation to the other sectors and activities of the 
economies.
The ECA had this to say about the issue:
Each government in Africa has fingers in every pie. Its interests range 
from banking and insurance through oil refineries, air and road 
transport, looking after agriculture and social welfare. Central 
Government bureaucracies are no longer content with merely shuffling 
papers from desk to desk, they now brew beer, distribute cement and 
sell meat. ... (AAPAM 1986:154).
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Implicit in the observation is a feeling that the public sector has been growing too 
fast, and the need to check this growth requires urgent attention. Available 
evidence supports the contention that there has been a growth in the public sector 
in Africa as shown in Table II.
Table II: Growth of the Public Sector in Selected African countries
1975 1983
Percentage 
increase per 
annum
Ghana 75 000 200 000 15
Malawi 31 840 50 000 7.9
Mali 31 763 49 116 5.6
Nigeria 716 421 1 723 519 15
Sudan 231 612 261 893 2.6
Senegal 61 836 80 390 3.7
Zambia 240 000 280 000 3.3
Source: Lindeaeur et al. 1986, p .36.
The data shows that for Ghana, Malawi and Nigeria, the annual growth of the 
public service stood at more than 5 %, an increase which could not be matched by 
a growth in either GDP or GNP per capita. In due course therefore, the additional 
employees were bound to just become consumers, rather than producers, of the 
national product.
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The Tendency Towards Centralism
Partly because of the colonial administrative legacy which was preoccupied with 
law and order (itself a function of the fragility of imposed rule, which seems for 
some countries to have stretched into the independence era), there has tended to 
be an emphasis on concentrated authority and power. The result is that the 
institutions and structures that have emerged leave little room for the sharing of 
responsibilities, with most functions and responsibilities tending to gravitate 
towards the centre.
Thus policy making, which requires informed inputs from various parties, has 
come to be the sole responsibility of the president or the "presidency", the party 
politburo or the military council, with dire consequences for the efficaciousness 
of policy decisions, including policies dealing with socioeconomic development and 
management issues. Within the ministries it is not unusual for permanent 
secretaries, who are often burdened with big decisions, to take action on minor 
issues on projects in far comers of the country.
In some countries decisions were taken in principle to decentralise responsibility 
for administrative functions and socioeconomic development activities to local 
governments, parastatal bodies or cooperative organisations; but subsequent or 
parallel activities whittled away the basis of the decentralisation measures taken. 
Thus, local government institutions were created and given responsibility for local 
services but no commensurate authority and power to raise revenue was granted 
to them.
In almost all countries, government involvement in business activities tended to be 
conducted through institutions known as parastatals or public enterprises, created 
because such institutions made it possible for the government to be involved in 
business activities without being encumbered with the bureaucratic rules and norms 
that govern the public service. Yet, in almost every country, these same 
parastatals are subjected to controls by more than three layers of bureaucratic 
agencies. This robs them of operational authority to make business and other 
strategic management decisions, thus crippling their efficiency and profitability.
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We have noted that African countries had a tendency to build centralised and 
authoritarian institutions. Despite this centralisation, however, the institutions have 
had limited capacities for effective policy management. While responsibility, 
authority and power for policy making are located in the office of the president, 
the party central committee or the military council, these institutions rarely have 
the staff to carry out data collection and analysis, provide policy options, monitor 
and evaluate implementation and advise on policy revisions where appropriate. 
These weaknesses have tended to result in the formulation of poor or irrelevant 
policies which often end up either not being implemented, or leading to 
unanticipated consequences if implemented.
Even where resources exist at the centre, they need to have complementary 
institutions at the national level that are viable and well articulated. Many of these 
central agencies do not even have parallel organs at the intermediate and local 
levels to carry out complementary policy management functions. Where they 
exist, they are normally weak. Moreover, as noted earlier, in most African 
countries there are no viable local institutions with which the central government 
can share responsibility for policy management. Given this situation, there is a 
great need to build viable policy management institutions at all levels.
Declining resources fo r  public management
Another major contributor to the crisis in public administration is the declining 
level of the resources that are critical to effective public management, including 
finance, manpower and material resources.
(a) Finance
The poor state of the finance of African countries is reflected in increasing fiscal 
deficits, which have their origins in two types of developments. Initially they were 
a function of escalating expenditures resulting from governments’ commitment to 
development as a response to the pressures for enhanced public services. This 
situation was later compounded by the economic crisis which tended to depress the
Inadequate and Inappropriate Institutional Capacities
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scale of economic activity (production, trade, imports and exports), which in turn 
had an adverse impact on the tax base, resulting in a decline in revenues. The 
decline in financial resources has been compounded by the absence of sound 
financial management systems and practices. A recent study by the ECA shows 
that government budgetary systems in Africa have remained archaic; accounting 
systems have not kept pace with the complexity of modem financial management 
systems; and auditing and financial controls have been poorly applied, usually 
concentrating on financial and compliance aspects. Tax administration is poorly 
managed, with unrealistic laws, poor systems of collection and inadequate 
information bases; all leading to tax evasion. The effect of all these factors has 
been to reduce the level of financial resources, which in turn compounds the 
financial crisis, with adverse effects on the capacity of the public management 
system.
(b) Manpower
While African countries have made concerted effects to train skilled manpower 
since the early years of independence, with aid agencies playing a significant part 
in the endeavour, a number of factors have made those efforts seem inadequate. 
Twenty-five years later, almost all countries face manpower shortages of some 
sort. The manpower shortage has two elements. While there is an absolute 
shortage of specific categories of skilled personnel, the available personnel are not 
making an optimal contribution to productivity. The situation is made worse by 
a brain-drain, of the few skilled people available, to greener pastures. This 
situation has come about as a result of the absence, in many African countries, of 
well-organised and adequately staffed manpower planning agencies; poor 
manpower management policies which include poor recruitment, training and 
compensation systems; poor management systems, which are characterised by the 
absence of performance appraisals, laxity in supervision and generally the absence 
of an accountability framework.
(c) Inadequate or Inappropriate Administrative Technological Resources
Administrative technology includes the organisation of office space in such a 
manner as to facilitate communication, coordination and control. It also includes 
such things as equipment, furniture, stationery, machinery and gadgets.
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African public administration systems generally have inadequate and inappropriate 
administrative technologies. They are using archaic and outmoded office gear, 
equipment and machinery is in disrepair, and one often finds a mismatch between 
the available personnel and the supportive technology. There is also a tendency 
to acquire new technologies without initially synchronising their compatibility and 
adaptability. This situation has come about as a result of a number of factors, 
including the following:
(i) African countries inherited an administrative technology that was 
adequate for the tasks then at hand, commensurate with the size and complexity 
of the public service. However, as the tasks of governance expanded, the size and 
complexity of the public service increased, there was not a commensurate growth 
in the size and complexity of the administrative technologies. The situation was 
exacerbated by the fact that public employment tended to grow haphazardly 
without being related to either the work on hand or the technological resources to 
be used in performing the work.
(ii) The economic crisis further made it even more difficult to increase 
the number of technological units or to acquire spares for units which break down, 
which made the ratio between the available workforce and the administrative 
technology at its disposal even more unbalanced.
(d) Declining Productivity
Mainly as a result of a combination of all the above negative characteristics, poor 
productivity has become pervasive throughout the public service. Development 
projects are never completed on time, if they are completed at all. Poor 
productivity is now rampant in the service sector and the public commercial sector 
and is quickly seeping through into the private sector.
Attributes of a Desirable Public Administration System
This paper has tried to demonstrate that African public administration faced severe 
problems during the post-independence period. Embodied within its structures are 
systematic anomalies derived from the inherited colonial administrative apparatus
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that inhibit the growth of the system into a development-oriented apparatus. At 
the same time, the post-independence ecology deprived the system of the necessary 
dynamism for effective performance. African public administration is now in a 
dual crisis: a crisis of performance, as well as of sustenance. The system not 
only fails to accomplish its tasks but it is also unable to confront the challenges of 
recovery and sustainable development.
As indicated earlier in this paper, the crisis in African public administration is part 
of the one facing the broader socioeconomic system and thus attempts to 
redynamise it have to focus on the basic structures of the society in terms of the 
economic base, political institutions and socio-alignments. However, it must also 
be acknowledged that public administration is a unique social organism which, 
while being shaped and conditioned by its ecology, has a potential to react back 
and transform the ecology. Consequently, a purposeful redynamisation of public 
administration can enable it to initiate changes in the ecology, leading to the 
transformation necessary for the desired recovery. Below is a brief review of the 
desirable attributes of a "combat-ready" public administration.
The first attribute is related to clarity of role and scope, as well as ability to 
determine optimal level of involvement. It is imperative that the public 
administration system rationalises its functions and activities so that it handles only 
as much as its capacity allows.
The second attribute relates to the structure or organisation of the system. A 
public administration system for recovery has to be organised in such a way that 
it is flexible enough so as to cope with turbulent and complex situations. It must 
facilitate the coordination of the various component parts, be open, allow the full 
utilisation of available talents as well as frequent interchange of personnel among 
sectors; reduce the specialist/generalist conflicts; promote a better understanding 
between civil servants and politicians and between top civil servants and those in 
lower ranks and allow wider integration with the public. How this can be 
achieved will depend on the particular situation in each country, but it is important 
that flexibility, capacity and ability to change be an inbuilt element in the 
organisation system.
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The third attribute is the capacity to generate adequate resources from the 
environment, to utilise the resources optimally and efficiently. The resources 
include manpower, finance and equipment. We have noted that the economic 
crisis places great demands on the public administration system for certain types 
of services, while at the same time shrinking the general level of resources. To 
balance the two contradictory tendencies will need imagination to devise new ways 
for revenue generation, of supervising and compensating personnel and of ensuring 
that resources are allocated where needed most. In short, the public administration 
system will have to ensure that productivity and efficiency are at the forefront of 
its operations.
The final set of attributes are to do with attitude, involving dedication, 
responsibility, responsiveness and accountability. While these can be induced, 
they are also innate in the individual. One factor affecting the emergence of these 
attributes is the environment - the political milieu. The issue to raise is: what 
external controls and influences should be brought to bear on the public 
administration system to ensure administrative morality, responsibility, 
responsiveness and accountability to the public? The response will depend largely 
on the character of the environment. However, the relationships worked out should 
leave the public administration system confident and not hamstrung by the political 
system, if it is to function efficiently and effectively.
Conclusion
The public administration system needed to cope with the multiple challenges will 
require, in terms of organisation and structure, a system that can ensure capacity 
to accommodate rapid environmental changes; improved facilities to coordinate 
the constituent parts; openness and flexibility in both internal and external 
relations and organisational designs permitting optimal involvement of and 
accessibility to the citizens. In terms of process, the focus should be on increased 
professionalism through continuous and systematic training to acquire up-to-date 
knowledge, skills and techniques; optimal utilisation of manpower, procedures and 
methods which allow speedier action; and greater involvement of staff in 
organisational decision-making. In terms of values and attitudes, public servants 
need to be more result-oriented, honest and cost-conscious, as well as more 
responsible and responsive to the public. In short there is need for administrative 
cultural change.
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REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE NEW SOUTHERN  
AFRICA: TOW ARDS INTERDEPENDENCE
MAFA SEJANAMANE 
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Introduction
It is now almost a cliche to say that the 1990s have ushered in a completely new 
world; a world where all the old ways of conducting international politics and 
diplomacy have given way to cooperation between the super-powers. Writing on 
the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe, Nabudere has argued that:
The changes that are currently underway in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe are of such epochal dimensions that they undermine our view 
of the world as we have known it since the end of the last world war.1
Similarly, Fred Halliday has argued that recent events represent an earthquake in 
world politics.2
In Southern Africa, this change has been partly responsible for the "peace" moves 
which began with the resolution of the Namibian question and are now focused on 
the ongoing negotiations about the future of South Africa. Though it is too early 
to reach any definite conclusions about the success or otherwise of the 
negotiations, it is clear that Southern Africa can no longer remain the same. If the
Nabudere, Dan Wadada (1990). "Changing Eastern Europe : Chance for 
Africa", SAPEM 3 (5), p .3.
Halliday, Fred (1990). "The End o f Cold War". New Left Review. N o .80 
(March/April), p .5.
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conditions of governance change in the region’s "power-house", so will the whole 
concept of security policy and management. While a few years ago it was 
inconceivable to talk about security without belabouring the military balance of 
forces, it is now regarded as a foregone conclusion that "counting guns" will in 
future be a pre-occupation of a tiny minority of people in the field of strategic 
studies.
In the debate on regional security in the new era, traditional realist perceptions on 
security must be replaced with new ones where the military is put in the 
background. There is little in orthodox international relations that addresses the 
predicament of small states such as those in Southern Africa. Past studies of small 
states, particularly their security policies, have usually focused on small states in 
Eastern and/or Western Europe, despite the preponderance of small states in the 
Third W orld.3 Furthermore, there is a great preoccupation with and certain 
assumptions about power in much of the literature. Thus, Thucydides’ logic that 
in international relations the powerful do what they want while the weak do what 
they can 4 is implicit in most analysis, and explicit in Aron and Morgenthau.5
Operating within this mould, analysts of Africa have conceived foreign and 
security policy in terms of the alliance of African states with one or the other of 
the big powers, and then deduced the options such states had in these alliances as 
a factor of policy. Needless to say, such studies have rightly been castigated for 
lacking insight as they concentrated on relatively transient features of a nation’s 
policy and, at least in the case of Africa, on relatively insignificant features. If 
anything, as I indicated in a paper earlier this year, recent attempts at 
rapprochement between the super-powers indicate the futility of such an
See for example Holl (ed) (1983). Small States in Europe and 
Dependence, Luxenburg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs.
Thucydides (1982). The Pelopponesian War, London, Penguin.
Morgenthau, Hans (1973). Politics Among Nations. New York, Knopf.
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rapprochement between the super-powers indicate the futility of such an 
approach.6 In fact, current developments indicate clearly that such an approach 
is totally out of step with the present world political climate.
In the contemporary international system, not only do small states continue to be 
primarily concerned with their position within a largely fixed international 
structure, but traditionally stronger states also find their abilities to direct 
international developments to be limited. All international actors participating in 
an interdependent international system face similar situations of dependence on the 
external environment, which can be controlled only to a limited extent. In the 
Southern African situation, this means that South Africa cannot "call all the shots" 
in the power game, but that regional institutions like Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) will also have a bearing on the reshaping of the regional security 
structure.
Traditionally, small states face somewhat different problems from the big powers. 
Accustomed to dependence on the international system and having only marginal 
impact on it, small states do not suffer any drastic revision with regard to 
international status. They remain small. On the other hand, the surrounding 
international environment has been transformed into a system characterised by 
interdependence. Quite possibly, the national ramifications of participation in such 
a system differ from those of the traditional setting. Whether the new environment 
is more beneficial than the previous one is a matter that will be determined in the 
future.
This paper is devoted to a preliminary discussion of the effects of international 
interdependence on national security in Southern Africa. The vital question is how 
participation in an interdependent system may affect the security position of the 
small Southern African states. In other words, in what respects is this position 
strengthened, and how could it be threatened, by interdependence?
Sejanamane, Mafa. "Conceptual Framework on Security Studies". Paper 
presented at the Initial Workshop o f the Security Studies Project o f ISAS, 
Maseru, 1990.
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On National Security
The national security literature is overwhelmingly responsive to conflicting events 
on the international level and to domestic crisis that challenges the behaviour of 
the state and the status of the governing groups. However, although the decision­
makers’ concern about state security goes back to the emergence of the nation­
state, the analysts’ concern and investigation into national security is more recent.
Agreement on the definition of national security is still largely elusive, though a 
careful inquiry into the literature dicloses that a great deal of it is concerned with 
military aspects of nation-states’goals.7 However, little in the literature has, until 
recently, focused on the equally important developmental process within states and 
internationally. The strategic conception of security policy conceives security in 
terms of abstract values and is concerned mainly with the preservation of the 
independence and sovereignty of nation-states.8 Thus Trager and Kronenberg 
have defined security as that part of government policy having as its objective the 
creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the 
protection or extension of vital values against existing and potential adversaries.9
Obviously one of the problems of such a definition is how to define "vital values". 
If the objective of national security policy is the creation of a national consensus 
around national basic values, there is an implicit assumption that the society is 
coherent, united and enjoys equilibrium among its forces. Such approaches to 
defining national security suffer from methodological,operational as well as 
conceptual deficiencies. They emphasise the role of perception in the decision­
making process rather than other, more objective, methods such as socioeconomic 
approaches.
Bock, P. and M. Berkowits (1966). "The Emerging Field o f National 
Security", World Politics 19:1, p p .122-136.
Clausewitz, Carl Von (1982). On War. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
Trager, Frank and Philip Kronenberg (eds) (1973). National Security and 
American Society: Theories, Process and Policy. Lawrence, Kans, 
University Press o f  Kansas, p .43.
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The serious impact of perception and misperception is that the drive of security 
produces aggressive action if the state either requires a high sense of security or 
feels menaced by the presence of other strong states. This circle of perceiving 
others’ "security as one’s own insecurity" will, on the whole, tend to generate 
mutual insecurity.
A few analysts subscribing to the economic security approach have concentrated 
on two major issues: (a) the security of strategically high-ranked resources and 
the economic functions of war systems; and (b) economic development as the 
essence of security.
Working along this vein, Krause and Nye define economic security as the "absence 
of threat of severe deprivatiopn of economic welfare", and they point out that 
"economic security as a goal becomes visible when a country consciously chooses 
to accept economic inefficiency to avoid becoming more vulnerable to economic 
impulses from abroad, or when a country stresses national approaches at the 
expense of integration gains".10
From the foregoing, it is obvious how to date the national security concept has 
been remodelled from purely military aspects to substantial issues of economics. 
Robert McNamara, an early critic of the classical definition, has argued that:
Security means development. Security is not military hardware, though 
it may include it; security is not military force though it may involve it; 
security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. 
Security is development, and without development there can be no
security.11
Krause, L. and Joseph, Nye (1975). "Reflections on the Economics and 
Politics and International Economic Organisations", in Fred Bergsten and 
Lawrence Krause (eds), World Politics and Intemationsl Economics. 
Washington, Brooklings Institution.
MacNamara, R. (1968). The Essence o f  Security. New York, Harper and 
Row, p. 149.
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From the above discussion, national security has to be viewed as a situational 
policy, and not necessarily a long-process one. The realisation of national security 
may appear or disappear according to the perception of threats to the economic 
performance of the nation-state. Secondly, it is obvious that stressing development 
needs, particularly if accompanied by an increased role for the citizenry, will 
enhance the credibility of the regime in power.
Security policy in this context will include the management of external threats and 
of autonomy. Though these are in essence inseparable, for analytical purposes 1 
have chosen to distinguish between them.
The Management o f  External Threats
Small states, many analysts have noted, are in general faced with almost identical 
conditions of political, economic and strategic insecurity in relation to bigger or 
more powerful neighbours. However, the degree of insecurity differs from case 
to case and period to period. Again, the measures adopted to protect themselves 
from external threats will vary along the dimensions of political strategy dictated 
by the dynamics of the regional and global environment. Thus, the measures 
states undertake to protect themselves against encroachment upon their sovereignty 
fall within the broad scheme of management of national security.
The Management o f  Autonomy
Vital argues that in the final analysis the condition of conflict between a great 
power and a small state is, ultimately, over autonomy. Autonomy in foreign 
policy making is defined as a situation in which the state asserts its ability to 
define its policy directions without the interference of a big power. Thus, the 
management of autonomy should be seen as the measures which a state takes to 
ensure and enhance its capability to chart its policies internally and externally. 
Paradoxically, Vital points out that small states tend to have more, not less, room 
of manoeuvrability when they face some pressure over autonomy from a bigger 
state. Why and how do small states succeed in achieving greater degrees of 
autonomy vis-a-vis larger states in periods of disharmony? Under what 
circumstances is this possible?
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It is important to note that it is unlikely that any of the small Southern African 
states, with the exception of Zimbabwe, could survive a protracted conflict with 
South Africa. Indeed, even without resorting to economic warfare strategies 
and/or military engagements, these states are too vulnerable outside an 
interdependent world, which we seem to be moving into.
Challenges o f  Interdependence
Though interdependence is clearly better than the current state of dependence of 
the regional states on South Africa, it should be made clear from the beginning 
that it is not a panacea. At times it could in fact be worse than the current 
situation if not managed properly.
It is widely recognised that participation in interdependent relations involves a loss 
of governmental autonomy. It is this factor which, for example, the former British 
Prime Minister used against European monetary union - it would involve too much 
loss of sovereignty, she is reported to have argued. Governments, in this 
situation, lose control of the outcomes of their policies since these are strongly 
affected by developments in the international environment.
According to Bengt Sundelins, participation in an interdependent relation may 
result in two forms of restrictions on governmental autonomy.12 A reduced 
policy effectiveness and/or a more limited scope of acceptable policy alternatives 
may be experienced.13 Overall, the result would be a loss of control of the 
outcome of policy.
This potential threat to national security is not easily detected. In contrast, 
traditional threats to national independence, such as the violation of territory, acts 
of economic warfare or the building of external military capabilities, are more 
tangible security concerns. The question here is not if the nation will be 
unexpectedly invaded, but if it will gradually lose governmental autonomy, 
economic independence or cultural integrity.
12 Holl op.cit, p .286.
13 Ibid.
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Another problem associated with interdependent relations is that they make it 
difficult to control the policy process. It becomes, as Sundelius points out:
difficult to set priorities, determine a clear direction of policy, and even 
to define national interest. Administrative units may undermine the best 
interests of the governments concerned. The existence of direct 
channels can also make it easier for others to influence national policy 
by gaining the support of crucial sub-units.14
Participation in interdependent relations can also result in the undermining of the 
solidity of government. The use of transgovemmental relations is often discussed 
as one of the significant features of the relations among modem states.'5
The great scope of such interactions, in combination with the difficulties in 
controlling them at the centre, involve a potential loss of governmental unity. It 
becomes increasingly difficult to set priorities, determine a clear direction of 
policy, and even to define national interest. Keohane and Nye have shown how 
administrative units may commit an unwilling government to unfavourable 
dependency relations.
One of the most important features of interdependence is societal sensitivity. 
Socioeconomic developments in one country can affect and are affected by similar 
changes in other societies. Indeed the opportunities for governments to harm or 
threaten others with socioeconomic interruption are greater in an interdependent 
system. Acts of interference in the domestic conditions of other societies can be 
used as a means of influence. This can be realised by a wide variety of externally 
directed activities bodering on economic warfare. At the same time, unintended 
actions can in fact destabilise the economy of an interdependent state.
14 Ibid, p .287.
15 Keohane, R. and J. Nye (1974). "Transgovemmental Relations and 
International Organisations". World Politics 27:1, p.39-62.
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In these circumstances, it is clear that traditional conceptions of security must be 
modified to include also this type of external threat to the nation. Existing studies 
of economic warfare strategies such as blockade, embargo and sanction, should be 
supplemented with investigations of more modest, low-key techniques of 
interrupting society. Moreover, in an interdependent world, it is not often that 
such drastic measures as embargoes are used to change or influence the position 
of an ally.
Opportunities in the Changing Southern Africa
Involvement in an interdependent system involves more than costs and restraints. 
Major benefits to society are derived from intimate links with the international 
environment.
It is widely claimed that in an interdependent relationship the relative power of the 
participants is equalised. Of course this does not suggest that all parties to an 
interdependent relationship possess equal power, but merely that their relative 
capacity to determine outcomes is more equal.16 Thus, according to Rosenau, 
states which are traditionally considered weak powers have found ways to 
strengthen their influence on changes in the international system, while 
traditionally strong powers have noted a relative loss of control. By becoming 
much more closely involved in the Southern African economic system through 
institutions like SACU and the "new-look" SADCC, all the regional states could 
have much more influence on South Africa than otherwise. This would be a result 
of the existence of many potential vetoers of outcomes. This obviously results in 
less process efficiency, but most participants would find greater opportunities to 
assert their interests internationally.
Another beneficial effect of participation in an interdependent system is that the 
usefulness of non-coercive strategies of influence is enhanced. According to Klans 
Knorr, this is the ability to affect the behaviour of another international actor
Rosenau, J. (1976). "Capabilities and Control in a Interdependent World", 
International Security 1:2 (Fall), pp.32-49.
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without resort to superior strength, military or economic.17 All the Southern 
African states know from experience that they lack the capacity to change South 
Africa’s behaviour by resorting to superior strength. Should the situation change 
for the better, they would be best advised to cultivate an environment where they 
can influence developments through an interdependent mechanism.
International organisations are crucial centres of interaction and decision-making 
in an interdependent system. Most aspects of the future international order are 
shaped within multilateral diplomatic context of international organisations. This 
seems to be the only way for these small states, short of full integration.
But for the regional states to be able to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
by interdependence, there should be peace and stability in the region. These make 
the nation less vulnerable. If anything, the experience gained from Jonathan’s 
security policy confirms this. While able to effectively mobilise international 
opinion against Pretoria, Jonathan did not strive for peace and unity, thus leaving 
room for South Africa and its surrogates like the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) 
to destabilise his government and finally to bring about his downfall.18 The 
ability to mobilise national resources and sentiments behind governmental efforts 
to resist interruptions or control disturbances is definitely an asset.
17 Knorr, K. (1975). The Power o f  Nations, New York, Basic Books, p .316.
18 For an extended exposition o f  this see Sejanamane, Mafa In the Mouth o f  
the Tiger: Lesotho Security Policy Since Independence. SAPES 
(forthcoming).
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LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT: 
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES BEYOND 
THE YEAR 2000
MAEMA M ., TURNER S., and PUTSOANE T.
Lesotho Highland Development Authority, Maseru
Introduction
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is a multipurpose water control and 
development project which will be constructed in phases during the period 1990- 
2020. The detailed design, construction of advanced infrastructure and processing 
of tenders for the construction of the dam and tunnels are either complete or about 
to be completed to enable the construction of Phase I.
Phase IA will involve the construction of a concrete arch dam on the Malibamatso 
river at Katse to create the Katse reservoir. Water from this reservoir will flow 
by gravity through a 45km-long transfer tunnel. At the north end of this tunnel, 
the 72MW Muela Hydropower plant will be constructed and the water flowing 
through the power plant will discharge into a tailpond created by the Muela Dam 
on the Nqoe river. From the Muela tailpond a delivery tunnel, about 35km long, 
will be built to carry the water to the Ash river, a tributary of the Vaal river, in 
South Africa. Construction will begin in late 1990 and last for 72 months.
Phase IB includes the construction of a diversion weir on the Matsoku river, the 
Mohale dam on the Senqunyane river and a transfer tunnel to Katse reservoir. At 
full development, Phase I will deliver 30m3/sec.
Our point of departure is that there is a Phase I of the project and that future 
phases are a possibility. The project is multidisciplinary and involves modem 
engineering and construction technologies, water resources and environmental
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management, and socioeconomic effects. There are, therefore, many opportunities 
for long-term research in the LHWP. The purpose of this paper is to highlight 
these research opportunities, with the aim of generating interest and collecting 
information that will be useful not only to the LHWP, but also to similar projects 
in the Southern African region and Africa as a whole.
Engineering and Construction Technology
Many of the engineering tools and machinery used in geotechnical investigations, 
tunnelling and other construction activities are necessarily state of the art 
machinery, which is imported from developed countries. However, the materials 
used in construction are local. Thus it is necessary to study these materials and 
to test their suitability for construction under Lesotho conditions. Such materials 
include basalts for use in aggregate production, sandstone products and clays.
Water Resources Management
There is a need to inventorise the water resources of the LHWP, to estimate 
present and future water use, and to manage the LHWP reservoirs with the 
objectives of maintaining downstream ecology and human needs, and maximising 
both the quantities of water to be transferred and hydropower generation.
Research and training opportunities exist in the development and use of stochastic 
and deterministic models for reservoir operation, forecasting and operation of the 
hydropower plant.
Watershed Management
The lifespan of water resources development projects can be prolonged either 
through engineering measures and/or good watershed management. Opportunities 
exist for long-term monitoring and quantification of erosion and sedimentation 
rates in small and large catchments, and in the reservoirs. There is a need to 
develop models to assist in defining experimental research and protection
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measures. Use can also be made of modem research techniques, such as remote 
sensing (e.g. aerial photos, satellite imagery) and geographical information 
systems.
Biology, Ecology and Epidemiology
The creation of reservoirs and increased development in the LHWP area will have 
both negative and positive impacts on biological resources and health conditions 
of the local communities. Inventory studies and biological monitoring of flora and 
fauna populations are required. Such research should be able to define the need 
to conserve the flora, fauna and unique habitats.
There is a need to assess and monitor, on a long-term basis, the ecological impacts 
of regulated flow, compensation, water releases and pollution from construction 
activities.
The possibility of introducing or increasing the prevalence of waterborne diseases 
and other infectious diseases should be monitored. There is very little information 
on the relative abundance and distribution of vectors of infectious agents such as 
mosquitoes, snails and blackflies. The development and use of mathematical 
models to aid interpretation, collection and analysis of epidemiological data, and 
in the design of control programmes is a research priority. Pattems'of disease and 
morbidity in a changing Southern Africa need to be re-examined.
Heritage and Cultural Aspects
The historical occupation and use of the Lesotho highlands has not been fully 
described, despite the sometimes rich ethno-archaeological evidence in the area. 
In the later phases of the LHWP, where some reservoirs will be formed within 
valleys bordered by cave sandstone formations, a detailed archaeological 
reconnaissance is required.
Through tunnelling operations, the LHWP is creating opportunities for research 
in palaeobotany and vertebrate palaeontology, as well as studies in palaeo-ecology.
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Socioeconomic and Rural Development
Opportunities exist for postgraduate and long-term research into the economic 
impacts of the LHWP, agricultural and rural development strategies and resource 
planning and economics. These aspects are particularly relevant for the LHWP 
area as the improved infrastructure (roads, ferry crossings, clinics, market outlets 
etc.) is likely to have a significant impact on the standard of living of the affected 
communities. Legal aspects of the LHWP, such as in areas of contract law, 
environmental law, industrial relations and health and safety regulations, can be 
investigated and analysed.
There are also opportunities for long-term research and monitoring of the impacts 
of the LHWP on communities or individuals in the area. This type of research, 
as has been undertaken for the Kariba Dam, could involve longitudinal monitoring 
of changes in social indicators such as health, nutrition and economic, in a few 
selected communities for periods of up to 20 to 30 years.
Role of Local Institutions
It should be apparent from this brief description of the research opportunities 
within the LHWP that a number of graduate and long-term studies can be 
undertaken. The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) itself has a 
number of graduate and postgraduate Basotho on its staff, all trained in various 
fields relevant to the project. In addition, there are many consultants and 
expatriate personnel with experience in their fields of specialisation. All these 
personnel should be available to guide and advise researchers.
Long-term monitoring and research programmes are best undertaken through 
established institutions which will provide the continuity and resources necessary 
for successful and relevant research. There is a role for the National University 
of Lesotho, through its institutions such as the Institute of Southern African 
Studies, other institutions of learning in Lesotho, the Lesotho government and sub­
regional and international organisations to play in promoting useful research in the 
LHWP.
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ACID PRECIPITATION IN LESOTHO
GISELA PRASAD 
Institute of Southern African Studies 
National University of Lesotho
Introduction
Lesotho, the mountain kingdom in the sky, with its clear skies and only a few 
emerging industries seems such an unlikely place for acid rain from industrial 
pollution. However, a preliminary survey of rainwater samples collected in Roma 
and Maseru during the 1991/92 rainy season indicated low pH values indicating 
acid rain water (Prasad and Del Sette, 1992). These findings raised concern 
because industries in Lesotho were and still are not emitting pollutants to cause 
acid rain.
The preliminary samples were collected in Roma and Maseru according to 
standard procedures and were analysed in the laboratories of the programme for 
Atmospheric Processes and Management Advice (APMA) of the Division of Earth, 
Marine and Atmospheric Science and Technology, at the Centre of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) in Pretoria. These samples, particularly those from 
Roma, also indicated acidification of rain water. Since the pollutants apparently 
do not come from within Lesotho, the most likely highly industrialized source 
areas are the Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vaal triangle and the Eastern Transvaal 
Highveld in South Africa.
Acidification of rain water is of particular concern because many fragile 
ecosystems in the foothills and highlands are already stressed by overgrazing, 
overharvesting and periodic droughts. It may also be of interest to the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project, which will supply water to the Vaal River system in the 
Northern Orange Free State and the Transvaal in South Africa.
To assess the situation, the nature of acidic causes, the degree of human influence, 
and the seriousness of the effects need to be evaluated. Effective remedial action 
depends on this understanding.
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One factor of utmost importance is the quality of available analytical, biological 
and meteorological data used in assessing the acid precipitation situation. 
Analytical precipitation data must be reliable since the levels are so low that small 
variations in measured parameters can change the interpretations significantly.
Background
What pH  is normal?
The acidity of water solutions is often indicated by giving the pH of the solution. 
The term pH is a logarithmic scale expressing acidity and alkalinity in a range 
from 0 to 14, with 7 representing neutral values, less than 7 being acidic, and 
values greater than 7 being alkaline (Fig. 1). If the concentration of hydrogen ions 
in a solution is written as 10*, the pH is - x. The lower the pH, the greater the 
concentration of hydrogen ions, increasing by a factor of ten for each drop of one 
pH unit. Very acidic solutions have a pH of zero or below. The pH of pure 
water is 7.
Fig. 1 M easuring the acidity o f rain - the pH scale
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Determining the "normal" Ph of precipitation, e.g, rain, snow, hail, dew, is 
difficult because the influence of human activities cannot be easily distinguished. 
If pure water is exposed to air, the acidity increases because some carbon dioxide 
in the air dissolves to form weak carbonic acid. The pH of such a solution would 
be about 5.6. For this reason 5.6 is sometimes considered to be the normal pH 
of rainfall. However, there are natural phenomena that contribute acid producing 
gases to the atmosphere, e.g, sulfur dioxide released by volcanoes which can cause 
the rainwater to have a lower pH, sometimes as low as 4.5. There are also 
alkaline substances naturally present e.g., ammonia that can neutralize acidity and 
raise the pH. Therefore, the question of "what is the normal pH of precipitation?" 
has to very carefully evaluated in each situation. The natural pH for the Southern 
African region is generally assumed to be 4.6.
Causes o f  acid precipitation
The major known natural sources that contribute airborne acids and their 
precursors are products of geothermal emissions, wind-generated materials and 
biological processes, also nitric oxide from lightning, sulfurous gases from 
volcanic eruptions and anaerobic decomposition.
The major man-made sources of acidic deposition are primarily sulfur and nitrogen 
oxide emissions from industrial and power-generating plants and transportation 
vehicles. The emissions may be particles or gases and may be transported 
hundreds of kilometres before they are converted to acids and deposited.
Large coal-burning industries and energy-generating facilities in South Africa are 
situated north and northwest of Lesotho; meteorological conditions in the region 
are often such that these acid emissions could produce acid rain in Lesotho Fig.2.
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Fig.2 Location map showing the rain collection stations in 
Lesotho, Roma and Maseru and the powerstations in 
South Africa; 1 =  Rooiwal; 2 =  Pretoria West; 3 =  
Kelvin; 4 =  Orlando; 5 =  Highveld/Taaibos; 6 =  
Lethabo (under construction); 7 =Grootvlei; 8 =  Wilge; 
9 =  Kendal (under construction); 10 =  Kriel; 11 =  
Matla; 12 =  Duvha; 13 =  Komati; 14 =  Hendrina; 15 
= Arnot; 16 =  Tutuka (under construction); 17 =  
Camden; 18 =  Ingagane.
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Atmospheric processes
Pollutants are emitted into the atmosphere from different sources and locations. 
Many pollutants from natural and transportation sources disperse pollutants near 
ground level, while power generating plants and smelter companies have built 
emission stacks to over 350m above ground level. The tall stacks are supposed 
to increase dispersion of the precursors of acid rain.
Fig. 3 Schematic showing banking and washout of polluted 
atmospheric layers over the Lesotho Highlands.
Powerstations in E TH  
and northern OFS
Transport, transformation and removal are the processes that define the formation 
and journey of acids and their precursors between source and area of impact.
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Transport
Acids and precursors are moved by atmospheric transport in meteorological 
patterns. Acid rain precursor material may be carried across geographic and 
political boundaries far from the pollution source. Meteorological patterns can be 
very complex. Fluctuations within hourly, daily, weekly and seasonal patterns and 
individual storms affect the transport of materials in the atmosphere.
Transformation
The acid in rain is produced by chemical transformations in the atmosphere. The 
precursors sulfur dioxide and nitric oxide are emitted and are transformed mainly 
into sulfuric, nitric with minor amounts of sulfurous, nitrous and other acids.
Globally, the natural emissions of sulfur into the atmosphere are thought to be 
greater than man-made sources. Natural sources include sulfate in sea water 
droplets, hydrogen sulfide and other forms of sulfur from anaerobic bacteria and 
plants, and small amounts of sulfur from volcanoes. However, in highly 
industrialized regions man-made sources emit much more sulfur dioxide than 
natural sources, particularly from the combustion of coal in power plants and 
industrial boilers, and the smelting of non-ferrous ores.
Naturally formed nitric oxide is estimated to be small compared to nitric oxide 
from human activities. In high-temperature combustion nitric oxide is formed from 
reaction of nitrogen with oxygen. Fuel motor vehicles and combustion plants 
(mainly power plants) emit an approximately equal amount of nitric oxide.
In the atmosphere, nitric oxide is oxidized by ozone to nitrogen dioxide. The 
concentration of nitric oxide, ozone and nitrogen dioxide appears to be affected by 
the concentration of sunlight. Photochemical "smog" is formed by a reaction of 
these chemicals with hydrocarbons and other atmospheric chemicals.
In northeastern USA, precipitation acidity increases during the summer months. 
This suggests that in summer chemical transformations of acids and precursors are 
more efficient; sulfate also has a summer maximum; but nitrate levels in 
precipitation are almost constant throughout the year.
266
Removal
The two major mechanisms for deposition are:
- wet deposition; acid substances and their precursors are suspended and/or 
dissolved in rain, snow, dew, fog, frost or hail;
- dry deposition; gaseous and particulate matter are transferred to natural 
surfaces by gravitational settling, turbulent exchange and vegetation uptake.
The rate of dry deposition can vary in different areas, ranging from ten times to 
one-tenth the contribution of wet deposition.
Acid rain assessment techniques
Wet deposition samples are most commonly used to assess acid precipitation. Dry 
deposition monitoring is difficult, because of the complexity of the mechanisms 
involved, the low concentration of pollutants of major concern and their variability 
in both region and time.
Accurate measurements of acid rain are possible in well-designed experiments. 
Two of the main problems are common to the analysis of natural water samples; 
the difficulty of measuring concentrations of chemical species near or below 
analytical detection limits and field/laboratory contamination of samples by 
chemical species which sometimes can be in greater concentration than the normal 
constituent. Standard procedures should be followed in samples collection, 
preparation and storage of rain water samples. Not all samples are analysed 
immediately after collection, however, it has been shown that pH meter readings 
must be taken at the sample collection site to obtain a true value. For minimizing 
significant changes in constituents due to chemical rearrangement and organism 
growth, other measured parameters should be analysed as soon as possible after 
collection.
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Acidity Measurements
Three different analytical methods are used to determine rainwater acidity: pH, 
titration and ion balancing. The pH method measures hydrogen ion concentration, 
titration determines the strength of ion activity and ion balancing determines ion 
capacity.
What are the effects o f  acid rain?
Since the industrial revolution, global emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides to 
the atmosphere have increased. The problem of acid rain has not only increased 
with population and industrial growth, but has also become more widespread. 
Using tall smokestacks to disperse local pollution has contributed to the spread of 
acid rain by releasing pollutants into regional atmospheric circulation. The remote 
glaciers near the poles that show natural variability in acid deposition also provide 
evidence in their more recently formed layers of the increased deposition caused 
by human activity during the past half century.
Acids from atmospheric deposition may damage the environment by:
- acidifying lakes, streams and groundwater in sensitive watersheds, resulting in 
damage to fish and other aquatic life; this may affect the trout population 
in Lesotho;
- affecting human health indirectly through contamination of drinking water and 
food supplies by toxic metals etched from soils, pipes, and other metal-bearing 
substances; and
- contributing to the deterioration of manmade structures like buildings and statues, 
exposed metal surfaces and possibly paint or other surface coating.
The recent forest decline in Europe and eastern USA, is most likely related to acid 
rain and other airborne pollutants, even though a cause and effect relationship has,
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so far, not been established (Krahl-Urban et al. 1988). It is estimated that the 
airborne pollution damages in German forests amount to US$200 million a year.
Since the mountain ecosystems in Lesotho are already threatened by overgrazing, 
soil erosion and recurrent periods of drought, the additional long-term exposure 
to acid rain may further damage vegetative cover.
Measurements o f  acid rain in Lesotho
The pH of 128 rainwater samples was measured in a pilot survey during the 
1988/89 rainy season (Prasad and Del Sette, 1992). The values were low 
indicating acid rain. This was surprising because there are no industries in 
Lesotho emitting sufficient pollutants to make the rain acidic. A second study was 
then undertaken to follow up with chemical analyses on these unexpected findings 
and to look for the possible sources of pollutants in the collected rainwater. 
Arrangements were made with APMA at CSIR in Pretoria for detailed chemical 
analyses of rainwater samples.
A standard sampling apparatus was used and standard procedures of sampling, 
preservation and transport of samples and pH measurements in the field were 
followed [Snyman et al., 1991].
In the laboratory the samples were analyzed according to standard procedures 
using ion chromatography and atomic absorption instruments. They are required 
because of the low concentrations of dissolved material. The following 
measurements were made: pH, conductivity, sulphate, nitrate, ammonia,
phosphate, chloride, sodium, potassium, calcium and magnesium (Table I and II).
Results o f  chemical analyses
The detailed results of the measurements are given in Snyman (1992) and a brief 
summary of these results is given here (Table I and II). The samples taken at 
Maseru seem to have been polluted in the collection process and therefore, the 
results cannot be fully relied upon.
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Table 1: Rain Water Analyses, Roma
Sam­
ple
Date Time S B 7 MM PH
(LAB)
PH
(FLD)
EC Na K Ca Mg NIL F c i PO, NO, SO, NO, :
s o .
R1 03/09/91 18.00 1 1 Y 2 4.33 4.68 36 30.4 2.8 21.0 16.5 78.5 10.5 32.7 0.0 62.6 97.2 0.64
R2 13/09/91 08.00 1 1 Y 23 4.35 4.21 28 8.7 0.0 11.0 8.2 85.7 10.5 13.8 0.0 55.3 58 J 0.95
R3 23/09/91 09.00 1 1 Y 2 6.77 3.70 91 39.2 6.9 50.9 32.9 435.5 10.5 60.7 0.0 210.3 188 8 1.11
R4 24/09/91 07.45 1 1 Y 13 5.50 3.80 18 8.7 0.0 4.5 8.2 114.2 10.5 15.5 0.0 42.1 36.4 1 16
R5 24/09/91 07.45 2 1 Y 13 5.38 3.80 18 8.7 0.0 4.5 8 2 100.0 10.5 15.5 0.0 42.1 36.4 1.16
R6 28/09/91 10.45 1 1 Y 13 5.91 4.30 11 4.4 0.0 4.5 8.2 78.5 10.5 8.7 0.0 17.3 17.7 0 98
R8 03/10/91 10.45 1 1 Y 2 4.53 4.65 40 0.0 2.6 3.0 32.9 64.3 10.5 25.7 0.0 79.8 134.9 0.59
R9 10/10/91 08.00 1 1 Y 6 4.25 4.03 24 8.7 0.0 39.9 16.5 42.8 10.5 8.5 0.0 32.7 61.0 0.54
RIO 13/10/91 10.00 1 1 Y 15 4.79 4 00 21 13.1 0.0 7.5 16.5 100.0 10.5 10.7 0.0 35.6 62.3 0.57
R ll 15/10/91 06.35 1 1 Y 43 4.55 4.12 14 4.4 0.0 5.5 8.2 64 3 10.5 6.5 0.0 14.4 39.8 0.36
R12 19/10/91 09.30 1 1 Y 18 5.03 4.33 22 8.7 0.0 1.5 16.5 78.5 10.5 9.6 0.0 35.3 26.2 1.35
R13 21/10/91 07.00 1 1 Y 18 5.99 3.94 13 13.1 0.0 6.0 16.5 114.2 10.5 11.0 0.0 38.4 66.2 0.58
R14 22/10/91 09.00 1 1 Y 16 4.18 3.83 30 4 .4 0.0 5.0 16.5 100.0 10.5 7.1 0.0 40.3 67.5 0.60
R15 23/10/91 07.00 1 1 Y 6 4.09 3.80 29 0.0 0.0 2.5 16.5 71.4 10.5 3.7 0.0 22.6 67.7 0.33
R16 24/10/91 07.00 1 1 Y 4 4.91 4.04 13 4.4 0.0 3.0 16.5 71.4 21.1 0.0 24.8 29.8 0 83
R17 28/10/91 07.00 1 1 Y 3 6.07 4.60 8 4 .4 0.0 3.0 24.7 14.3 10.5 11.3 0.0 22.6 14.4 1.57
R18 30/10/91 09.45 1 1 Y 9 5.21 4.01 21 8.7 0.0 11.0 16.5 121.4 10.5 7.9 0.0 45.3 62.7 0.72
R19 31/10/91 08.40 1 1 Y 5 5.77 4.30 8 0.0 0.0 5.5 16.5 64.3 10 5 5.6 0.0 14.2 11.0 1.29
R20 10/11/91 10.15 1 1 Y 15 4.17 4.19 31 17.4 0.0 2.0 24.7 14.3 10.5 15.8 0.0 36.5 65.6 0.56
R21 11/11/91 07.45 1 1 Y 13 5.61 4.25 13 13.1 1.8 9.5 16.5 57.1 10.5 10.7 0.0 19.0 24.6 0.77
R22 20/11/91 08.40 1 1 Y 11 6.28 5.45 19 8.7 0.0 3.0 2.5 71.4 13.7 8.5 0.0 18.7 12.5 1.50
R23 28/11/91 07.20 1 1 Y 9 5.92 4.14 12 4.4 12.8 14.0 16.5 78.5 10.5 5.4 0.0 16.8 34.8 0 48
R30 05/12/91 07.35 1 2 Y 18 5.78 4.61 7 1.7 1.3 4.5 4.1 42.8 10.5 0.0 11.0 11.5 0.96
R31 09/12/91 08.20 1 2 Y 17 6.31 4.71 8 19.1 1 J 0.0 2.5 14.3 10.5 3.9 0.0 2.6 3 J 0.77
R32 11/12/91 08.40 1 2 Y 8 4.20 3.95 27 4.8 1.5 4.5 4.9 50.0 10.5 0.0 37.9 56.8 0.67
R33 17/12/91 08.20 1 2 Y 4 5.58 4.33 10 9.1 2.6 3.5 4.1 57.1 10.5 12.1 0.0 28 6 12.9 2.21
R34 20/12/91 09.00 1 2 Y 8 4.05 3.85 29 3.9 2.0 0.5 3.3 35.7 10.5 7.1 0.0 32.9 51.0 0 65
R35 05/01/92 10.00 1 2 Y 9 4.59 4.24 17 4.4 2.0 4.5 6 6 64.3 10.5 5.1 0.0 29.4 46.6 0.63
R36 19/02/92 08.45 1 2 Y 7 4.97 4.25 10 7.4 1.5 3.0 4.9 35.7 10.5 0.0 27.6 19.4 1.42
R37 20/02/92 09.25 1 2 Y 16 4.02 3.97 32 1.7 1.8 0.0 3.3 35.7 10.5 0.0 33.7 62 J 0.54
S =  SAMPLE NR 
B =  BATCH NR
? Y =  OUR SAMPLE BOTTLE; N -  NOT OUR SAMPLE BOTTLE 
MM =  RAIN FALL VOLUME
EC = ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY IN MICROSIEMENS PER CM 
ALL CONCENTRATIONS IN ueq / L 
AMMONIA AS NH,
Table II: Rain Water Analyses, Maseru
S im ­ Dele Time S B 7 M M PH pH E C
ple ( I A B ) ( F I D )
M l 03/09/91 01 IS 1 1 N S 0 5 30 5 32 4S
M2 03/09/91 01 IS 2 1 N 4 1 1 37 5 91 135
M3 12/09/91 13 20 1 I N 4 0 4 44 4 41 IS
M4 12/09/91 10 05 2 1 Y 9 5 6 56 4 35 31
MS 12/09/91 10 US 1 1 Y 9 S 4 43 4 21 34
M6 12/09/91 13 20 2 1 N 3 9 4 43 4 31 23
M7 23/09/91 14 OS 1 1 N 7 5 5 36 5 33 14
M l 23/09/91 14 OS 2 1 N 7 1 5 05 5 32 16
M 9 14/10/91 01 01 1 1 N 5 0 5 01 5 39 7
M IO 14/10/91 01 01 2 1 N 4 9 4 65 5 40 5
M i l 11/11/91 19 45 1 I N 6 5 6 46 6 19 13
M I2 11/11/91 19 45 2 1 N 6 1 6 91 6 24 12
M l 3 . 21/11/91 12 SO 1 1 Y 2 4 N/A 5 59
M l  3b 21/11/91 12 SO 2 1 Y 2 4 N/A 5 59
M I4 27/11/91 20 45 2 1 N 6 1 6 76 4 65 I I
M IS 27/11/91 20 45 1 1 N 6 7 6 42 4 69 23
M20 03/12/91 04 30 2 1 Y 9 1 6 96 S 41 145
M21 03/12/91 04 30 1 1 Y 9 2 6 02 5 S3 23
M22 04/12/91 16 OS 1 I Y 4.4 S 11 6 SO I I
M23 04/12/91 16 OS 2 1 Y 4 6 7.42 6 04 174
M24 06/12/91 16 30 1 1 N 24 6 5 59 6 19 13
M2S 06/12/91 16 30 2 1 N 23 2 5 17 6 63 4
M26 10/12/91 14 30 1 1 Y 7 2 4.71 S 10 14
M27 10/12/91 14 30 1 ♦ 2 1 Y 7.2 5 71 4 95 14
M 2 I IS/12/91 01 30 1 4 2 1 Y 4 0 5 15 6 35 23
M29 19/12/91 01 00 1 1 N 21 2 4 61 5 05 14
M30 19/12/91 01 00 2 1 N 22 0 4 33 5 12 15
M32 21/01/92 11 30 2 2 Y 4 5 5 57 6 91 42
M33 21/01/92 I I  30 1 2 Y 5 1 6 I I 6 32 104
M34 30/01/92 09 30 1 2 Y 6 6 5 23 6 60 14
MSS 30/01/92 09 30 2 2 Y 6.7 5.46 6 67 17
M SI 09/01/92 14 00 1 4 2 2 N 5.94 N/A 20
M36 02/03/92 N/A 1 2 Y 6 16 N/A 23
MS7 02/03/92 N/A 2 2 Y 6 56 N/A 43
M S I 16/02/92 01 00 377 2 Y 5 11 N/A 21
R7 17/03/92 14 00 1 2 Y s OS N/A 4
S = SAMPI.F. NR 
B -  BATCH NR
? Y -  OUR SAMPLE B O TTLE ; N -  N O T OUR SAMPLE B O TTLE  
MM -  R A IN FA LL V O LUM B
N « K C « M f N il, F a PO. N O , SO. N O ,:
SO.
1.7 51 I 31 4 49 4 <  I I  1 < 1 0  5 73 9 695 91 9 134 9 0 61
21 I 0 0 56 9 91 7 471 2 < 1 0  5 117 1 0 21 1 227 1 0 10
21 I 2 3 12 5 16 5 49 9 < 1 0  5 24 I 0 26 9 45 2 0 60
13 1 I S 20 0 49 4 <  I I  I < 1 0  5 32 2 0 16 5 •3 5 1 04
1 7 0 0 9 5 32 9 16 6 < 1 0  5 39 2 0 12 3 90 4 0 91
1.7 0 0 13 5 16 5 27 7 < 10 5 15 5 0 29 5 53.1 0 56
0 0 0 0 2.5 1 2 33 3 < 1 0  5 16 9 0 23 9 30 4 0 79
0 0 0 0 1 5 1 2 <  I I  1 < 1 0  5 7 1 0 16 0 19 t 0 I I
1 7 2 6 0 0 2 5 <  I I  I < 1 0  S 5 6 0 1 1 6 2 0 21
1.7 2 3 0 0 2 5 <  I I  I < 1 0  5 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 000
47 9 2 0 24 0 16 5 <  11 1 < 1 0 5 20 6 0 0 0 IS 5 00 0
47 9 1 1 2 3 0 24 7 <  111 < 1 0  5 IS 2 0 0 0 I I  9 0 00
4 4 2.0 27 9 32 9 <  I I  I < 1 0  5 9 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 0
39 2 5.9 30 9 41 1 <  11 1 < 1 0  5 79 3 0 0 0 59 1 0 00
17 4 0 1 50 9 32 9 <  I I  1 < 1 0  5 20 3 0 44 7 92 2 0 41
21 1 5 6 41 4 32 9 <  I I  1 < 10 5 35 3 257 0 0 91 1 0 00
26 5 45 3 27 4 22 2 1031 2 < 10 5 32 3 56 19 2 107 6 0 I I
35.7 14 6 19 5 15 6 <  I I  I < 1 0  5 40 9 0 4 1 25 6 0 19
6 1 5 4 9 0 1 2 <  I I I < 1 0  5 21 4 0 0 0 12 3 0 0 0
13 9 17 1 29 4 7 4 311 1 < 1 0  5 57 5 0 9 1 20 6 0 41
0 0 5.1 13 5 1 6 16 6 < 1 0  5 26 5 0 I I  1 17 1 0 65
0 0 0 3 2 0 3 3 <  11 1 < 1 0  5 5 4 0 4 0 5 1 0 79
10 0 I S 4 5 1 2 22 2 < 1 0  5 1 10 14 22 1 44.1 0 50
154 9 64 2 90 3 26 3 99 S < 1 0  5 150 6 0 31 3 262 1 0 12
1 17 2 1 24 5 I I . 1 55 4 < 1 0  5 22 9 0 59 2 69 3 0 IS
3 0 2 0 0 S 7 4 27 7 < 1 0  5 12 4 0 20 6 31 9 0 53
0 9 1.0 0 0 6 6 <  11 1 < 1 0  5 4 2 0 11 9 33 7 0 56
22 2 14 1 100 3 40 3 27 7 < 1 0  5 305 152 21 3 139 5 0 15
29 6 45 0 91 I 40 J 360 4 < 10.5 36 4 0 17 I 197 2 0 44
4 4 I I 14 5 14 1 27 7 <  10 5 I I  3 0 33 1 54 1 0 61
6 1 2 0 24 0 111 33 3 < 1 0  5 I I  0 0 39 1 59 3 0 67
2 0 5 1 36 9 16 5 16 6 <  10.5 23 7 0 31 4 39 6 0 97
9.1 4 1 41 9 21 1 22 2 < 1 0  5 16 6 0 30 6 77 2 0 40
109 6 1 125 2 77 4 <  111 <  10 5 12 4 0 3 5 91 5 0 0 4
6 1 10 2 0 0 4 I 61 0 < 1 0  5 137 4 0 17 1 13 3 1 21
0 0 2 6 1.5 0 0 <  I I  I < 1 0  5 4.1 0 0 0 0 0
EC -  ELEC TR IC C O N D U C TIV ITY  IN MICROSIEMENS PER CM 
A IJ - CON CENTR ATIO NS IN uoj/L 
AM M O N IA AS Nil,
The rainfall volume in Roma was measured at House SRR 0009 on the University 
Campus' (Table I). The summer 1991/92 was a period of drought in Southern 
Africa and the rainfall was below the annual mean.
pH
The pH of field measurements was generally lower than the pH measured in the 
laboratory (Table I). The pH of most rainwater samples measured after each 
rainfall in Roma is below the 4.6 level which is assumed to be the lower limit for 
natural acidification in the region.
Sulphate and nitrate
Manmade sources generally contribute to these anions. An NO, : S 04 ratio of 1 
is supposed to be from an unpolluted area whereas a ratio of 0.5 or less indicates 
anthropogenic pollution (Galoway et al., 1982). According to these criteria about 
half the Roma samples are polluted.
Ammonia
Biodegradation of organic material contributes to the ammonia levels in the 
atmosphere, e .g ., emanations from cattle, stables and latrines. The values for both 
Maseru and Roma are extremely high (> 3 0 0  u eg/1).
Chloride
Higher than average chloride values correlate to higher than average sulphate and 
nitrate values. No consistent trend in cation values correlates with these higher 
anion values.
Precipitation
Many Thanks are due to David Ambrose who made these 
measurements available.
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Sodium, potassium, calcium, magnesium
Calcium and magnesium are usually derived from soil dust, but calcium is also 
associated with fly ash. Sodium and potassium, together with chloride are 
associated with maritime air, but there is no clear indication of this in the values 
found.
Weather conditions
During the months September 1991 to February 1992 the upper-level wind 
directions (approximately 3170m above MSL) were mostly westerly to 
northwesterly with sometimes northerly and rarely southwesterly. With such wind 
directions it is quite likely that pollutants are transported south and southwestwards 
towards Lesotho.
As an example of a pollution event at Roma the following care history is cited 
from Snyman et al.(1992).
Samples collected at Roma on 10, 13 and 19 October are polluted 
according to the ratio of nitrate to sulfate ("clean" having a ratio of = 1 
and "polluted" =  0.5, Galoway et al., 1982). At that time, a very 
strong Indian Ocean anticyclone was ridging in over the northeastern 
parts of the subcontinent, as shown for 10 October in Fig. 3. The 
situation remained more or less similar during the whole period (see 14 
October; Fig.4). It is interesting to note that the 700 hPa winds over 
Irene near Pretoria were from north-northeast (3.6m sec ') on 13 
October (14.00 h), east-northeast (4.3m sec ') at 02.00 h on 14 
October, backing to north-northwest (12.2m sec ') at 14.00h, while at 
Bethlehem wind then was from west-northwest. Considering the 
initially low wind speeds, such a trajectory could have advected polluted 
air from the Pretoria - Witwatersrand - Vaal area towards Lesotho. 
Looking at the synoptic maps (Fig.4), it could be assumed that polluted 
air from the industrial area of the Eastern Transvaal Highveld could 
have been advected along a curving trajectory following the air flow 
around the ridge and into the trough. Since this synoptic situation was 
relatively persistent, it should explain the series of pollution episodes 
measured at Roma when the pH in the field was about 4 (Table I).
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Figure 4a. The synoptic situation on 10 October 1991 at 14.00.
Figure 4b. The synoptic situation on 14 October 1991 at 14.00.
N>'O
Note: For both figures sea-level isobars are dotted and 850 hPa contours are
solid lines (SA Weather Bureau, Daily Weather Bulletin).
Conclusion
Using the criteria of pH measurements and the nitrate to sulphate ratio acid rain 
does fall in Roma and Maseru. It is most probable that the pollutants are derived 
from emissions in the urban and industrial centres in South Africa. The Pretoria - 
Witwatersrand - Vaal area and the Eastern Transvaal Highveld are likely to 
contribute most of the pollutants. However, the westerly winds may also carry 
emissions from the urban area of Bloemfontein towards Lesotho.
The findings indicate that it is quite possible that acid precipitation falls in the 
mountain areas of Lesotho. It is strongly recommended to continue with rain 
water sampling and analysis and to include sampling sites from the highlands of 
Lesotho.
References
1. Galoway, J.N ., Likens, G .E., Keene, W.C. and Miller, J.M. (1982). 
The composition of precipitation in remote areas of the world. JGR 
87:8771-8776.
2. Krahl-Urban, B., Papke, H .E ., Peters, K. and Solimanski, P. (eds). 
(1988). Forest Decline. Cause-effect research in the United States o f 
America and Federal Republic o f  Germany. Assessment Group of 
Biology, Ecology and Energy for the Julich Nuclear Research Centre. 
Prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and German 
Ministry of Research and Technology, p. 137.
3. Prasad, G., and Del Sette, P. (1992). Report on a preliminary study of 
acid precipitation in Lesotho. ISAS Occasional Paper Series No. 6. 
National University of Lesotho, Roma.
4. SA Weather Bureau (1992). Daily Weather Bulletin, January and 
February 1992, Pretoria, Department of Environment.
5. Snyman, G .M ., Held, G., Turner, C.R. and Josen, G.R. (1991). A 
feasibility study for the establishment of a co-ordinated wet acid 
deposition monitoring network, covering the Transvaal, Natal and
276
Orange Free State. A Report to the Department of National Health and 
Population Development, CSIR Report EM A - C 9197, Pretoria, 1-228.
6. Snyman, G .M ., Held, G. and Taljaard, J.F. (1992). Analytical Results 
of rain water from Lesotho and meteorological conditions during the 
1991/92 rain season. A Report to the CSIR Executive (Project 
731.20529). CSIR Report EMAP-I 92007, Pretoria, 1-18.
277

OPENING SPEECH FOR THE INSTITUTE 
OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES 
W ORKSHOP TO COM MEMORATE  
ITS 10TH ANNIVERSARY
L.B.B.J. MACHOBANE 
Hon. Minister of Education, 
Maseru
When I received the invitation to come and open this Conference, I immediately 
sensed the grandeur of the occasion and likened it to an invitation to a seasonal 
dance of pundits. Thus, although I truly was badly harassed by the responsibilities 
of my office, I had in the end to heed the pithy Ashanti proverb which says: "He 
who cannot dance will say: The drum is bad". By which I mean, I am most 
grateful and honoured to be here to join you, as it were - colleagues and old 
friends, as a way of saying: "The drum is good, and I am happy to dance."
The Vice-Chancellor, members of the Diplomatic Corps, representatives of donor 
agencies, honoured guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to welcome 
you all to the Mountain Kingdom. I also wish to thank you all for having found 
time to come and share with us your ideas about and your expectations of what 
future research emphasis should be for the Southern African region in order to 
provide a better environment for its people.
When I first joined the National University of Lesotho in 1970 there were plans 
for the establishment of a research institute, and differences of opinion were quite 
sharp as to how modest or how ambitious the structures would be.
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The plan in 1976, as reflected in Section 19.(2) of the National University of 
Lesotho Development Plan of 1976 was:
That the University establish at Roma an Institute of Southern African 
Studies. This Institute will promote and coordinate research projects 
dealing with Southern African matters, provide research, conference, 
seminar and workshop facilities, and collect, receive, store and 
disseminate information and data on Lesotho and the Southern African 
region. The Institute should be an integral part of the University with 
its own advisory board to assist its Director.
It was not by accident that this section of the Development Plan was included 
under the general heading of research. It was, quite appropriately, sandwiched 
between a section, on the one hand, that called for the establishment of a National 
Research Council - which has never materialized, and on the other hand, the 
statement of an aim to negotiate the removal of the National Archives from 
Maseru to the University - which I am proud to say that I single- handedly 
masterminded and the National Archives are now housed in the basement of the 
University Library.
Be that as it may, the seeds of the Institute’s inception were spread around, but 
perhaps it took too long for them to germinate. However, once they had sprouted, 
they showed a steadiness and liveliness in growth, to the extent that they tended 
sometimes to tumble over in a tangle. The venture was novel and naturally it 
required skilled and experienced direction and visionary leadership. For the 
National University of Lesotho this was to be the academic cynosure.
At that time it was unthinkable to establish a merger of the various disciplines. 
We all know how jealously each discipline protects and guards its territorial turf. 
And yet the fact is that, presently, institutions of higher learning all over the 
region are challenged to focus on consolidation rather than expansion; to go 
beyond the narrow Confines of disciplinary boundaries.
It is therefore not surprising that it took almost four years of intensive discussion, 
lobbying and a great deal of sweat before the Institute was finally established. 
From its inception, the Institute took on a character of its own, which is perhaps 
unique in many ways. The focus of the service that this institute was to render to 
the peoples of Southern Africa was futuristic.
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Although the area to be covered was wide and seemingly daunting even to the 
large hearted, the Institute has succeeded in establishing itself as a 
multidisciplinary, policy - and development - oriented research unit. This is 
largely attributable to the tenacity, commitment and sacrifice of its staff members 
over the past ten years. I feel proud that the responsibilities which were entrusted 
to the Institute have been pursued with diligence and scholarly discipline.
It is, indeed, fitting at this juncture that we should openly and in the nature of the 
academic tradition, pay tribute to its successive Directors. The first and forceful 
Director was Dr Gorerazvo Stanislas Mudenge in 1979, who unfortunately had to 
leave for the service of his country in June 1980, before he completed his term of 
office. Dr Bethuel Setai took over as Acting Director at that critical period, when 
the nascent Institute might very well have been shattered, and he kept it together 
until a permanent appointment was effected several months later. The next 
appointment was that of Dr Michael Malefetsane Sefali in 1981, who served for 
a little over one term and succeeded in holding that crucial workshop, of 
November 23-27, 1981, on Research Priorities in Southern Africa, held here at 
Roma, featuring distinguished participants, some of whom are with us today. 
When Dr Sefali departed for the lofty and dangerous apex of an African 
government ministerial post in 1986, (for as you know, political misfortunes in 
African governments are often tied up with personal misfortunes), Dr Gwendolyn 
’Maphepheng Malahleha picked up the mantle. Finally we cannot forget the 
energising roles played by the Institute’s Heads of the Research Division, Dr 
James Cobb and Professor Kwesi Kwa Prah and the assiduousness of the Institute’s 
supportive staff. I would like you kindly to join me in giving these men and 
women a deserving applause.
The Institute has grown from a modest level with only two staff members to a 
reasonably large establishment with two divisions (the research division and the 
documentation and publication division). Its activities have expanded to the extent 
that a number of scholars in the region are somehow or other involved in its 
research and documentation network. Just to mention a few: 26 scholars are 
involved in the Human Rights project, 15 on the Conflict and Security Issues and 
the BLS documentation network.
The Institute has achieved a multidisciplinary status. Its Human Rights project, 
I believe, has brought together scholars from the science, legal and literary 
disciplines throughout the region. So also has the study on security issues and
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conflict resolution. Smaller projects have also been undertaken which foster a 
better understanding of the complex issues which seem to thwart our endeavours 
to move forward. These include studies in early childhood development, contract 
farming and outgrower schemes, sociocultural studies, human resource 
development, health, ecology, environment and the SASSI BLS project, to mention 
a few.
The output of the Institute is well demonstrated by the book and document 
exhibition in the foyer. Were it not for the acquisition of up-to-date documents 
and information or the relentless search by the documentation division, I am sure 
the quality of the researchers’ output would have in one way or other been 
affected. Furthermore, the Institute has been able to draw renowned international 
scholars to carry out research under the aegis of ISAS, and to deliver seminars and 
public lectures. These visitors were drawn not only from academicians, but also 
comprise statesmen and diplomats. We hope that this momentum will not be lost.
In all this, we cannot however forget the role of donors who have generously 
sponsored the research programmes in ISAS. These include the Ford Foundation, 
IDRC, SIDA, SAREC, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, NUFFIC and SSRC. They have 
contributed tremendously to the achievements of ISAS and we are grateful to them 
and count on their continued support.
The decade that ISAS has just come through was one in which there was strife, 
despondency and social disintegration in the region. Indeed it was a dingy period 
for those of us in the region. We seemed bent on a course of self-immolation. 
The ravages of conflict left countless people of the region traumatised, disoriented 
and riderless. The social, economic and cultural life of the peoples of the region 
was jeopardised. I understand that the ramifications of these circumstances will 
constitute the central theme of your three days of deliberations.
The Potential of African Universities
It is at this point that I would like to make my own humble contribution, by way 
of suggesting guidelines for the University’s role in the solution of the problems 
of our times, through centres such as the Institute of Southern African Studies and 
generally through the full complement of the academic staff. The challenge to our 
university as a centre of social transformation is no less crucial than that faced by
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any other African university. Hence we need to view ourselves in that larger 
context.
There can be little doubt that the universities of Africa have made a major 
contribution to the development of the countries which they serve. They have 
constituted the most significant source of high-level manpower for the public 
service, the professions and private business in almost all African countries.
They have made, and continue to make, essential inputs into the shaping of policy 
at the highest levels of government through their researches, the service of their 
members on boards and committees and, more recently, their secondment to 
ministerial posts and other high public offices. While the evaluation of the benefits 
of this contribution to policy - making will vary from observer to observer, from 
time to time and from country to country, the fact of university involvement is 
indisputable.
Whatever their historical contribution to national development, the import issue for 
us now is the potential of the African universities for helping in the resolution of 
the current crisis of economic stagnation and the apparent accompanying social 
anomaly. For a variety of reasons, the typical African university concentrates, to 
a much greater degree than its counterpart in the industrialized countries, scarce 
national resources and talent. It brings together some of the finest and best-trained 
minds; some of the best-equipped research and teaching facilities; and a selection 
of the ablest and most highly - motivated youth in the country. That is why so 
much is expected of it.
Research
In considering the contribution of the universities of Africa to the solution of the 
current crisis through their research production, key among the issues that should 
engage our attention are:
i) the agenda - what issues call most urgently for study?
ii) how is research best organized and financed?
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iii) how do we ensure the most rapid absorption of research findings 
into productive use?
Agenda
The broad outlines of a research agenda appropriate to these times of crisis easily 
suggest themselves - research in support of agricultural and industrial production; 
the organization of society for the maximum mobilization and development of our 
human and material resources; the development and delivery of the most 
appropriate and efficient health service system, etc. Within these general 
categories hundreds of important research subjects can be carved out. The 
problems that arise in the process relate to the issues of how relevant research is 
to be organized and financed, the quality of its results, and the application of the 
new knowledge it yields.
Organization and Finance
The characteristic form of research activity in a typical African university 
continues to be the small project undertaken by the individual scholar, occasionally 
in a team with one or two others, on a subject of interest to the researchers. 
Research thus undertaken ranges from the "routine" research done by all lecturers 
essentially in support of their teaching activities, to more fundamental and 
sustained studies by senior scholars. Depending upon the eminence of the 
researcher and the "attractiveness" and extent of promotion of the project, the 
latter projects can attract quite substantial funding. In the main, though, such 
individual projects are usually shoestring operations, supported by funds made 
available from the resources of their universities. While this approach to research, 
in which the individual researcher in effect "follows his own nose," has a 
venerable tradition, and has yielded enormously beneficial results, the modem 
trend has been decisively towards more institution-based, team-operated projects.
In the present and the foreseeable future, the traditional approach will continue to 
play an important role in research activity in African universities. But for their 
research to have a chance of influencing national development, African universities 
have to place greater emphasis on institutional research. This latter mode of 
organizing research has implications for the kinds of projects undertaken, and their
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financing, as well as what happens to the results. In the first place research of the 
category is usually large-scale, relatively long-term and therefore expensive. It is 
usually undertaken at the request, or at least with the concurrence, of some agency 
in a position to fund or procure funding for it. This ensures not only that the 
projects are adequately equipped and staffed, but also that in general they relate 
to some socially relevant problem. It further improves the chances of the results 
being promptly applied in the solution of the indicated problem. It is precisely 
these characteristics that make institutional research the most promising in the 
attack on the crisis facing Africa today.
How do We Ensure the Most Rapid Absorption o f  
Research Findings into Productive Use?
A third particularly difficult category is made of cases in which the new 
knowledge requires testing and development under actual production conditions 
before it becomes usable. In such cases, unless the project was commissioned by 
a body in a position to develop and apply the new process, a real gap between 
research and useful application emerges.
Unfortunately, this is the fate of much of the research output of our universities, 
especially in the area of science and technology, and is often the basis of the 
accusation that the results of university-based research end up gathering dust on 
shelves. While this charge may be justifiable in the many cases of fanciful, 
clever, impractical laboratory inventions, it is not always so. Thus a university 
research body may succeed in developing a process for producing from local 
grasses, essences for the perfume industry, or new methods for drying fruit and 
vegetables and reducing post-harvest losses. For these to make any impact on 
society they need to be developed and tested under commercial conditions. Unless 
there are agencies interested in taking up what the universities have thus produced, 
the new processes will remain undeveloped and socially useless. In a sense, this 
failure cannot be blamed on the university, since the function of the university, 
qua university, can be said to end with the publication of the results of the 
research.
To deal with the frustration of initiative resulting from this gap between laboratory 
and market, universities in Africa have resorted to taking out patents on their 
inventions, developing the processes themselves and even setting up private
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companies for the utilisation of their new ideas. There are those who would argue 
that that is not part of the function of a university or university research institution. 
That being said, I hasten to add that I am not aware of any significant successes 
attending the effort of any African university to promote its research results by 
going commercial with them.
Against this background, therefore - within this context, my submission and my 
hope is that, especially with its modicum of success in satisfying a great deal of 
the research priorities that it articulated in 1981, the Institute of Southern African 
Studies should now aim for a loftier role than before. And that is the role, not 
only of undertaking research, but of social transformation. Firstly, it should 
reorient the perception of the university at large toward a more relevant and 
systematic research agenda, organization and finance, as well as the promotion of 
a rapid absorption of research findings into productive use. And then the 
university, and not merely the Institute, should undertake the role of social 
transformation - nationally and regionally. Activities of the past two to three years 
at this university have demonstrated clearly that there is sufficient energy, time, 
and resourcefulness to meet a challenge of this magnitude, once all academics 
decide that it should be their priority.
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Institute of Southern African Studies 
was originally intended to be the academic cynosure of the University; and not a 
mere traditional feature of its organizational structure. Let us restore and sharpen 
that original vision. Let us turn it into a visible, vibrant reality.
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